Monument Negative Briefs

The following was created for the 2012-2013 school year in the Stoa speech and debate league. Give due attention to checking all hyperlinks before attempting to run in competition as Monument Publishing does not update this archive information.

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its foreign military presence and/or foreign military commitments.**

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL - Bad idea 3

NEGATIVE BRIEF: CARTER DOCTRINE - good 15

NEGATIVE BRIEF: DRONES ARE GOOD 29

NEGATIVE BRIEF: EGYPT MILITARY AID - good 39

NEGATIVE BRIEF: HONDURAS - good 45

NEGATIVE BRIEF: HORN OF AFRICA/SOMALIA - US needs to stay involved 57

NEGATIVE BRIEF: MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE - good 69

NEGATIVE BRIEF: NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS - Good 83

NEGATIVE BRIEF: NATO WITHDRAWAL - bad idea 101

NEGATIVE BRIEF: PAKISTAN ALLIANCE - good 113

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SAUDI ARABIA - good 121

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SOUTH KOREA 137

NEGATIVE BRIEF: WAR POWERS 149

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL - Bad idea

STATUS QUO DEFENSE

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY: Status Quo policy is working and is the only approach that will work

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan, Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg 2011. (Frederick Kagan is the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute; PhD in Rusian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy. Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War; PhD in history; served on Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategic assessment team. Dressler and Forsberg are research analysts at the Institute for the Study of War.) “Defining Success in Afghanistan” <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AEI_DefiningSuccessinAfghanistan.pdf>

The current American and Coalition strategy is making progress and should be continued. Since President Obama, NATO allies, and the Afghans have agreed that troops will be present in Afghanistan through 2014, the policy does not require substantial modifications at this point. This paper is thus primarily a report on the current situation in Afghanistan and a consideration of some of the prospects and challenges ahead. Our principal recommendation is that the U.S. and its allies should continue to resource and sustain the strategy now being executed, which is the only approach that can secure their vital national security interests in Afghanistan.

Status quo strategy is working, and it’s the only way to deny safe haven to terrorists in Afghanistan

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan, Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg 2011. (Frederick Kagan is the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute; PhD in Rusian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy. Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War; PhD in history; served on Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategic assessment team. Dressler and Forsberg are research analysts at the Institute for the Study of War.) “Defining Success in Afghanistan” <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AEI_DefiningSuccessinAfghanistan.pdf>

It is not possible to deny safe haven to terrorists in Afghanistan without also pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy. The neutralization and ultimate defeat of the insurgency is a necessary prerequisite for preventing the return of al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups that thrive in the political vacuum that the insurgency creates. As long as local networks willing to support extremists exist and can operate freely in Afghanistan, terrorists will be able to use those networks however intense our direct-action operations might be. The current counterinsurgency strategy is the only approach that can disrupt and ultimately eliminate those local networks, thereby preventing the terrorists from returning to Afghanistan and ensuring that America achieves its vital national security objectives.

Military strategy is working: Local governance is improving, enemy attacks are down, insurgent sanctuaries have been cleared

Bruce Riedel & Dr. Michael O’Hanlon 2012. (Riedel - 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe.; former senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council. O’Hanlon - worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office; member of General David Petraeus’s External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency. PhD from Princeton Univ.) “Mission Incomplete” FOREIGN POLICY, 13 Mar 2012<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/13/mission_incomplete?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>

Most of the populated south has been cleared of important insurgent sanctuaries, weapons caches, and improvised-explosive-device fields. Violence was down about one-third in 2011, relative to 2010. There has been at least some progress in the quality of governance, too -- for example under Gov. Mohammad GulabMangal in Helmand, where far more provincial and district offices are now staffed and where citizens now line up at government buildings to request officials' help with their problems and needs. Meanwhile, the deterioration that had occurred in Afghanistan's north and west in recent years has been arrested and partially reversed. Kabul has worsened slightly in statistical terms over the last year, but only modestly: The capital still accounts for less than 1 percent of insurgent attacks nationally, despite containing about 15 percent of the country's population. Overall, enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan are down almost 25 percent over the last few months, relative to the comparable period last year.

Afghan security forces are improving, and will be able to block the Taliban after 2014

Bruce Riedel & Dr. Michael O’Hanlon 2012. (Riedel - 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe.; former senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council. O’Hanlon - worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office; member of General David Petraeus’s External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency. PhD from Princeton Univ.) “Mission Incomplete” FOREIGN POLICY, 13 Mar 2012<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/13/mission_incomplete?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>

Despite the recent rash of tragedies involving Afghan attacks on NATO troops, there are important indicators that Afghan security forces are improving too -- not enough to quell the insurgency, but enough to prevent Taliban reconquest of the country's major cities and transportation routes even after 2014, when U.S. President Barack Obama has announced that the current NATO mission in Afghanistan will end.

INHERENCY

No quagmire and no unending military commitment: We have a clear plan for reducing US role & presence in Afghanistan

Bruce Riedel & Dr. Michael O’Hanlon 2012. (Riedel - 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe.; former senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council. O’Hanlon - worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office; member of General David Petraeus’s External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency. PhD from Princeton Univ.) “Mission Incomplete” FOREIGN POLICY, 13 Mar 2012<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/13/mission_incomplete?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>

So there are reasons for observers to have doubts about the future of the Afghanistan mission. But this is far from a quagmire: Even without further accelerations of the U.S. troop drawdown, there is a clear campaign plan for reducing the U.S. role and presence over the next 30 months. This will happen, for better or worse -- nobody should fear an unending military commitment in Afghanistan.

DISADVANTAGES

Generic Disadvantage Brink: Afghan campaign is on the knife’s edge between success and failure

Dr. Christopher Paul 2012 (PhD sociology; social scientist at the Rand Corporation, a research group) 3 Apr 2012 History Favors More Time, NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/history-shows-that-more-time-is-needed>

We found that in Afghanistan, the government and counterinsurgency forces have realized many positive indicators, like uncontested air dominance, sufficient military strength to force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas, quality intelligence and forces seeking to establish positive relations with the population. But Afghanistan lacks several traits that have been crucial to success historically, like the legitimacy and competence of the imperiled government, and the ability to disrupt or prevent insurgents from obtaining sanctuary and materiel support across borders. The result: the campaign appears poised on a knife's edge between success and failure.

1. Terrorists return.

Link: Speeding up Afghan withdrawal means terrorists will return

KoriSchake 2012. (research fellow at the Hoover Institution; formerly worked in the Pentagon, National Security Council and the State Department) 3 Apr 2012 “Afghan Leaders and Troops Need Time” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/afghan-civic-leaders-and-troops-need-time>

It’s been a discouraging several weeks in the Afghan war, but we absolutely should not speed the pace of our withdrawal. All of the evidence suggests that if we walk away from Afghanistan without securing it, terrorists will return it to what it was in 2000 (or worse), their narratives about American decadence will be reinforced, and America’s trustworthiness as a partner to struggling societies will be badly compromised.

Link: Leaving some troops in Afghanistan after 2014 would allow us to disrupt Al Qaeda

Andrew Exum 2012. (fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He is a U.S. Army veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) 3 Apr 2012 “Some Troops Will Stay Past 2014” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/some-troops-will-have-to-stay-past-2014>

The U.S. military can continue to carry out the president’s policy -- which is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda -- with smaller numbers of troops in Afghanistan. Special operations forces can continue to degrade the leadership of Afghanistan’s insurgent groups on the one hand while providing training and assistance to Afghan government forces on the other hand. The war, then, is not so much ending as transitioning to a period in which U.S. forces hope to fight by, with and through their Afghan allies -- rather than against the Taliban on their own.

Link: We can successfully defeat Al Qaeda if we don’t give up the fight in Afghanistan

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

In other words, the moral case for Afghanistan is not only a matter of our being virtuous for the sake of virtue. Because we increasingly have the heretofore neglected population on our side, we can still win. As a result of the heroic efforts of coalition forces, al-Qaeda has largely been forced to relocate to the tribal areas of Pakistan or outposts in Yemen and Somalia. Still, the Afghan government’s stability is threatened as Taliban forces struggle to retake many districts. They can be stopped. But only if our leaders give our troops free reign to do so and avoid the temptation to give up the fight.

Impact: Global terrorism

Fawzia Koofi 2012.(a woman candidate for the Afghan presidential elections in 2014) April 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Dark Days If the U.S. Left Now <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/dark-days-would-return-if-the-us-left-now>

If the West abandons Afghanistan once again our country will become a playground for global terrorism and a risk to the world. I understand the pressure on President Obama to pull out of an unpopular war at a time of economic crisis. But by pulling out now we risk undoing all the fragile gains of the last 11 years.

Impact: Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan means attack on another big Western city

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan 2012. (PhD in Russian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; resident scholar and the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute) 3 Apr 2012 Al Qaeda Allies Remain Strong, NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/al-qaeda-allies-remain-to-be-defeated-in-the-east>

Ryan Crocker, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, recently told The Telegraph, “Al-Qaeda is still present in Afghanistan. If the West decides that 10 years in Afghanistan is too long then they will be back, and the next time it will not be New York or Washington, it will be another big Western city.”

2. Taliban resurgence

Link & Brink: Military pressure has kept Al Qaeda and Taliban from re-emerging in Afghanistan

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan 2012. (PhD in Russian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; resident scholar and the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute) 3 Apr 2012 Al Qaeda Allies Remain Strong, NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/al-qaeda-allies-remain-to-be-defeated-in-the-east>

Our efforts in Afghanistan aim at preventing Al Qaeda’s return by preventing the Taliban and Haqqani Networks from gaining control of the Afghan state, as well as by preventing the lawlessness and civil war that allow Al Qaeda to flourish globally. Military pressure has kept Al Qaeda and the Taliban from re-emerging in Afghanistan. The Taliban tried to return to their Afghan strongholds after 2005. By 2009, it controlled districts around Kandahar City and poppy-rich Helmand Province. The surge of forces and change of strategy President Obama ordered in 2009 shattered Taliban influence and command structures in the south.

Impact: Brutal repression for Afghan women under the Taliban

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

The Taliban enforced a strict morality code for both men and women, but women and girls bore the brunt of the most brutal repression. Women were prohibited from working outside the home except in certain fields and, in many cases, from leaving their homes unless accompanied by a close male relative. As the group Physicians for Human Rights noted the same year that Leno gave her briefing, “No other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest.” In addition to enforcement of laws requiring women to wear a burka completely covering their bodies, schools for girls were closed and basic health care was often denied. It is not surprising that such a moral wasteland came to serve as the staging ground for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as they planned the attacks of 9/11. Bin Laden’s ideology and that of his Taliban hosts sprang from the same vile swamp.

Impact: Horrific oppression of women by the Taliban

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

In August 2010, after years of both military gains and setbacks, *Time* ran a cover story about an 18-year-old Afghan woman named Aisha. Her nose and ears had been cut off by a Taliban commander for having fled abusive in-laws. Provocatively titled “What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan,” the article and attendant images provoked a discussion about whether the United States was about to abandon the women and girls of Afghanistan to renewed oppression under the Taliban.

Impact: Lack of human rights = more likely to promote terrorism, because they don’t value human life

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

An Afghanistan that does not protect the rights of women, children, and minorities would be a devastating failure for the United States. As Hillary Clinton noted back in 2001, “A post-Taliban Afghanistan where women’s rights are respected is much less likely to harbor terrorists in the future. Why? Because a society that values all its members, including women, is also likely to put a higher premium on life, opportunity, and freedom—values that run directly counter to the evil designs of the Osama bin Ladens of the world.”

3. Quality of Life in Afghanistan

US presence has dramatically improved many aspects of life for millions of Afghans: schools, women’s rights, reduced infant mortality. We can and we have successfully changed Afghan social norms

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

It is understandable that many Americans look at Afghanistan after a decade of war and fail to see past the violence and lawlessness that still rages. But there is another story to this war. Over the last decade, Afghanistan has experienced improvements in almost every area of life. By 2010, according to the U.S. State Department, 35 percent of the 6.2 million students enrolled in Afghan schools were girls, up from zero percent among the fewer than 900,000 students enrolled during Taliban rule. U.S.-funded efforts have assisted the building of schools, the incorporation of women into Afghanistan’s police forces, and the training of female teachers, politicians, lawyers, and judges. There are now 69 female members of the Afghan parliament. Afghanistan has also experienced a sharp decrease in infant and child mortality rates and significant increases in life expectancy for both men and women. These achievements undermine the criticism that our efforts in Afghanistan must fail because we are attempting to change deeply held societal norms and the inherent nature of Islam as practiced in Afghanistan’s tribal society.

4. Corruption in Afghan government.

Link & Brink: 2014 is crucial: US must stay engaged to bring in new Afghan leaders in 2014 to replace current corrupt leaders

Kori Schake 2012. (research fellow at the Hoover Institution; formerly worked in the Pentagon, National Security Council and the State Department) 3 Apr 2012 “Afghan Leaders and Troops Need Time” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/afghan-civic-leaders-and-troops-need-time>

President Karzai is an unsatisfactory partner for our efforts, but we are complicit in his continuing rule, because in one of the major mistakes of the war we validated the corrupt 2009 election that returned him to power. Remaining until 2014 is crucial if we are to usher in new political leaders for Afghanistan and institutionalize power in a society that has rarely known it (Karzai is prevented from standing for election again). Capable governors and mayors and other civic leaders will contest the 2014 elections; what we need to help Afghans do before that is set up the electoral rules and prosecute corruption.

Link & Brink: US assistance is making a difference in reducing corruption, but requires more time and support

Col. Gregory Douquet and Dr Michael O’Hanlon 2010. ( Douquet - student at the Joint Forces Staff College in Virginia and was a member of ISAF's Strategic Analysis Group in Kabul, Afghanistan. O’Hanlon - worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office; member of General David Petraeus’s External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency. PhD from Princeton Univ.)) A Realistic Anticorruption Strategy for Afghanistan, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 13 Oct 2010 <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/realistic-anticorruption-4219>

With U.S. partnering assistance, Afghanistan’s government has improved. We are now seeing points of light in the anticorruption effort, such as President Karzai’s new specialized anticorruption agency—the High Office of Oversight—which is mandated to oversee and coordinate corruption prevention efforts and assist ministries in developing and implementing anticorruption plans and strategies. The President’s anticorruption efforts are in their infancy and will require time and continued support.

Link & Brink: Not time to leave yet - the longer we stay the more we can do to improve success of the Afghan government

Dr. Christopher Paul2012 (PhD sociology; social scientist at the Rand Corporation, a research group) 3 Apr 2012 History Favors More Time, NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/history-shows-that-more-time-is-needed>

The Afghans will have better prospects for defeating their insurgency with continued improvement, of course, and the United States can contribute to that improvement while American forces remain. While a premature departure invites failure, remaining does not guarantee success. Stalemate is a very real possibility. That said, the longer United States forces remain, the better Afghan security forces become, and the more opportunities the Afghan government will have to increase competence, stem corruption and improve governance. Yet there is a point of diminishing returns where America will have to admit that it's done what it can, spent what it's willing to spend, and that it needs to allow the Afghans to move forward and succeed or fail by themselves. That point has not yet been reached, and it may be hard to recognize when it arrives.

Impact: Improved governance is key to blocking terrorism

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan, Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg 2011. (Frederick Kagan is the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute; PhD in Rusian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy. Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War; PhD in history; served on Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategic assessment team. Dressler and Forsberg are research analysts at the Institute for the Study of War.) “Defining Success in Afghanistan” <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AEI_DefiningSuccessinAfghanistan.pdf>

Success therefore requires direct efforts to improve Afghan governance. This is not mission-creep. The objective of improving Afghan governance is strictly required to obtain a stable political order that can survive the withdrawal of international forces. That objective is a core part of President Obama’s oft-repeated goal of preventing Afghanistan from once again degenerating into a safe-haven for al Qaeda and affiliated transnational terrorist and insurgent groups.

Impact: Corruption fuels the insurgency

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan, Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg 2011. (Frederick Kagan is the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute; PhD in Rusian/Soviet military history; former prof. of military history at the U.S. Military Academy. Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War; PhD in history; served on Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategic assessment team. Dressler & Forsberg are research analysts at the Institute for the Study of War.) “Defining Success in Afghanistan” <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AEI_DefiningSuccessinAfghanistan.pdf>

Corruption and abuse-of-power must be addressed by the United States because they fuel the insurgency. Our challenge is not eliminate corruption in Afghanistan but to help the Afghan political leadership behave sufficiently in accord with Pashtun norms that groups that now feel marginalized and preyed-upon see an advantage in at least tolerating the new order.

5. Afghan Civil war

Link & Brink: The moment US troops leave, civil war could break out

Fawzia Koofi 2012. (a woman candidate for the Afghan presidential elections in 2014) April 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Dark Days If the U.S. Left Now <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/dark-days-would-return-if-the-us-left-now>

The moment United States troops leave, we risk being plunged back into the darkness of Taliban rule or even a civil war. Civil war is a distinct possibility because there are many progressive, democratic, peace loving people in my country who would rather die than see us return to those terrible days.

Link: Afghan civil war would allow Al Qaeda to flourish

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan 2012. (PhD in Russian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; resident scholar and the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute) 3 Apr 2012 Al Qaeda Allies Remain Strong, NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/al-qaeda-allies-remain-to-be-defeated-in-the-east>

Our efforts in Afghanistan aim at preventing Al Qaeda’s return by preventing the Taliban and Haqqani Networks from gaining control of the Afghan state, as well as by preventing the lawlessness and civil war that allow Al Qaeda to flourish globally.

Impact: See DA #1. Al Qaeda resurgence = terrorism

6. Peace talks sabotaged.

Link: Premature withdrawal will sabotage reconciliation process

Bruce Riedel & Dr. Michael O’Hanlon 2012. (Riedel - 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe.; former senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council. O’Hanlon - worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office; member of General David Petraeus’s External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency. PhD from Princeton Univ.) “Mission Incomplete” FOREIGN POLICY, 13 Mar 2012 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/13/mission_incomplete?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>

As for peace talks with the Taliban, they are only in their earliest days, and international expectations for success should be limited. But it is an avenue worth exploring, especially given the increasing evidence of tension between the Taliban and their Pakistani patrons. The U.S. relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai -- dysfunctional as it often looks -- is actually more harmonious than the partnership between the Taliban and Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's premier spy agency, on the other side of the hill. Premature withdrawal will sabotage any reconciliation process by suggesting time is on the Taliban's side.

Brink: Sense of stalemate makes it time for political phase of the conflict

LakhdarBrahimi and Thomas R. Pickering 2011. (co-chairs of the Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan. Brahimi twice represented the United Nations in Afghanistan — first during the Taliban regime, where he negotiated with its top leaders, and again after its ouster, when he led the international effort to support a new, more open government. Pickering - served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, India, and Russia, as well as undersecretary of state for political affairs) Afghanistan - Negotiating Peace, The Report of The Century Foundation, International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions <http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/afghanistan-negotiating-peace/AfghanTCFTaskForce%20BookComplete.pdf>

The alliance between the government and the forces deployed by NATO remains a formidable obstacle to any prospect of an outright Taliban victory. This suggests clearly that the war in Afghanistan may already be settling into a stalemate: neither ISAF nor the Afghan government is likely ever to subdue the insurgency in the Pashtun heartland or indeed in other areas of the country where the insurgency is spreading. But the Taliban cannot expect to win control over major cities or the northern half of the country. Neither side can expect to vanquish the other militarily in the foreseeable future. This growing sense of stalemate helps to set the stage for the beginning of a political phase of the conflict.

Brink : Now is the time to negotiate.

Impact: Delaying negotiations will force a higher price for peace in the end

LakhdarBrahimi and Thomas R. Pickering 2011. (co-chairs of the Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan. Brahimi twice represented the United Nations in Afghanistan — first during the Taliban regime, where he negotiated with its top leaders, and again after its ouster, when he led the international effort to support a new, more open government. Pickering - served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, India, and Russia, as well as undersecretary of state for political affairs) Afghanistan - Negotiating Peace, The Report of The Century Foundation, International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions <http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/afghanistan-negotiating-peace/AfghanTCFTaskForce%20BookComplete.pdf>

The large military effort undertaken since 2009 has provided the time and built the platform for achievement of core American objectives in a negotiation. Arriving at Afghanistan’s ultimate arrangements through a negotiating process—in which the United States plays a central role as the country’s most deeply invested ally—would seem now to be in order. Indeed, for all sides, the longer negotiations are delayed, the higher the price is likely to be for restoring peace at the end. Quite apart from the costs of waging war, in lives and money, during the period that leaders continue to put off peace talks, there are other important factors to bear in mind: higher reconstruction costs to repair the inevitably increased destruction from prolongation of war, bloated payrolls for ever-expanding security forces (which, even with a settlement, can safely be demobilized only gradually into a shattered and jobless economy), and the continued hemorrhaging of Afghan talent sufficiently trained to provide public administration or private-sector dynamism.

7. NATO collapse

Link: Withdrawal without victory in Afghanistan means Western security structures could collapse

Boris Gromov & Dmitry Rogozin 2010. Boris Gromov (governor of the Moscow region, commanded the 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan) and Dmitry Rogozin (Russia’s ambassador to NATO) 11 Jan 2010 NEW YORK TIMES, Russian Advice on Afghanistan http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/opinion/12iht-edrogozin.html

That is precisely why the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is the moment of truth for NATO. If the alliance does not accomplish its task, the mutual commitments of its 28 member-states would be undermined and the alliance would lose its moral foundation and raison d’être. We know all too well what happens to unions that become meaningless. The war in Afghanistan was one of the major factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Officials in Brussels and Washington who are thinking of a rapid exit strategy for the ISAF mission are engaged in elaborating on a suicide plan. Withdrawal without victory might cause a political collapse of Western security structures.

Impact: We need NATO for a peaceful world

Prof. Alfred van Staden 2005. (Director, Netherlands Institute of International Relations) , Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," , p. 52-53 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cli_diplomacy_paper_1.pdf> ("which is clearly needs" was misspelled in the original; it should say "which IT clearly needs")

Although in the more distant future China and perhaps India may pose the most serious challenge to American power, in the short term Europe is in the best position to moderate the worst impulses of the US. While the EU is no match to the US in terms of military capabilities, the experience with supporting nascent democracies demonstrates the Union has something to offer America which is clearly needs: an extensive arsenal of civilian foreign-policy tools. Since the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable pillars of the international order, the survival of NATO should be of immediate concern to all those who care about a more peaceful world.

Impact: We need NATO for deterrence, stability and security

Lieutenant-General (retired) J.O. Michel Maisonneuve 2006. (Canadian general; Academic Director, Royal Military College Saint-Jean) “The Necessity of NATO” VANGUARD <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/NecessityOfNATOMaisonneuve>

In summary, NATO has become a leader in the standardization of doctrine, equipment and practice, and an important forum in which to engage Russia and other hemispheric organizations. We need a NATO with the ability to continue its traditional role of deterrence as well as the capability to intervene. While the need for new capacity is huge, a NATO that is visionary, flexible, and expeditionary can be a force for stability and security.

8. Drug trafficking

Impacts of NATO failure in Afghanistan: Boost Islamic militants, destabilize Central Asia, thousands of refugees, more illegal drug trade and heroin drug deaths

Boris Gromov & Dmitry Rogozin 2010.(Gromov - governor of the Moscow region, commanded the 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Rogozin - Russia’s ambassador to NATO) 11 Jan 2010 NEW YORK TIMES, Russian Advice on Afghanistan <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/opinion/12iht-edrogozin.html>

How long would the Afghan government endure today if it were left alone to face the Taliban? A rapid slide into chaos awaits Afghanistan and its neighbors if NATO pulls out, pretending to have achieved its goals. A pullout would give a tremendous boost to Islamic militants, destabilize the Central Asian republics and set off flows of refugees, including many thousands to Europe and Russia. It would also give a huge boost to the illegal drug trade. Opium production in Afghanistan in 2008 came to 7,700 tons, more than 40 times that of 2001, when international forces arrived. If even the ISAF presence could not prevent the explosive growth of Taliban drug dealing, than it is not difficult to understand what a NATO pull-out would lead to. As people in the West count the coffins of NATO soldiers from Afghanistan, let them not forget to include the coffins of Americans and Europeans who were killed by Taliban heroin in their own countries.

9. National dishonor

Link: Abandoning the Afghan people would be dishonorable

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

Similarly, recent decisions to downsize the Afghan security forces need to be reconsidered; and the administration needs to devote a renewed sense of urgency to negotiations with the Afghan government, not the Taliban, over a strategic partnership agreement that makes clear America’s long-term interests in the fate of Afghanistan and its people. American policymakers may very well decide to abandon the Afghan people, but few seem willing to admit how dishonorable that would be.

Link: Failing to defeat the Taliban would be dishonorable and do long-term damage to our national character

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

On February 23, the *New York Times* ran an article with a headline that, in 2002, could have appeared only in a satirical paper such as the *Onion*: “Beheadings Raise Doubts That Taliban Have Changed.” The governing force in Afghanistan in the 1990s performed such beheadings, and bodily mutilations, and deadly stonings, in stadiums and compelled thousands to attend and watch. They are no different today. The moral and strategic imperatives in Afghanistan are one and the same: Defeat the Taliban. Any other course is not only harmful to our national interest but also dishonorable—and will do long-term damage to our national character.

Impact: Honor matters. Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy

George Kourous 2000. (masters thesis for Master of Arts, International Affairs, Center for International Studies, Ohio Univ) SHADOW BOXING: International Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://shadowboxing.kourous.net/2.international.pdf>

The image of the last American helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975 made an indelible impression upon U.S. officials, who worried that America’s failure had worked “to weaken [allies] and embolden...adversaries,” one analyst observes. “[T]he effect was to raise serious doubts about the credibility of American power.” Kissinger later lamented that “[t]he collapse in 1975…ushered in a period of American humiliation, an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe, and pervasive insecurity, instability, and crisis.” And ten years after the fall of Saigon, Richard Nixon wrote that the defeat in Vietnam paralyzed America’s will to act in other Third World trouble spots and therefore encouraged aggression...Over the next five years, Soviet clients and proxy forces unleashed a geopolitical offensive that led to stunning reversals for the United States in virtually every region of the world, [for example] the fall one by one of Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. As Washington’s national security establishment mulled over its failure in Vietnam, the post-Watergate presidency of James Carter tried to chart a foreign policy course that did not assume the inviolability of U.S. commitments as its underlying principle, but which instead sought to substitute a sort of “moral credibility” for the conventional notion of credibility. For many the results proved disastrous and, unsurprisingly, when global events appeared to indicate an increased threat to U.S. interests, the pressured administration quickly returned to more familiar strategies.

10. Drone campaign jeopardized

Link: Faster pull-out from Afghanistan would jeopardize the drone campaign against Al Qaeda

Lisa Curtis 2012. (former member of the professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ; former White House-appointed senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs; worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency; served abroad in the Foreign Service at the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and India) 1 Feb 2012 “Hasty Afghan Troop Drawdown Could Jeopardize Drone Campaign” <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/02/01/hasty-afghan-troop-drawdown-could-jeopardize-drone-campaign/>

The effectiveness of the drone campaign is dictated largely by the degree of access the U.S. has in the region and the kind of relationships it has with the ruling governments. If the U.S. pulls its troops out of Afghanistan too quickly and/or fumbles the negotiation of a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Karzai government that would allow the U.S. to sustain a troop presence after 2014, it will jeopardize its ability to continue effective counterterrorism operations in the region, such as the drone strikes.

Link: Drone strikes have recently taken out many top Al Qaeda leaders

Brink: Drone campaign has put us within reach of defeating Al Qaeda

Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland 2012. Peter Bergen (CNN's national security analyst, is a director at the New America Foundation.) and Jennifer Rowland (a program associate at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank which seeks innovative solutions across the ideological spectrum), March 27, 2012. “CIA drone war in Pakistan in sharp decline,” CNN,<http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/opinion/bergen-drone-decline/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7>

And despite its deteriorating relations with Pakistan, the United States killed a number of key al Qaeda leaders with drone strikes in 2011. Al Qaeda's top operative in Pakistan and purported conduit between the terrorist group and the Pakistani Taliban, Ilyas Kashmiri, was reported killed in a strike on June 4. Then, on August 22, a drone reportedly killed al Qaeda's top operational planner, AtiyahAbd al-Rahman, dealing another heavy blow to the organization. And in September, a drone strike killed Abu Hafs al-Shihri, the man believed to be responsible for planning al Qaeda's operations in the region. The continued success of strikes against al Qaeda's top leaders led Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to declare in July that the United States was "within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda." According to senior U.S. counterterrorism officials, al Qaeda's leadership bench has been so thinned by the drone campaign that there are only two real leaders of the organization left: bin Laden's successor as overall leader of the group, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Yahya al-Libi.

Link: Drone strikes are the most effective tool for destroying Al Qaeda

Lisa Curtis 2011. (former member of the professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ; former White House-appointed senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs; worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency; served abroad in the Foreign Service at the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and India) 29 Aug 2011 “ Drone Strikes Protect America from al-Qaeda’s Terror” <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/29/drone-strikes-protect-america-from-al-qaedas-terror/>

In another major blow to al-Qaeda, a U.S. drone strike last Monday in the North Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan killed the organization’s new number two commander, AtiyahAbd al-Rahman. The successful strike demonstrates the importance of continuing the drone missile campaign along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan as a cornerstone of the mission to degrade and eventually defeat al-Qaeda. Pakistani officials and media outlets regularly criticize the drone missile strikes as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. But the U.S. is highly unlikely to relent in its drone campaign since the tactic has proven to be the most effective tool for the U.S. to destroy al-Qaeda’s leadership and disrupt its ability to plot and train for attacks across the globe.

Impact: Terrorism. Drone attacks on Al Qaeda successfully prevent terrorism against US targets

Dr. James Jay Carafano 2011. (PhD ; graduate of West Point, Carafano holds a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University as well as a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown Univ; director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation ) Drones Save American Lives, 25 Sept 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/09/drones-save-american-lives>

There is a reason White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan recently felt confident enough to declare that al-Qaida was “on the ropes.” Progress came from taking the offensive. A decade of strenuous effort to disrupt terrorist sanctuaries, take out leaders, pre-empt planning and operations, disaggregate networks, thwart terrorist travel and communications, and disrupt fundraising and recruiting is paying off. And, without question, the drone missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas have helped put al-Qaida on the defensive. Similar operations conducted against an al-Qaida affiliate in Yemen have paid dividends as well. The results speak for themselves. Successful terrorist attacks on U.S. targets — both at home and overseas — have been on a continual rate of decline since 2005.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: CARTER DOCTRINE - good

**(Megan McKinley contributed some of the evidence in this brief)**

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Carter Doctrine is not obsolete: It’s even more vital now than in 1980

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress; M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, <http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf/++atfield++file>

Despite a changed strategic context, the Carter Doctrine has not become obsolete. Indeed, given the increasing interconnectedness of economic development and resources, it is even more vital now than in 1980 that the United States and the global community be assured of access to the Middle East’s primary energy resource. Moreover, the United States is still the only country with the means and the will to take the leadership in protecting this lifeblood flowing from the greater Middle East.

US has vital interest in preventing hostile powers from exercising hegemony in the Middle East and will need to use force to continue the flow of oil

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that no hostile power exercises hegemony over the Middle East, which is not only a key region for energy production, global trade, and investment, but also a potential source of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The U.S. will likely need to selectively use force to ensure the continued flow of oil from the region, as it did in Operation Desert Storm. Securing the oil fields and supporting allies, especially GCC members and pro- American elements in Saudi Arabia, may be imperative.

The US should continue its military presence in the gulf.

Anthony H. Cordesman 2011( holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies. has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies; consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense; also served in in the State Department and on NATO International Staff) April 14, 2011 “U.S. Strategy in the Gulf” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-strategy-gulf>

The US must assure its partners in the Southern Gulf that it will stay in the region, and maintain a strong and active presence in the bases and facilities the US is allowed to use in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The US should reinforce the fact that it does not want to leave any key facility or access capability it the Gulf. It should not leave any fears that it will not make use of such facilities to protect the host country, and it should – wherever possible – seek to work as a partner with host country forces, rather than turn to a US-only approach.

The US needs to improve its relations in the gulf, not harm them.

Anthony H. Cordesman 2011( holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies. has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies; consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense; also served in in the State Department and on NATO International Staff) April 14, 2011 “U.S. Strategy in the Gulf” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-strategy-gulf>

The US will have to rebalance its relationships with every Southern Gulf state, restore their confidence and trust that the US will stay engaged in the region in spite of calls for budget cuts. The US will also have to restore their trust that it will support them in dealing with key security issues at a time when some regional leaders feel the US effectively abandoned Mubarak. At some level, the US will also have to establish a new approach to balancing its strategic interest with efforts to help each Southern Gulf state deal with the need for reform and a reduction in internal political tensions. Such efforts may work best as the result of quiet, low profile work by the country teams in each embassy, but the US cannot simply be passive and focus on security.

No other country can defend Saudi Arabia - they’ve already tried

Dr. David Ottaway 2011. ( PhD in political science; Senior Scholar in the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Uncle Sam and the Saudi Split, FOREIGN POLICY, 23 Sept 2011<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/uncle_sam_and_the_saudi_split?page=0,1>

It is worth remembering that Saudi King Abdullah became so furious with President George W. Bush just before 9/11 that he wrote an angry letter warning that if Washington did not do something quickly to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Saudi Arabia intended to freeze its relations with Washington and go its own way. Bush scrambled to pacify the king, but the presence of 15 Saudis among the 9/11 hijackers so traumatized both countries that their relations effectively froze anyway. King Abdullah then cast about for other political and military partners that could replace the United States, engaging in an exchange of visits with the leaders of China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. But he soon discovered that none was likely, or even militarily capable, of coming to the kingdom's rescue the way the United States had done when Iraqi forces rolled across Kuwait to the Saudi border in August 1990.

“Saudis can defend themselves” - Response: Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself

Prof. David Lake 2012. (department of political science, Univ of Calif-San Diego) Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy, Mar 2012, <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeLegitimatingPowercirc.pdf>

As proven in 1991, despite billions of dollars of sophisticated weapons purchased from the United States, Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself against the regional forces potentially arrayed against it. This holds even more so for Kuwait, which was overrun by Iraq in one night, and the Emirates, which are equally vulnerable because of their tiny size.

“We would have other reasons to defend those countries even without oil” - Response: Other than oil, we don’t have strategic interests in the region

Prof. David Lake 2012. (department of political science, Univ of Calif-San Diego) Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy, Mar 2012, <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeLegitimatingPowercirc.pdf>

Nonetheless, through more covert ties and the implicit dependence of many regimes in the region on the protection of the United States, Washington exerts considerable authority over the foreign security and economic policies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates, and others, now including Iraq and Afghanistan. Real security hierarchy is likely greater than these imperfect measures suggest. The gains for the United States from these hierarchies are hard to estimate but likely limited. The United States is deeply involved at present in providing regional stability, which produces, first and foremost, a secure supply of oil at moderate prices for itself and its other subordinates around the world. This appears to be the primary benefit to the United States. Other than oil security, it is difficult to see what strategic interests the United States has in the region that are not otherwise connected to the effort to create international hierarchies themselves.

HARMS

US military presence stabilizes the region

Minor Repair: Stability requires military presence plus more engagement with Iran. Let’s keep status quo military presence plus increase our diplomacy with Iran, instead of dropping the Carter Doctrine

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress, working with Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb. He earned an M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, <http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf/++atfield++file>

The U.S. military presence in the region does serve as a deterrent to hostile actions by violent extremists and aggressive state actors, and so it is a force that helps to provide stability in a volatile region. Our military presence in the region has remained robust for the past thirty years. It grew substantially after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and then again after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. But, by itself, it has not been able to produce anything close to sustainable regional stability, which is why it is imperative that our military efforts be matched by sustained diplomatic and economic engagement with all the regional states, including Iran.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Regional Instability

Link: Persian Gulf region has threats to stability - Carter Doctrine ensures stability

Link: World markets react swiftly to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies

Notes & Analysis: Even “perceived” interruptions can cause problems in world oil markets. There doesn’t have to be a big war breaking out, just concerns or perceptions can cause oil price impacts. That’s why we need the Carter Doctrine to stabilize the region and minimize the fear of disruptions.

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress, working with Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb. He earned an M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, <http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf/++atfield++file>

We know from past and present experience just how swiftly world markets react to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies. That is one reason why it is in the interest of the United States and the international community to promote and maintain stability in the region where the majority of the world’s chief source of crude oil is produced. The main reason for President Carter’s declaration twenty-eight years ago—fear of encroachment on the Straits of Hormuz by the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan at the height of the cold war—no longer exists. Yet the need to protect the free flow of oil from the region is even more critical today than it was three decades ago. In 1980, the United States produced 3.1 billion barrels of oil a year and imported 1.9 billion. Today, the United States produces only 1.9 billion barrels a year and imports 3.7 billion, and new challenges threatening regional stability have emerged and in some ways have grown more difficult.

Impact: Oil price spikes cause great economic damage

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST<http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

Nonetheless, whether driven by demand or supply, a large enough spike in the price of oil can do great damage. Economists call such abrupt responses “non-linearities” and they suggest that when the price rises fast enough, consumers and businesses trim their spending and investment plans. This is often because prices are driven by other factors that hurt confidence, such as wide unrest in the Middle East. If another Arab government were toppled, pushing the oil price over $150, the economic impact would almost certainly be larger than the 0.5% to 1% of GDP that simple extrapolation suggests.

2. Strait of Hormuz sea lanes

Link: Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, which carries 17 million barrels/day of oil

David Blair 2012. (journalist) 23 Jan 2012 “Iran threatens to close Strait of Hormuz over EU oil sanctions” THE TELEGRAPH (British newspaper) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9032948/Iran-threatens-to-close-Strait-of-Hormuz-over-EU-oil-sanctions.html>

Britain, America and France delivered a pointed signal to Iran, sending six warships led by a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier through the highly sensitive waters of the Strait of Hormuz. The naval deployment, led by an aircraft carrier, defied explicit Iranian threats to close the waterway. It coincided with an escalation in the West's confrontation with Iran over the country's nuclear ambitions. The EU embargo on Iranian oil exports, amounts to the most significant package of sanctions yet agreed. They are also likely to impose a partial freeze on assets held by the Iranian Central Bank in the EU. Tehran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation. Tankers carrying 17 million barrels of oil pass through this waterway every day, accounting for 35 per cent of the world's seaborne crude shipments.

Link: US military action would be needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz and stabilize oil prices

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

Iranian threats to block oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, if acted upon, could disrupt the global energy supply and cause oil prices to spike. However, as this report suggests, this scenario is relatively short term. It leaves the oil-producing infrastructure intact, and prices would stabilize if military action, led by the United States, and a coordinated international response successfully restore security to the sea-lanes.

Impact: Oil price shocks hurt the US and world economy

Dr. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Kai-Wei Hsu 2012. (Chen - PhD economics; professor of economics at National Taiwan University; Hsu - economics department, National Taiwan University) Reverse Globalization: Does High Oil Price Volatility Discourage International Trade? Jan 2012, <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36182/1/MPRA_paper_36182.pdf>

It has been shown that the dramatic rise in oil prices during the 1970s was associated with subsequent economic downturns. Although there is some debate as to whether oil price shocks are the main cause of recessions, Hamilton (2009b) asserts that the latest surge in oil prices between June 2007 and June 2008 was an important factor that contributed to the economic recession that began in the US in 2007:Q4. Moreover, a number of recent studies show that oil price shocks have significant effects on a variety of domestic economic activities. An increase in oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a), Cologni and Manera (2008), and Lardic and Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

If the supply situation worsens, opportunities for this type of substitution will be fewer, creating supply bottlenecks, shortages of petrol and spikes within price spikes for different crudes and products, even when spare capacity remains. The price differential of about $15 a barrel that has built up between Brent crude, which more closely reflects global trade, and West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for oil prices in America, is a good example of how oil markets can become distorted by local patterns of supply and demand. If supply gets even more stretched, oil could fetch a far higher price in some parts of the world than others. If supply problems become really grave, oil companies may even declare *force majeure*, raising the prospect that, as in 1978, oil markets fail altogether.

3. Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia. “Arab Spring” refers to the events that occurred in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt where their dictatorial governments were overthrown by popular movements. This Disad argues that the same thing will happen in Saudi Arabia sooner or later, and the US had better be prepared to act with our military in the region when it does.

Link: Saudi’s days are numbered. The Saudi regime is in trouble with its own people because of corruption and disrespect for human rights, and they will be hit with popular wrath like others in the region

Erick Stakelbeck 2012. (journalist) 5 Mar 2012 Why the Saudis' Downfall Could Impact America , CBN NEWS, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2012/March/Why-the-Saudis-Downfall-Could-Impact-America/>

Then, after governments fell in Tunisia and Egypt, the Saudi royals moved to appease their own restless subjects with billions of dollars in new welfare and housing programs. "It is absolutely bribery. That's what it is. When this uprising started, they started getting nervous," said Dr. Ali Alyami, of the Washington-based Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia. Alyami believes the Royal Family's days are numbered. "The Saudi people suffer from corruption, lack of political freedom, lack of religious freedom, lack of press freedom, injustice, no accountability, no transparency," he told CBN News. "So the same problems that led all of these Arabs to take to the streets are in Saudi Arabia," Alyami said. "So regardless of all the bribes -- they know it, actually -- they are not going to be spared the wrath of the people."

Link: Arab Spring uprising in Saudi Arabia could eliminate 8.4 million barrels/day, significantly affect global energy markets and world economy. US needs to be prepared

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A complete disruption of Saudi oil production (8.4 million barrels per day) caused by an “Arab Spring” uprising would significantly affect global energy markets and overall economic activity. The United States needs to prepare domestic and international measures before such a disruption of the energy supply and be prepared to secure its access to foreign and domestic oil resources. This preparation will enable the U.S. to lead effectively during such a crisis.

Brink: Saudi Arabia dominates the oil market

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

The Saudi Kingdom is the largest oil producer in the world—occasionally surpassed by Russia—and essentially dominates the oil market due to its large excess production capacity, which it can ramp up to 12 mbd. A prolonged and massive disruption of Saudi oil production would significantly affect global energy markets and economic activity.

Link & Impact: US military power in the Persian Gulf would prevent a political and economic disaster. Following in context from the comments above about the risk of an Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia, Cohen, Kreutzer, Phillips & Bendikova in 2012 go on to conclude:

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

The United States should maintain a military force structure that can project U.S. power into the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. This along with using U.S. influence in international institutions to secure the release of members’ strategic petroleum reserves would help to prevent a political and economic disaster in the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Impact: Losing 5.4 million barrels/day would lose $214 billion from US economy, 1.5 million jobs

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

However, the initial shock of the net loss of 5.4 mbd in the petroleum market has a corresponding impact on the U.S. economy with the greatest impacts occurring in the first two years. Over the first two years, U.S. GDP loses $214 billion per year. Employment averages 1.1 million jobs below the baseline, bottoming out at more than 1.5 million lost jobs in the second quarter of the second year.

4. Loss of US credibility

Link: Lack of US commitment to allies in the Middle East would cause loss of credibility in time of crisis

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A crisis in Saudi Arabia would have drastic implications for the United States, its economy, and the whole world. The optimistic scenario modeled here presupposes a one-year cessation of production followed by a two-year recovery. In the real world, the exact length of the recovery period is difficult to predict. Gasoline prices would rise from $3.95 to more than $6.50 per gallon, petroleum prices would rise from $100 per barrel to more than $220 per barrel, employment losses would exceed 1.5 million jobs, and U.S. GDP would drop by a total of nearly $450 billion. Based on prior Heritage energy simulation exercises, in such a scenario the United States would fail to actively engage its bilateral partners to prevent its adversaries from exploiting this crisis and harming global U.S. and allied interests. This would likely lead to the loss of American credibility with its partners and adversaries aroundthe world. U.S. allies would expect tangible actions and clear commitments from the United States, especiallyduring a global crisis such as the collapse of Saudi oil production. A United States that lacks a proactive international policy that promptly reaches out to its allies and friends would be perceived as weak.

Impact: Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy

George Kourous 2000. (masters thesis for Master of Arts, International Affairs, Center for International Studies, Ohio Univ) SHADOW BOXING: International Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://shadowboxing.kourous.net/2.international.pdf>

The image of the last American helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975 made an indelible impression upon U.S. officials, who worried that America’s failure had worked “to weaken [allies] and embolden...adversaries,” one analyst observes. “[T]he effect was to raise serious doubts about the credibility of American power.” Kissinger later lamented that “[t]he collapse in 1975…ushered in a period of American humiliation, an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe, and pervasive insecurity, instability, and crisis.” And ten years after the fall of Saigon, Richard Nixon wrote that the defeat in Vietnam paralyzed America’s will to act in other Third World trouble spots and therefore encouraged aggression...Over the next five years, Soviet clients and proxy forces unleashed a geopolitical offensive that led to stunning reversals for the United States in virtually every region of the world, [for example] the fall one by one of Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. As Washington’s national security establishment mulled over its failure in Vietnam, the post-Watergate presidency of James Carter tried to chart a foreign policy course that did not assume the inviolability of U.S. commitments as its underlying principle, but which instead sought to substitute a sort of “moral credibility” for the conventional notion of credibility. For many the results proved disastrous and, unsurprisingly, when global events appeared to indicate an increased threat to U.S. interests, the pressured administration quickly returned to more familiar strategies.

5. Vulnerable Saudi oil facilities.

Link: The US is currently helping to protect Saudi Arabian oil.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13635972#.T4X51KtSTzM>

Despite their deepening political divide, the United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding defense ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to protect the kingdom's oil riches and future nuclear sites. The U.S. also is in discussions with Saudi Arabia to create an air and missile defense system with far greater capability against the regional rival the Saudis fear most, Iran. And it is with Iran mainly in mind that the Saudis are pressing ahead with a historic $60 billion arms deal that will provide dozens of new U.S.-built F-15 combat aircraft likely to ensure Saudi air superiority over Iran for years.

Link: Saudi Arabian oil facilities are vulnerable to attack.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13635972#.T4X51KtSTzM>

The Saudis' security worries were heightened by a failed al-Qaida car bombing in February 2006 of the Abqaiq oil processing facility, one of the largest in the world. The State Department cable said a subsequent U.S. assessment of Abqaiq security standards determined that it remained "highly vulnerable to other types of sophisticated terrorist attacks." That warning was conveyed to top Saudi officials on Oct. 27, 2008. "The Saudis remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy production facilities," the cable said. "They recognize many of their energy facilities remain at risk from al-Qaida and other terrorists who seek to disrupt the global economy."

Brink: Even the smallest disruption would have a large impact on supply.

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” (brackets added) THE ECONOMIST<http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

The crucial question is how much oil will be lost, and for how long. When oil markets operate at the limits of supply, even the smallest extra disruption has a disproportionate effect. On February 26th, for example, Iraq’s biggest refinery shut down after a terrorist attack. This and other assaults could knock out another 500,000 b/d [barrels per day] from the world’s fuel supplies. And if the raids on oil installations in previous elections in Nigeria are anything to go by, the next one, in April, may threaten another 1m b/d of supplies from west Africa. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia remains far from secure (see article).

Brink: Saudi Arabia is the focal point of the global oil market.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 266.7 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia produced roughly 8.6 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil as of late December 2010, an increase over the prevailing level for most of 2009 and 2010, but well below the record high production of 9.7 million bpd in mid-2008. Saudi oil reserves, oil exports, and spare oil production capacity make the kingdom the focal point for the global oil market, and recent political unrest in the Middle East has contributed to market concerns and price increases. Saudi Aramco recently completed a multi-year, multi-billion dollar production capacity expansion project that raised its daily crude oil production capacity to 12.5 million bpd. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of December 2010, Saudi Arabia was the third largest source of U.S oil imports, about 1.1 million bpd of 11.1 million bpd gross U.S. imports, behind only Canada and Mexico.

Impact: Collapse of Saudi oil production = deep economic impact around the world

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs.Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012<http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A collapse of Saudi oil production would drastically affect global energy and the economic situation. The economic performance of national economies around the world would suffer, with some falling into deep recession.

Impact: Global economic downturn.

Gavyn Davies 2011 (Gavyn Davies is a macroeconomist who is now chairman of Fulcrum Asset Management and co-founder of Prisma Capital Partners. He was the head of the global economics department at Goldman Sachs from 1987-2001, and was chairman of the BBC from 2001-2004. He has also served as an economic policy adviser in No 10 Downing Street, an external adviser to the British Treasury, and as a visiting professor at the London School of Economics.) February 24, 2011 “How big is the 2011 oil price shock?” FINANCIAL TIMES BLOG<http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2011/02/24/how-big-is-the-2011-oil-price-shock/>

Each of the last five major downturns in global economic activity has been immediately preceded by a major spike in oil prices. Sometimes (e.g. in the 1970s and in 1990), the surge in oil prices has been due to supply restrictions, triggered by OPEC or by war in the Middle East. Other times (e.g. in 2008), it has been due to rapid growth in the demand for oil. But in both cases the contractionary effects of higher energy prices have eventually proven too much for the world economy to shrug off.

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

If the supply situation worsens, opportunities for this type of substitution will be fewer, creating supply bottlenecks, shortages of petrol and spikes within price spikes for different crudes and products, even when spare capacity remains. The price differential of about $15 a barrel that has built up between Brent crude, which more closely reflects global trade, and West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for oil prices in America, is a good example of how oil markets can become distorted by local patterns of supply and demand. If supply gets even more stretched, oil could fetch a far higher price in some parts of the world than others. If supply problems become really grave, oil companies may even declare *force majeure*, raising the prospect that, as in 1978, oil markets fail altogether.

6. Rise of Iran.

Link: US military presence in the region is key to deterring Iran’s aggression

Lawrence Korb& Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress, working with Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb. He earned an M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, <http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf/++atfield++file>

There is no doubt that U.S. military power will remain a vital component of any future comprehensive strategy to ensure stability. Iran, for example, will be less likely to take a more aggressive stance in its quest to project militarily its own influence across the region if there is a U.S. military presence ready to counter it. A U.S. military force that is light, flexible, and ready will clearly provide a counterbalance to any potential use by Iran of its own military power.

Link: All the Persian Gulf states are worried about defending themselves against Iran

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power”<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

Despite the foregoing, the organizing principle of every Arab Gulf country’s defense posture is the same: Iran. As one Saudi royal put it bluntly, “Iran is everybody’s problem.” By far the most populous of the region’s states, Iran’s imperial past, its presumed ambitions, and its supposed ties to the Shi‘ite communities scattered around the Gulf make it a constant source of worry. As one senior Gulf royal commented in 2007 when discussing Sunni-Shi‘ite tensions, “You don’t understand. Iran has only been Shi‘ite for 500 years. It has been Persian for millennia.”

Link & Brink: No other country has the capability to provide security in the Persian Gulf

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power”<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

Beneath the surface, however, is an appreciation of how much of the region’s security order is a consequence of U.S. action and how little ability any other country or collection of countries has to do anything close to what the United States does. While there is fear for the future of the U.S. role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the military resources or the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons.

Link: US commitment to the region is necessary and key to managing Iran

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power”<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

For many in the Gulf, the rise and decline of U.S. power in absolute terms is a largely academic exercise. Within the neighborhood, the U.S. role is both necessary and durable. More significant is the question of U.S. relative power in the Gulf, especially as it helps shape Iranian action. Most important, however, is ensuring a sense among the parties in the Gulf that their region remains one of principal concern to the United States. An overwhelmingly powerful United States that deemphasized the region would provoke a profound realignment; yet, even a diminished United States that is committed to the region would be overwhelmingly more powerful than any other party and would shape political alignments for years into the future.

Link: Iran is increasing its offensive capabilities

Anthony H. Cordesman 2010( holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies; consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense; also served in in the State Department and on NATO International Staff) September 14, 2010 “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-saudi-security-cooperation-and-impact-us-arms-sales>

Iran remains an emerging challenge. It is deeply involved in strategic competition with the United States and its friends and allies in the region. It is developing steadily better capabilities to attack shipping, targets in the Gulf, and targets on the Saudi and southern Gulf coast, and it is using asymmetric warfare in doing so. It is fielding significant long-range missile forces and may acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States is to deter other regional states from proliferation in reaction to Iran, and make its statements about offering “extended regional deterrence” a credible option, it must show it will do its best to create effective regional partners in the southern Gulf, as well as try to build a strategic partnership with Iraq.

Impact: Terrorism and confrontation. Iran foments terrorism and confrontation in the region

Dr. Ariel Cohen and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation) Iran’s Menace in Azerbaijan, 16 Mar 2012<http://blog.heritage.org/2012/03/16/irans-menace-in-azerbaijan/>

Iranians are not only operating terrorist networks on Azerbaijani territory, but are also allegedly behind the 2006 murder of RafikTagi, a prominent Azeri writer against whom an Iranian ayatollah issued a fatwa sentencing him to death. The third wave of anti-terrorist arrests since the beginning of the year is seen as a reprisal by Baku to signal to Iran to “play by the rules.” Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been steadily deteriorating as Azerbaijan continues to develop its ties to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States has been leading the effort to impose sanctions to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. It is possible that Iran is growing more wary and aggressive as sanctions start to bite. Azerbaijan is not the only country in the region that Iran targets. Iranian intelligence and its Hezbollah subsidiary recently conducted operations against Israeli targets in Tbilisi, Georgia, New Delhi, and Bangkok. According to some experts, Iran is wary of a major confrontation and wants to provoke Israel into smaller confrontations, because it needs an external threat around which it can organize its increasingly dissatisfied population.

7. End of the Petrodollar

Link: Affirmative removes US military protection from Saudi Arabia

Link: The “Petrodollar” arrangement. Saudi pricing of oil in dollars depends on US military protection

Jerry Robinson 2012 (Economist, holds a Bachelor's degree in Economics with Honors from the University of Tulsa. He has taught a course in macroeconomics at the college level. In addition, appeared on numerous TV and radio programs, including FoxNews, to discuss global economic topics. Robinson has been quoted by USA Today and other news agencies on the topic of the economy, and his columns have appeared regularly in numerous print and web publications) April 19, 2012 “Meet the System That Will Collapse the U.S. Dollar (Part 1)” FTM DAILY<http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/>

The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970’s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. In a series of highly secret meetings, the U.S. – represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to many commentators – and the Saudi Royal Family made a powerful agreement. According to the agreement, the U.S. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. What did the U.S. want in exchange? For Saudi Arabia to agree to price all of their oil sales in U.S. dollars and to then invest their surplus oil proceeds into U.S. Treasury Bills. This system was later referred to as “petrodollar recycling” by Henry Kissinger. The Saudis agreed and the petrodollar system was born.

Link: Petrodollar Policy established the US dollar’s status as a world reserve currency

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

What saved the greenback after Nixon removed the U.S. dollar from the gold standard in 1971 — ending the post-war Bretton Woods international financial order — was the status of U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. This began with Saudi Arabia agreeing in 1973 to accept only U.S. dollars as payment for oil in exchange for U.S. protection of the Saudi monarchy and its oilfields. By 1975, the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar was firmly established, with OPEC members agreeing to trade only in dollars. Trading of other commodities came to be priced in dollars, which reinforced the reserve currency status of the dollar.

Link & Brink: Collapse of the dollar is closer than we realize as erosion of the dollar as a reserve currency happens while the federal debt grows

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

On March 29, the China Development Bank agreed with its BRICS' counterparts to eschew dollar lending and extend credit to each other in their own respective currencies. The erosion and loss of the use of the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency means less demand and more dollar selling by central banks around the world, which in turn causes inflation as the dollar weakens against other currencies. Worse, the demise of the dollar's reserve currency status at the same time that federal debt compounds to new heights creates a perfect storm, making a collapse of the dollar closer than most Americans realize.

Impact: $225 billion impact on US economy

Dr. Barry Eichengreen 2011. (PhD; professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley) Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End 1 Mar 2011 WALL STREET JOURNAL Foreign Exchange Report <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html>

Conversely, life will become easier for European and Chinese banks and companies, which will be able to do more of their international business in their own currencies. The same will be true of companies in other countries that do most of their business with China or Europe. It will be a considerable convenience—and competitive advantage—for them to be able to do that business in yuan or euros rather than having to go through the dollar. U.S. Impact In this new monetary world, moreover, the U.S. government will not be able to finance its budget deficits so cheaply, since there will no longer be as big an appetite for U.S. Treasury securities on the part of foreign central banks. Nor will the U.S. be able to run such large trade and current-account deficits, since financing them will become more expensive. Narrowing the current-account deficit will require exporting more, which will mean making U.S. goods more competitive on foreign markets. That in turn means that the dollar will have to fall on foreign-exchange markets—helping U.S. exporters and hurting those companies that export to the U.S. My calculations suggest that the dollar will have to fall by roughly 20%. Because the prices of imported goods will rise in the U.S., living standards will be reduced by about 1.5% of GDP—$225 billion in today's dollars. That is the equivalent to a half-year of normal economic growth. While this is not an economic disaster, Americans will definitely feel it in the wallet.

8. Mid-East Nuclear Arms Race

Link: Affirmative removes security guarantees from the Persian Gulf region

Link: US security keeps nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia

Michael Miner 2011. ( teaching fellow at Harvard Univ.; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and International Society for Iranian Studies) 18 Dec 2011 “Strategic Clarity and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran” FRONTLINE <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/opinion-strategic-clarity-and-the-prospect-of-a-nuclear-iran.html>

Saudi Arabia represents the most likely state to begin a nuclear program in response to developments in Iran. Riyadh may not feel that a U.S. alliance is adequate enough defense on its own accord. With significant pressure from allies and increased security reassurances, these anxieties can be dealt with through political and economic policies. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and given substantial investment in the United States of Saudi assets, it seems reasonable that strategic alliances and guarantees would be adequate to keep nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia.

Brink: Saudi Arabia fears Iran getting a nuclear bomb and is considering building one of its own

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power”<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf> (brackets in original)

Speaking with Western researchers, a senior Saudi diplomat said in 2006 that the best way for the Gulf to respond to an Iranian nuclear capability would be “with another nuclear weapon.” “We are naked,” a Saudi prince recently complained. “We are surrounded by a country that already has a nuclear capability [Israel], and a country that is building it [Iran].”

Impact: Nuclear war. Mid East countries would deploy nuclear weapons with the intention of using them

Dr. Richard L. Russell 2010. (PhD; Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and Adjunct Professor of Security Studies in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University) “Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race” NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY 3rd Quarter 2010 <http://www.ndu.edu/press/middle-east-nuclear-arms-race.html>

Another key determinant for nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East is the desire for nuclear weapons to wage war. This view may be startling to observers who judge that nuclear weapons are only good for deterrence and not for warfighting. But the history of nuclear weapons development shows otherwise. The United States and its NATO Allies during the Cold War deployed nuclear weapons in Europe not as some grand deterrent bluff, but because they intended to use them if the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Western Europe with conventional forces. The United States and its Allies worried that Warsaw Pact forces outnumbered and outgunned NATO forces, so the Alliance would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to blunt a conventional invasion. Middle Eastern states will probably be making similar calculations. Saudi Arabia, for example, might come to think that the early use of nuclear weapons against Iranian forces invading through Kuwait would be wiser statecraft than letting those forces get an operational foothold in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where a largely Shia population is alienated from the Sunni Saudi regime and is sympathetic to Iran.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: DRONES ARE GOOD

**(Matthew Baker contributed some of the evidence in this brief)**

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Congress and Courts should NOT micromanage war tactics like use of drones

Killing US citizens who joined Al Qaeda overseas is permissible under laws of war

David Rittgers 2010. (law degree, U. of N. Carolina; legal policy analyst for Cato Institute; served in the United States Army as an Infantry and Special Forces officer, including three tours in Afghanistan; won two Bronze Stars) “Both Left and Right Are Wrong about Drones” 25 Feb 2010 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/both-left-right-are-wrong-about-drones>

Liberal critics should refrain from erroneously labeling drone strikes as "nonjudicial killings." Even the most controversial drone strikes—those that kill American citizens who have joined al Qaeda affiliates overseas—are permissible under the laws of war. Neither Congress nor the courts should micromanage tactical decisions such as whether the president can order soldiers to seize a particular hill or employ a certain weapon. Referring to drone strikes as "nonjudicial" implies that the courts should be given the ability to rule out specific drone attacks. Vetting these targets for accuracy of intelligence and minimization of collateral damage is essential, and the record continues to improve on that front.

TOPICALITY

1. “Military” versus CIA.

Link: Drones are operated by the CIA

Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School 2011. (Co-directed by Prof. Sarah Cleveland, Counselor on International Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department; and Prof. Peter Rosenblum, a former human rights officer with the Geneva-based precursor to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Right) “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” 25 Mar 2011 <http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf>

While the U.S. government has not officially confirmed or denied the involvement of the CIA in conducting targeting practices using drones, the role of CIA personnel has been widely reported. Observers suggest that the CIA almost exclusively controls targeting operations in northwest Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia—as well as playing a role in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Link: CIA is not part of the US armed forces

Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School 2011. (Co-directed by Prof. Sarah Cleveland, Counselor on International Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department; and Prof. Peter Rosenblum, a former human rights officer with the Geneva-based precursor to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Right) “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” 25 Mar 2011 (brackets in original) <http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf>

Hypothetically, the U.S. government could incorporate the CIA into its armed forces, but there is no indication that it has done so. To the contrary, as Lieutenant Colonel Mark Maxwell notes, “paramilitary operatives are not members of the Armed Forces and cannot be incorporated into the force by some procedural fiat” since “[u]nder congressional dicta, an individual must meet specific criteria to be a member of the U.S. Armed Forces and bind[] himself, via contract to certain obligations.”

Link: CIA are civilians

Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School 2011. (Co-directed by Prof. Sarah Cleveland, Counselor on International Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department; and Prof. Peter Rosenblum, a former human rights officer with the Geneva-based precursor to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Right) “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” 25 Mar 2011 <http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf>

Nonetheless, it is notable that state practice supports formal, open incorporation of paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies, rather than secret incorporation. Thus, as Schmitt has emphasized, “non-incorporated paramilitary and law enforcement agencies are civilian in nature for the purposes of humanitarian law.” If they are not members of the armed forces, CIA personnel could be considered civilians directly participating in hostilities. Indeed, a wide spectrum of commentators regard them as such, although their analyses vary.

Violation: Resolution says “military” presence or commitments. Affirmative is changing the behavior of civilians, not military.

Impacts:

1. No solvency or advantages. All benefits of the Affirmative case relating to CIA drones must be dropped from the round, because the Affirmative had no right to introduce those issues in today’s debate.

2. Abusive to the Negative.The Negative team came here prepared to debate changes to US military presence and commitments. There was no way we could have known nor prepared for debating other issues outside the resolution, and it’s abusive and unfair to expect us to do so. We spent a lot of time preparing to debate the resolution and you, Judge, came here expecting a debate about the military. The best way to encourage the Affirmative not to do this in the future is to award a Negative ballot.

INHERENCY

CIA drone strikes in Pakistan plummet in 2012

Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland 2012. Peter Bergen (CNN's national security analyst, is a director at the New America Foundation. His book "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden; From 9/11 to Abbottabad" will be published on May 1) and Jennifer Rowland (a program associate at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank which seeks innovative solutions across the ideological spectrum), March 27, 2012. “CIA drone war in Pakistan in sharp decline,” CNN,<http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/opinion/bergen-drone-decline/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7>

“The past year has seen the number of CIA drone strikes in Pakistan plummet. In the first three months of 2012, there were 11, compared with 21 in the first three months of 2011 and a record 28 in the first quarter of 2010.”

“Civilian casualties” - Drone strikes are becoming more precise and discriminating

Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland 2012. Peter Bergen (CNN's national security analyst, is a director at the New America Foundation) and Jennifer Rowland (a program associate at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank which seeks innovative solutions across the ideological spectrum), March 27, 2012. “CIA drone war in Pakistan in sharp decline,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/opinion/bergen-drone-decline/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7>

“At the New America Foundation, we maintain an up-to-date database of every reported drone strike in Pakistan's tribal regions since 2004. We monitor reports about the strikes from the top Western and Pakistani news sources, such as The New York Times, Associated Press, CNN, Reuters, Express Tribune, Dawn, Geo TV and others. According to our data, 7% of the fatalities resulting from drone strikes in 2011 were civilians, up 2 percentage points from our figure in 2010. Over the life of the CIA drone program in Pakistan from 2004 to 2012, we found that the civilian casualty rate has been 17%. Clearly, as the years have progressed, the drone strikes have become more precise and discriminating.”

HARMS

Drones have great precision for avoiding collateral deaths

Ken Dilanian 2011. (journalist) LOS ANGELES TIMES, “U.S. counter-terrorism strategy to rely on surgical strikes, unmanned drones” 29 June 2011 (brackets added) <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/29/news/la-pn-al-qaeda-strategy-20110629>

In the peculiar dance that marks the administration’s discussions of this issue, Brennan did not explicitly mention the vast expansion of drone strikes the U.S. has undertaken in Pakistan since January 2009— 213 of them, according to the New America Foundation, which counts them through media reports. That is because the program technically is secret, even though it is widely discussed and openly acknowledged by U.S. and Pakistani officials in private. Later, when asked whether a policy of targeted killing was appropriate for the United States, [President Obama’s counter-terrorism advisor, John] Brennan responded that the U.S. is “exceptionally precise and surgical in terms of addressing the terrorist threat. And by that I mean, if there are terrorists who are within an area where there are women and children or others, you know, we do not take such action that might put those innocent men, women and children in danger.” He added that in the last year, “there hasn't been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we've been able to develop.”

Congress, Courts and Constitution all allow strikes against Al Qaeda outside Afghanistan

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense. None of this is changed by the fact that we are not in a conventional war. Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks – fortunately, unsuccessful – against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.

Use of force in foreign territory is justified if they consent or if they are unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the US

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

This does not mean that we can use military force whenever or wherever we want. International legal principles, including respect for another nation’s sovereignty, constrain our ability to act unilaterally. But the use of force in foreign territory would be consistent with these international legal principles if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved – or after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.

Congress authorized use of force against Al Qaeda and Taliban

Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School 2011. (Co-directed by Prof. Sarah Cleveland, Counselor on International Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department; and Prof. Peter Rosenblum, a former human rights officer with the Geneva-based precursor to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Right) “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” 25 Mar 2011 <http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf>

The Obama administration has indicated that it is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces. In March 2010, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, described the conflict in an address at the American Society of International Law (ASIL):“As I have explained, as a matter of international law, the U.S. is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law. As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). These domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day.”

Targeted killing of enemy leaders is not “assassination” and is entirely lawful

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

Furthermore, it is entirely lawful – under both United States law and applicable law of war principles – to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated forces. This is not a novel concept. In fact, during World War II, the United States tracked the plane flying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – the commander of Japanese forces in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway – and shot it down specifically because he was on board. As I explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee following the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the same rules apply today. Some have called such operations “assassinations.” They are not, and the use of that loaded term is misplaced. Assassinations are unlawful killings. Here, for the reasons I have given, the U.S. government’s use of lethal force in self defense against a leader of al Qaeda or an associated force who presents an imminent threat of violent attack would not be unlawful — and therefore would not violate the Executive Order banning assassination or criminal statutes.

Judicial review is unnecessary: Targeted killing is a military strike, not a punishment for a crime

Mike Dreyfuss 2012. ( JD candidate, Vanderbilt Univ. law school) My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, VANDERBILT UNIV LAW REVIEW Vol 65, Jan 2012, <http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2012/01/Dreyfuss_65_Vand_L_Rev_249.pdf>

The federal government may target and kill individuals who have not been convicted of crimes, because targeted killing and execution serve different purposes. Execution is a punishment for a crime. Targeted killing is not a punishment. It is a military strike. The state does not intend to right a wrong but to further a military objective. Viewed in this light, prior judicial review of targeted killings—like prior judicial review of military decisions to kill enemies (U.S. citizens or not) on the battlefield—is unnecessary.

Supreme Court says US citizenship does not block targeting belligerent individuals abroad

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

Now, it is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that some of the threats we face come from a small number of United States citizens who have decided to commit violent attacks against their own country from abroad. Based on generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions handed down during World War II, as well as during this current conflict, it’s clear that United States citizenship alone does not make such individuals immune from being targeted.

Legal to target American citizens abroad under certain circumstances

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign country, targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, would be lawful at least in the following circumstances: First, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.

No “Due Process” violation in strikes against American terrorists abroad

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces. This is simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process. The conduct and management of national security operations are core functions of the Executive Branch, as courts have recognized throughout our history. Military and civilian officials must often make real-time decisions that balance the need to act, the existence of alternative options, the possibility of collateral damage, and other judgments – all of which depend on expertise and immediate access to information that only the Executive Branch may possess in real time. The Constitution’s guarantee of due process is ironclad, and it is essential – but, as a recent court decision makes clear, it does not require judicial approval before the President may use force abroad against a senior operational leader of a foreign terrorist organization with which the United States is at war – even if that individual happens to be a U.S. citizen.

Americans committing treason abroad by fighting against the US can get their “due process” by surrendering to the US judicial system and asking for a trial. They can’t evade the system and claim that it should protect them at the same time

Mike Dreyfuss 2012. ( JD candidate, Vanderbilt Univ. law school) My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, VANDERBILT UNIV LAW REVIEW Vol 65, Jan 2012, (brackets added) <http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2012/01/Dreyfuss_65_Vand_L_Rev_249.pdf>

Forcing the accused to face trial does not deprive him of his rights: [quoting federal court decision in Al-Aluqi v. U.S., 2010] “All U.S. citizens may avail themselves of the U.S. judicial system if they present themselves peacefully, and no U.S. citizen may simultaneously avail himself of the U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law enforcement authorities.” Targeted killing is not punishment for treason. U.S. citizens who serve as soldiers for the enemy can be shot without trial during military operations but must be afforded a trial as traitors if they can be captured. So too U.S. citizens who are leaders at the strategic level for the enemy can be targeted and killed without trial during military operations but must be afforded a trial as traitors if they can be captured. Targeted killing is not a punishment for a crime but a military operation.

“Need to capture, not kill, US citizen terrorists abroad” - Response: Not always feasible, and we are clearly authorized to kill them if they pose an imminent threat of violent attack

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

Whether the capture of a U.S. citizen terrorist is feasible is a fact-specific, and potentially time-sensitive, question. It may depend on, among other things, whether capture can be accomplished in the window of time available to prevent an attack and without undue risk to civilians or to U.S. personnel. Given the nature of how terrorists act and where they tend to hide, it may not always be feasible to capture a United States citizen terrorist who presents an imminent threat of violent attack. In that case, our government has the clear authority to defend the United States with lethal force.

“Need to capture, not kill, terrorists” - Response: Not always feasible, sometimes Drones are the only game in town

David Rittgers 2010. (law degree, U. of N. Carolina; legal policy analyst for Cato Institute; served in the United States Army as an Infantry and Special Forces officer, including three tours in Afghanistan; won two Bronze Stars) “Both Left and Right Are Wrong about Drones” 25 Feb 2010 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/both-left-right-are-wrong-about-drones>

Criticism from conservatives is largely based on the logic that a live and talking terrorist is worth more than a dead one. While this is true as a general matter, several factors make drone attacks a good alternative to capture. First, not all terrorists targeted in drone attacks can be feasibly taken alive. This is especially true of those who reside in the many areas dominated by local insurgent groups and therefore out of reach of national governments. For example, putting troops on the ground in the Pakistani tribal areas, where numerous drone attacks have been carried out, is both tactically and diplomatically problematic. Last May, CIA Director Leon Panetta called drones the "only game in town" when it comes to certain parts of Pakistan, and this will remain the case for the long term.

“Laws of War” - Drone strikes are effective and meet the test of proportionality

Dr. James Jay Carafano 2011. (PhD ; graduate of West Point, Carafano holds a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University as well as a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown Univ; director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation ) Drones Save American Lives, 25 Sept 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/09/drones-save-american-lives>

The efficacy of drone strikes is unquestionable. As an act of war, such strikes also meet the test of proportionality. That is: (1) they employ a level of force consonant with the goal of the operation; (2) the attacks are not indiscriminate; and (3) the operations take reasonable precautions to safeguard the lives of innocents.

US attacks comply with fundamental laws of war

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

Of course, any such use of lethal force by the United States will comply with the four fundamental law of war principles governing the use of force. The principle of necessity requires that the target have definite military value. The principle of distinction requires that only lawful targets – such as combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and military objectives – may be targeted intentionally. Under the principle of proportionality, the anticipated collateral damage must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Finally, the principle of humanity requires us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Al Qaeda

Link: Drone strikes have recently taken out many top Al Qaeda leaders

Brink: Drone campaign has put us within reach of defeating Al Qaeda

Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland 2012. Peter Bergen (CNN's national security analyst, is a director at the New America Foundation. His book "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden; From 9/11 to Abbottabad" will be published on May 1) and Jennifer Rowland (a program associate at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank which seeks innovative solutions across the ideological spectrum), March 27, 2012. “CIA drone war in Pakistan in sharp decline,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/opinion/bergen-drone-decline/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7>

And despite its deteriorating relations with Pakistan, the United States killed a number of key al Qaeda leaders with drone strikes in 2011. Al Qaeda's top operative in Pakistan and purported conduit between the terrorist group and the Pakistani Taliban, Ilyas Kashmiri, was reported killed in a strike on June 4. Then, on August 22, a drone reportedly killed al Qaeda's top operational planner, AtiyahAbd al-Rahman, dealing another heavy blow to the organization. And in September, a drone strike killed Abu Hafs al-Shihri, the man believed to be responsible for planning al Qaeda's operations in the region. The continued success of strikes against al Qaeda's top leaders led Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to declare in July that the United States was "within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda." According to senior U.S. counterterrorism officials, al Qaeda's leadership bench has been so thinned by the drone campaign that there are only two real leaders of the organization left: bin Laden's successor as overall leader of the group, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Yahya al-Libi.

Link: Drone strikes are the most effective tool for destroying Al Qaeda

Lisa Curtis 2011. (former member of the professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ; former White House-appointed senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs; worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency; served abroad in the Foreign Service at the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and India) 29 Aug 2011 “ Drone Strikes Protect America from al-Qaeda’s Terror” <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/29/drone-strikes-protect-america-from-al-qaedas-terror/>

In another major blow to al-Qaeda, a U.S. drone strike last Monday in the North Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan killed the organization’s new number two commander, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. The successful strike demonstrates the importance of continuing the drone missile campaign along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan as a cornerstone of the mission to degrade and eventually defeat al-Qaeda. Pakistani officials and media outlets regularly criticize the drone missile strikes as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. But the U.S. is highly unlikely to relent in its drone campaign since the tactic has proven to be the most effective tool for the U.S. to destroy al-Qaeda’s leadership and disrupt its ability to plot and train for attacks across the globe.

Brink: If we keep hitting them, Al Qaeda won’t be able to replace its top leaders because we’re killing them so rapidly

John Brennan 2011. Remarks of John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on Ensuring al-Qa'ida's Demise -- As Prepared for Delivery, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 29 June 2011 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/remarks-john-o-brennan-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter>

All told, over the past two and half years, virtually every major al-Qa’ida affiliate has lost its key leader or operational commander, and more than half of al-Qa’ida’s top leadership has been eliminated. Yes, al-Qa’ida is adaptive and resilient and has sought to replace these leaders, but it has been forced to do so with less experienced individuals. That’s another reason why we and our partners have stepped up our efforts. Because if we hit al-Qa’ida hard enough and often enough, there will come a time when they simply can no longer replenish their ranks with the skilled leaders they need to sustain their operations. And that is the direction in which we’re headed today.

Impact: Terrorism. Drone attacks on Al Qaeda successfully prevent terrorism against US targets

Dr. James Jay Carafano 2011. (PhD ; graduate of West Point, Carafano holds a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University as well as a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown Univ; director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation ) Drones Save American Lives, 25 Sept 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/09/drones-save-american-lives>

There is a reason White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan recently felt confident enough to declare that al-Qaida was “on the ropes.” Progress came from taking the offensive. A decade of strenuous effort to disrupt terrorist sanctuaries, take out leaders, pre-empt planning and operations, disaggregate networks, thwart terrorist travel and communications, and disrupt fundraising and recruiting is paying off. And, without question, the drone missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas have helped put al-Qaida on the defensive. Similar operations conducted against an al-Qaida affiliate in Yemen have paid dividends as well. The results speak for themselves. Successful terrorist attacks on U.S. targets — both at home and overseas — have been on a continual rate of decline since 2005.

2. Delayed Operations. Adding additional rules to restrict or delay strikes would result in more Americans being killed by terrorists

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

The evaluation of whether an individual presents an “imminent threat” incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United States. As we learned on 9/11, al Qaeda has demonstrated the ability to strike with little or no notice – and to cause devastating casualties. Its leaders are continually planning attacks against the United States, and they do not behave like a traditional military – wearing uniforms, carrying arms openly, or massing forces in preparation for an attack. Given these facts, the Constitution does not require the President to delay action until some theoretical end-stage of planning – when the precise time, place, and manner of an attack become clear. Such a requirement would create an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and that Americans would be killed.

3. Micromanaging the War.

Link: Affirmative has Congress dictate specific tactics (“no drones”) to the President as he carries out the war on Al Qaeda

Link & Impact: Congressional micro-management of war tactics is bad. Presidential power is essential to protecting us against foreign attacks

Prof. John Yoo 2007. (law professor at the[University](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/university-of-california-berkeley-OREDU00000197.topic) [of](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/university-of-california-berkeley-OREDU00000197.topic) [California, Berkeley](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/university-of-california-berkeley-OREDU00000197.topic) and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He served in the [Justice](http://www.latimes.com/topic/crime-law-justice/u.s.-department-of-justice-ORGOV0000160.topic) [Department](http://www.latimes.com/topic/crime-law-justice/u.s.-department-of-justice-ORGOV0000160.topic) from 2001 to 2003, where he worked on constitutional issues involving war) Apr 2007 LOS ANGELES TIMES (brackets added) <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-dustup2apr02,0,3065343.story?page=2&coll=la-opinion-center>

[Alexander] Hamilton argued that the president should manage war because he could act with "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch." "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government," he observed. "It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks." You are right to quote Congress's power to declare war and to pass laws to govern and regulate the armed forces. But presidents and congresses have never believed they allow for control of tactics and strategy. Congress' real power is its power of the purse, not any right to dictate which units should fight where, or whether to surge troops into Baghdad. Congress is too fractured, slow, and inflexible to micromanage military decisions that depend on speed, secrecy, and force.

4. Civilian Casualties. Drones actually minimize civilian casualties during a counter-insurgency campaign, compared to other military tactics

Andrew Callam 2010. (candidate for a masters degree in international affairs, George Washington Univ.) Winter 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol XVIII No. 3 “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”<http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144>

In counterinsurgency warfare, the main benefit of the armed drone is an increased ability to “find, fix and finish” enemy combatants, while minimizing civilian casualties. Traditionally, aerial surveillance vehicles would observe a suspected target and radio the coordinates to an operations center, where personnel would consult maps and senior officers in an attempt to identify civilian structures. Following the consultation, the operations center would relay instructions to an airborne craft. In Operation Desert Storm, this process (also know as the “kill chain” or “sensor-to shooter-cycle”) could take up to three days, by which time the targets could have left the target building or civilians could have entered it. When armed drones are used, the kill chain is only one link long and the process takes less than 5 minutes. Additionally, as P.W. Singer, author of Wired for War, notes, using an unmanned drone allows the pilot to take more risks with his craft, such as flying lower and loitering longer, thus leading to a more accurate strike. The drones therefore allow commanders to avoid killing noncombatants during their strikes, a crucial element in counterinsurgency warfare.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: EGYPT MILITARY AID - good

INHERENCY

Status Quo has monitoring, consultation with Congress, and adjustments to aid if conditions change

Reuters news service 2012. U.S. approves Egypt military aid despite rights fears, 23 Mar 2012<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/us-egypt-usa-aid-idUSBRE82M0UG20120323> (ellipses in original)

The law still requires Clinton to consult congressional appropriators before any funds are actually transferred to Egypt, and U.S. officials said they would be keeping a careful eye on Egypt's political development. "We have the flexibility to adjust what is being disbursed out of this assistance and we obviously ... will be watching the situation on the ground to decide if we need to exercise that flexibility at any time," one senior U.S. official said.

HARMS

Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence and is denounced by terrorists because it’s too moderate

Bruce Riedel 2011. (30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe. Riedel was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House) Don't Fear Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 28 Jan 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0128_egypt_riedel.aspx>

The Egyptian Brotherhood renounced violence years ago, but its relative moderation has made it the target of extreme vilification by more radical Islamists. Al Qaeda’s leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, started their political lives affiliated with the Brotherhood but both have denounced it for decades as too soft and a cat’s paw of Mubarak and America.

No reason to fear the Muslim Brotherhood

Bruce Riedel 2011. (30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe. Riedel was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House) Don't Fear Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 28 Jan 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0128_egypt_riedel.aspx>

The crisis in North Africa has come up unexpectedly for President Obama and Secretary Clinton. They have moved quickly to grasp the challenge. They know the stakes and the delicacy of our options. Neither complacency nor panic is the right American response. They should not be afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood. Living with it won’t be easy but it should not be seen as inevitably our enemy. We need not demonize it nor endorse it.

SOLVENCY

Conditioning US military aid to Egypt doesn’t work: We tried in 2007, no reform happened

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

For a donor to condition assistance on a recipient meeting certain goals seems logical. International donor institutions often condition loans on reform in the financial and economic sector. It would seem that there would be a power relationship to exploit. In the case of the U.S.-Egypt aid, however, attempts to condition money had little positive effect. The threat of Congressional conditions in 2007 placed enough pressure on the Egyptian military to exert some additional effort to protect Israel, as it ultimately allocated $23 million of its $1.3 billion in aid to enhance security on its border with Gaza, but the conditions failed in their larger goals of reorienting military expenditures to focus on border security and counterterrorism, and of motivating political reform in Egypt. Moreover the condition campaign increased bilateral tensions and the conditions provided the Mubarak regime an opportunity to grandstand against American intervention.

Egypt’s military cannot bring about political reform

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

Conversely, as the military receded from politics, the security services gained strength, and came to comprise the bulk of the Egyptian Government’s coercive apparatus. The Egyptian military remained the prime guarantor of stability in times of great crisis, but its influence on day-to-day governing and political reform was slight. A more likely scenario than the Egyptian military forcing the Egyptian government to reform in order to preserve military aid from the U.S., was the Egyptian regime supplementing any shortfall in the event of a reduction.

Withholding funds from Egyptian military aid will not achieve reform goals

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship (ellipses in original) <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

Consecutive U.S. administrations supported the Egyptian military with arms because it was in U.S. strategic interests to bolster the durable peace between Israel and Egypt and to ally itself with a powerful Arab military in the region. But it also viewed the Egyptian military as the possible future arbiter of any domestic crisis in Egypt. This judgment came from the military’s own behavior, as it intervened in domestic affairs only twice in several decades—the bread riots of 1977 and the Central Security Force unrest of 1986, and from sustained interaction with the military-to-military interaction over 30 years. That interaction included the training of thousands of Egyptian military officers in the United States and the stationing of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of American officers in Egypt. A consensus emerged that the military relationship was worth protecting, that the military did not contribute to authoritarianism in Egypt, and that reducing aid would not bring about political reform. In a joint letter to House Leader Nancy Pelosi in 2007, Secretaries Robert Gates and Condoleezza Rice stated this declaratively: Egypt has been a partner for peace in the Middle East for almost thirty years. Egypt’s continued tactical and strategic cooperation is essential to sustaining success in the War on Terror, including ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By facilitating the transit of U.S. naval vessels through the Suez Canal and permitting unfettered overflight access, Egypt has earned the trust of U.S. military commanders in-theater. …Much work remains to be done in promoting human rights, judicial reform and border security in Egypt. Withholding funds destined for the Egyptian military will not help achieve these goals.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lose the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

Brink/Uniqueness: Status Quo, Egypt will not break the peace treaty with Israel

Eli Lake 2011. (journalist) 3 Feb 2011, “Muslim Brotherhood seeks end to Israel treaty” WASHINGTON TIMES<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-to-israel-treaty/?page=all>

“I do not think a government following elections would withdraw from the peace treaty with Israel. Nobody in Egypt wants war with Israel and there is every sign right now that the military will still play a strong role in the government that comes next,” said Michele Dunne, an Egypt expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Stephen Hadley, who served as National Security Adviser to President George W. Bush, said Mr. Mubarak was rhetorically tough on Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. He has also periodically let the Brotherhood participate in the political process and has failed to seal tunnels Hamas use to smuggle weapons into Gaza. “My guess is that while a successor regime may be less hard on Hamas with the rhetoric, the security concerns about Gaza and Hamas will remain. Rhetorically they may be different, but practically I think they could be roughly the same,” he said.

Link: Egypt will reconsider peace treaty with Israel if US cuts military aid

Jeffrey Fleishman 2012. (journalist) 16 Feb 2012 “[MuslimBrotherhood: U.S. aidcutsmayalterEgypt-Israeltreaty](http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/02/senior-muslim-brotherhood-say-cuts-in-us-aid-could-affect-egypts-peace-treaty-with-israel-.html)” LOS ANGELES TIMES <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/02/senior-muslim-brotherhood-say-cuts-in-us-aid-could-affect-egypts-peace-treaty-with-israel-.html>

The Muslim Brotherhood suggested Thursday that Cairo might reconsider its commitment to a peace treaty with Israel if the U.S. cuts $1.3 billion in military aid in retaliation for a deepening diplomatic crisis over American-funded pro-democracy groups working in Egypt. It was unclear whether the comments by two senior Brotherhood members were rhetoric or marked a willingness by Egypt to reevaluate its 1979 peace agreement with Israel. Mohamed Morsi, leader of the Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party, which controls nearly 50% of parliament seats, said U.S. aid was part of Egypt’s commitment to the treaty.

Link: Muslim Brotherhood believes US aid is a condition of the Egypt-Israel treaty

Jeremy White 2012. (journalist) 17 Feb 2012 INTERNAITONAL BUSINESS TIMES, “Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty Threatened In Aid Dispute”<http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/300482/20120217/egypt-israel-camp-david-accords-1979-peace.htm> (brackets in original)

The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization that was outlawed by former president Hosni Mubarak and has gone on to won a plurality of seats in the new Parliament, said a decision to cut off the aid would lead Egypt to review its treaty with Israel. "We [Egypt] are a party [to the treaty] and we will be harmed so it is our right to review the matter," Essam el-Erian, a senior Brotherhood leader, told Reuters in a telephone interview. "The aid was one of the commitments of the parties that signed the peace agreement so if there is a breach from one side it gives the right of review to the parties."

Brink: 54% of Egyptians favor canceling the peace treaty with Israel

Pew Research Center 2011. (independent non-partisan research organization) “54% - Overturn Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement » 25 Apr 2011 <http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1246>

By a 54%-to-36% margin, Egyptians say their country should annul its three-decade-old peace agreement with Israel. Egyptian Muslims who sympathize with those who disagree with Islamic fundamentalists are nearly evenly divided in their views on the peace treaty; 48% favor maintaining the treaty with Israel and 51% favor annulment.

Impact: Increased risk of war

YardenGazit 2011. (a research fellow at the Public Policy Center at the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies. His writings on foreign policy and economics have appeared in major Israeli news media ) Economic and Strategic Ramifications of American Assistance to Israel, Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies <http://jimsisrael.org/pdf/PPusaidEnglish.pdf>

Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan lower the likelihood of war between them, yet the IDF must nevertheless invest considerable resources in maintaining battle readiness in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. The “cold peace” with Egypt, coupled with the fact that it borders no country other than Israel which has a strong army, has left Egypt free to develop its modern efficient army. In addition, the great uncertainty regarding the country’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the Mubarak era means that the IDF must be prepared for any eventuality – even one of very low probability – of a defensive war on either the Egyptian or the Jordanian front.

2. Lost US manufacturing jobs in defense industries

Link & Impact: Cutting aid to Egypt means cutting orders for military equipment in US factories, which means lost jobs. Professor Timothy Garton Ash in 2012, although in this article he does not specifically say he agrees with maintaining military aid to Egypt, nevertheless he reports the political analysis that went into the status quo decision to resume the aid, due to the jobs impact it would have:

Prof. Timothy Garton Ash 2012. (senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and professor of European studies at Oxford University) Egypt's hold on the U.S., LOS ANGELES TIMES<http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/08/opinion/la-oe-gartonash-lahood-20120308>

Talking of U.S. elections, the experts add one further detail. Much of the $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt (the rest of the grand total is more conventional economic assistance) comes straight back to American military suppliers. To factories like the General Dynamics one in Lima, Ohio, for example, where (wholly or partly U.S. government-funded) Egyptian army orders for tanks will help keep the production lines going despite Pentagon cutbacks. Risk those American jobs, in the crucial swing state of Ohio in an election year? You must be joking.

3. Loss of military professionalism

Link: US military aid made the Egyptian army capable and professional

Admiral Michael G. Mullen 2011. (US Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 16 Feb 2011 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1534>

Foolhardy would be it for us to make hasty judgments about the benefits, tangible and intangible, that are about to be derived from forging strong military relationships overseas, such as the one we enjoy with Egypt. Changes to those relationships in either aid or assistance ought to be considered only with an abundance of caution and a thorough appreciation for the long view rather than in the flush of public passion and the urgency to save a buck. The $1.3 billion we provide the Egyptian military each year has helped them become the capable, professional force they are, and in that regard has been of incalculable value.

Link: US military aid led to professionalism of the Egyptian army during crisis situations

Robert Gates 2011. (secretary of Defense) 16 Feb 2011 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,<http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1534>

And I would tell you, the kinds of instability that we're seeing in the Middle East now, it is -- it is difficult for me to imagine circumstances in which we would send U.S. ground forces in, in any of those situations. Those are -- those are problems that are emanating from within those countries, and -- and it's primarily a -- a diplomatic challenge for us, although I would say, if you ever wanted proof of the value, as the chairman said in his opening statement, of the value of our military assistance to Egypt over the past 30 years, it had been in the behavior of the Egyptian armyover the past three weeks and their professionalism in dealing with the kinds of situations they had.

Impact: Human rights. The Egyptian Army protected peaceful protestors during the revolution because of the training they got from the US

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships”<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

Furthermore, U.S. security assistance also often provides critical training that helps professionalize partner militaries and teaches them about core U.S. values like respect for human rights and civilian control of the military. In fact, the Expanded-IMET or E-IMET program is specifically designed to focus on these topics. The influence of our security assistance was evident early this year. During the uprising in Egypt, the Egyptian military responded admirably. It allowed peaceful protests to take place and resisted calls to crack down on the protesters. There are a number of complex factors that explain why the Egyptian military responded the way it did. But it is clear that our long standing ties – our ability to pick up the phone and urge restraint – allowed us to effectively engage the Egyptian military. Additionally, the Egyptians greatly value our security assistance relationship and wanted to ensure it continued.

4. Loss of US influence

Link: Security assistance gives the US leverage and influence

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships” (brackets added) <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

This is because security assistance gives the United States leverage and influence. Our funding helps tie a country’s security sector to the United States, creating strong strategic and financial incentives for the recipient countries to maintain close relations. The linkages through IMET [International Military Education & Training] also help build personal relationships between officer corps, which gives us increased access and potential points of influence.

Link: Military aid creates strong incentive to maintain good ties with the US

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships”<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

When we provide security assistance through our Foreign Military Financing program to buy U.S. defense systems, we are not just providing a country with weapons systems. We are committing ourselves to a long term relationship. The complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems often require continuous collaboration between countries. This includes training and support in the use of the equipment, assistance in maintenance, and help to update and modernize the equipment throughout its life-cycle. Additionally, programs like the International Military Education and Training program, or IMET, help build military-to-military connections between countries. This program brings foreign military officers to the U.S. to see the practices of our military first-hand. This assistance helps build ties between militaries and creates strong incentives for recipient countries to maintain good ties with the United States.

Impact: Instability & Terrorism. US partnership with Egypt promotes stability and counters terrorism.

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

Both the United States and Egypt have benefited from a thirty-year-old strategic relationship. U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Francis Ricciardone explained the benefits and the importance of aid to Egypt in a 2007 memo to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance: Egyptian strategic partnership played a central role in promoting peace and stability, countering extremism and terrorism, and creating an environment in which political and economic reforms can prosper. A key pillar of the relationship, U.S. economic and security assistance both symbolizes and vastly strengthens our nation's historic cooperation and long-term commitment to the partnership. While many would have taken issue that political and economic reforms could possibly prosper under former President Hosni Mubarak, it was not easy to disagree that Egypt supported the regional strategic goals of the United States.

“Aid isn’t providing enough leverage” – Response: “No aid” would provide even less leverage

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships”<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

Now of course the influence and leverage gained through our security assistance does not guarantee a country will listen. In crisis situations, leaders and regimes often act out of desperation, making them more willing to resist our calls and ignore our warnings. This is why we constantly review our security assistance and why we make every effort to be sure it is being used as it was intended. However, in countries where we have limited relations, where we provide no security assistance, our influence is much more limited.

5. Backlash. The louder we complain about Egypt’s behavior, the more they resist.

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

On more than one occasion, and once while in Egypt, Secretary Rice called on Egypt to lift its Emergency Law. Mubarak refused. Separately, in a flagrant abuse of power, the Egyptian Government imprisoned opposition leader AymanNour after Mr. Nour performed well in the country’s first multi-candidate presidential elections. The more loudly and publicly that the Bush Administration protested the arrest, the more recalcitrant the Mubarak Government became. Shortly after Bush left office, however, AymanNour was freed. Few doubted that the timing was coincidetal.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: HONDURAS - good

**(Matthew Baker contributed evidence to this brief)**

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Support for the Honduran military has risks, but the deteriorating situation justifies it

Michael Shifter 2012. (M.A. sociology, Georgetown Univ.; President of the Inter-American Dialogue; Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; directed the Ford Foundation's governance and human rights program in the Andean region and Southern Cone. Subsequently he directed the Latin American and Caribbean program at the National Endowment for Democracy) 8 May 2012 NEW YORK TIMES, “Military Aid Is Unattractive, but Unavoidable” <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2967&s>=

Policy options are not good, but in today’s Honduras a government of any stripe would turn to the military to fight drug violence. There are considerable risks associated with building up militaries in countries like Honduras, with precarious governance and a history of rights abuses. But such risks have to be weighed against the risks of the current, deteriorating situation, which has taken a tremendous human toll and poses a serious threat to the rule of law.

INHERENCY

Congress put human rights conditions on 20% of US military & police aid to Honduras for 2012

Alex Main 2012. (Senior Associate for International Policy, Center for Economic & Policy Research; focuses on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean; frequently interviewed by media in the U.S. and Latin American and his analyses on U.S. policy in the Americas have been published in a variety of domestic and international media outlets ; Prior to CEPR, spent more than six years in Latin America working as an international relations analyst; degree in history and political science from the Sorbonne University in Paris) 3 Jan 2012 “US Congress Conditions Aid for Honduran Military and Police “ HONDURAS WEEKLY <http://www.hondurasweekly.com/us-congress-conditions-aid-for-honduran-military-and-police-201201034672/>

In response to widespread concern in both the United States House of Representatives and Senate over human rights abuses involving the Honduran police and military, the US Congress has placed new conditions on a portion of US police and military aid to Honduras. The legislative language that establishes these new conditions can be found in the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act within the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which was passed by Congress on December 16. It now requires that, before allocating 20 percent of the funds allocated for Honduras, the State Department must investigate and report back to the Committee on Appropriations whether the Honduran military "is implementing policies to protect freedom of expression and association, and due process of law," whether it is prosecuting "military and police personnel who are credibly alleged to have violated human rights,” and whether the Honduran police and military "are cooperating with civilian authorities in such cases."

SIGNIFICANCE

Honduran democracy is fine: 56.6% of Hondurans voted for Lobo, there were 4,600 observers, and the other four parties recognized the election

Jorge R. Hernandez Alcerro 2012. (Ambassador of Honduras) Letter to the Editor, January 31, 2012, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/opinion/us-policy-on-honduras-views-of-two-diplomats.html>

“Ms. Frank’s insinuations about the Honduran government’s illegitimacy are offensive to the 56.6 percent of Hondurans who voted for President Porfirio Lobo in the last election. More than 4,600 international and domestic observers closely supervised the electoral process. The other four Honduran political parties recognized President Lobo’s election, have been integrated into the sitting national reconciliation and unity government, and are represented in Congress.”

Nothing could be further from the truth than labeling the removal of Zelaya as a “Coup”

U.S. Congressman Connie Mack 2010. (member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee) “Mack Opening Statement for Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing on Honduras,” March 18, 2010, <http://mack.house.gov/index.cfm?p=CommitteeStatements&ContentRecord_id=1ff76a59-b672-49d7-9115-aa84a42f3902&ContentType_id=5e381b8b-6cb6-4547-86e8-acca7e10af56&Group_id=12a9b509-c64e-4a1f-af45-ff681c1dc07f&MonthDisplay=3&YearDisplay=2010>

“A lot has changed in the past year in Honduras. We saw a Chavez crony and fellow thugocrat, Manuel Zelaya, try to change the Honduran Constitution to rule for life. We saw the Honduran Supreme Court and the Honduran Congress follow their constitution and the rule of law by removing Zelaya from power. We saw the OAS, the UN, and even the Obama Administration come out on the wrong side of history and call Zelaya’s removal a coup. And to top it off, we saw our own State Department threaten Honduras to reinstate Zelaya by withholding vital aid and revoking visas of Honduran officials. At this Subcommittee’s hearing last week, Assistant Secretary Valenzuela referred to the situation in Honduras as a coup. His reasoning: President Zelaya was not given “the most elementary due process of law. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is important to note that the Honduran military never took control over any of the levers of power. The Honduran government institutions worked.”

Timeline demonstrates Zelaya’s removal was legitimate

U.S. Congressman Connie Mack 2010. (member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee) “Mack Opening Statement for Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing on Honduras,” March 18, 2010, <http://mack.house.gov/index.cfm?p=CommitteeStatements&ContentRecord_id=1ff76a59-b672-49d7-9115-aa84a42f3902&ContentType_id=5e381b8b-6cb6-4547-86e8-acca7e10af56&Group_id=12a9b509-c64e-4a1f-af45-ff681c1dc07f&MonthDisplay=3&YearDisplay=2010>

"And I'd like to read a timeline of what exactly happened.

* May 2009: President Zelaya, working with his friend Hugo Chavez, ordered a referendum to take place on November 29, 2009, that would have removed presidential term limits. The Honduran Constitution specifically prohibits this, and thus Zelaya violated Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution.
* On May 29, 2009, the Attorney General recommended that the Honduran courts hold that Zelaya’s referendum was illegal and unconstitutional.
* In late June, the Supreme Court ordered the Honduran forces not to provide support for the referendum.
* On June 27, in opposition to the Supreme Court order, Zelaya led a violent mob to seize and distribute the ballots for the referendum.
* On June 28, the Supreme Court issued an arrest order for Zelaya and removed him as president.
* On June 28, the Honduran Military, acting on a warrant from the Honduran Supreme Court, removed Zelaya from power. He was later put on a plane out of the country for his own protection, as well as other security reasons.
* Later, the Honduran Congress, pursuant to the Honduran Constitution, voted Roberto Micheletti in as president. (Micheletti was constitutionally next in line for succession and assumed the presidency on an interim basis.)
* President Micheletti never interfered with the ongoing presidential campaign nor interfered with the previously planned November 29th presidential election.
* November 29, 2009: Hondurans voted in the presidential election. Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo won with 56 percent of the vote.
* On December 2, in accordance with the San Jose/Tegucigalpa Accord, the Honduran Congress voted 111-14 to not reinstate ousted President Zelaya. The Supreme Court and Attorney General also recommended this outcome.
* On January 27, President Micheletti stepped down from power, in accordance with the Constitution, and handed over power peacefully to democratically-elected President-elect Pepe Lobo.

“And while some have criticized the Honduran military for ushering Zelaya out of the country, his removal saved lives and prevented dangerous riots and violence in the streets. What happened in Honduras was not a coup, and the Administration needs to stop calling it one.

Honduran forces are eager partners in interagency and human rights programs

Thom Shanker 2012, (journalist) “Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. Fight a Drug War in Honduras,” May 5, 2012, New York Times, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw#](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw)

“The American ambassador to Honduras, Lisa J. Kubiske, is responsible for bringing order to the complex and sometimes competing mix of interagency programs, and she oversees compliance with human rights legislation. She described the Honduran armed forces as “eager and capable partners in this joint effort.”

U.S. Diplomats worked to facilitate free and fair elections after Zelaya was removed in June 2009

Dr. James F. Creagan 2012. (former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras from 1996 to 1999, PhD from the Unviersity of Virginia and former professor of political science at Texas A&M) Letter to the Editor, January 31, 2012, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/opinion/us-policy-on-honduras-views-of-two-diplomats.html>

“Honduras faced political and institutional stalemate after the removal of President José Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. Far from making a “mess,” the skilled diplomats under Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton deftly worked for the only way out of a descent into armed clashes — democratic elections. My fellow international observers concluded that the process was free and fair.”

U.S. aid supports reforms & Honduras is making progress on human rights

Jorge R. Hernandez Alcerro 2012. (Ambassador of Honduras) Letter to the Editor, January 31, 2012, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/opinion/us-policy-on-honduras-views-of-two-diplomats.html>

“Ms. Frank observes that Honduras is struggling against crime and narcotics trafficking — yet she urges the United States to abandon Honduras to the drug lords by cutting off police and military aid. This assistance supports President Lobo’s and Congress’s efforts to strengthen the legal and institutional framework to better combat crime and narcotics trafficking, by appointing judges with national jurisdiction, approving a security tax, authorizing wiretapping, creating a strong internal affairs board for the National Police, amending the Constitution to allow extradition of Honduran nationals and establishing an independent commission for reform of the security sector. The independent Office of the National Prosecutor for Human Rights has been investigating and prosecuting the alleged human rights violations with assistance from the United States, Colombia and Spain. Legislation has been passed to combat child labor, a committee against torture was established and legislation against human trafficking has been introduced.”

SOLVENCY

Cutting aid after the demise of Zelaya is what originally opened the door to narcotics trafficking

David Agren 2012. “Honduras suffocating in grip of drug violence and poverty,” USA TODAY, March 6, 2012 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-06/honduras-drugs-poverty/53389722/1>

“The U.N. International Narcotics Control Board said last month that Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua had become major transit countries for traffickers smuggling cocaine and marijuana to North America. Mexican drug cartels, under pressure from police, shifted bases to Central America, resulting in increased levels of violence, kidnapping, bribery, torture and homicide, said the agency's annual report for 2011. Central America is home to about 900 "maras," or streets gangs, which have 70,000 members. When he won the presidency, Lobo promoted reconciliation with Zelaya, who was allowed to return to Honduras last year, but the cutoff of aid and contact had a lasting effect. "The lack of external credibility and isolation and the lack of money flowing in made poverty increase," said Father Germán Calix, Honduras director for Caritas, the Vatican's charitable arm. "It was a void for new money from narcotics trafficking to circulate in the country."”

Honduras’ problems are not caused by dictators but by drugs, gangs, and corruption

Dr. James F. Creagan 2012. (former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras from 1996 to 1999, PhD from the Unviersity of Virginia and former professor of political science at Texas A&M) Letter to the Editor, January 31, 2012, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/opinion/us-policy-on-honduras-views-of-two-diplomats.html>

“It may be gratifying to attribute Honduras’ problems to generals with sunglasses or to rigged elections. But it is not true. This is not the 1970s with Central American coups, contras and revolutionaries. No, the unfettered violence of today’s Honduras, and its neighbors, is caused by drugs, gangs and corruption. It is a choice of bribes or bullets, all driven by the market for coca leaf products.”

DISADVANTAGES

1. Natural Disaster Assistance

Link: US Base at Soto Cano provides regional support for natural disasters

Impact: 6,981 patients were treated in 2010

General Douglas M. Fraser 2011. (Commander of the United States Southern Command), March 30, 2011, “Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, United States Air Force Commander, United States Southern Command Before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee,” <http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=fcc6b631-6b51-4bdb-b0a0-6b97ea36cb58>

“Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras provides regional support for responding to natural disasters and supporting counter drug operations with our partners in Central America and the Caribbean. In 2010, JTF-B medical personnel conducted four Medical Capability Projects in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, treating 6,981 patients and also supported relief efforts in Haiti and in Guatemala after the eruption of the Pacava volcano and the landfall of Tropical Storm Agatha.”

Link: Helping foreign governments confront natural disasters helps fight Anti-Americanism and radical ideologies

Carlota García Encina 2010. (PhD student at the at the Universidad Autónoma and research assistant at the Elcano Royal Institute) May 13, 2010, “Haiti: the U.S. and Military Aid in Times of Natural Disaster, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/defense+security/ari57-2010> [Brackets added]

‘For years now, natural disasters have been part of the range of threats the US has to address. And this is part of official US military strategy, although it must be noted that the aid process that follows a catastrophe is an inter-agency effort. Military aid in cases of natural disasters now appears for the first time in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006, which stresses its growing importance for the American military. That review also stated that it was in the US’s national security interest to back up governments that are at a clear disadvantage in confronting earthquakes, hurricanes or other phenomena of this kind, through cooperation and joint exercises. A year after the QDR 2006 came out, Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, elevated disaster relief efforts into the category of the six main capabilities described in the Navy’s strategy for 2007 (*A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*). That document reformulated the Navy’s strategic goals for the first time since 1982. [Former Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates said these efforts, besides being an effective tool for fighting against anti-Americanism and radical ideologies, were part of an idea he began to use and develop: smart power, which was a combination of soft power and hard power. ‘I am here to strengthen our capabilities using soft power and integrating it in the best way possible with hard power’, he said in 2007. The idea of smart power was later taken up by Obama himself and his Secretary of State. It is a concept that is leading the US to try to reinforce its civil capabilities as a critical part of foreign policy and national security strategy. It is also leading US military forces to carry out more and more operations like the one it is conducting in Haiti.”

Disaster aid can buy love

Charles Kenney 2011. (senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More. "The Optimist," his column for ForeignPolicy.com, runs weekly.) “A Friend in Need: Can Disaster Assistance Aid Actually Win Hearts and Minds?,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/31/a_friend_in_need?page=0,1>

“But there is evidence of an exception to the rule that money can't buy love, and it involves disaster assistance. Four years after a 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan, economists TahirAndrabi of Pomona College and Jishnu Das of the World Bank surveyed attitudes towards foreigners in the region. They found trust in foreigners was significantly higher in areas where humanitarian aid had been concentrated than in other areas -- dropping off by six percentage points for each 10 kilometers of distance from the fault line. Why might recipients react differently and more positively to disaster relief assistance than they do to other forms of aid? In part it is surely related to the simple gratitude felt by people who have just lost much of what they had in a flood or earthquake. But it is also more plausible that such aid is given without a broader political motive.”

Impact: Attractiveness of the United States is key to winning cooperation of other nations against terrorism

Prof. Joseph Nye 2004. (Professor of International Relations, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard; also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ) Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol 119 No. 2, Nov 2004 <http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C1104.pdf>

It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate, up to a point, out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States.

Impact: Better attractiveness means we get more cooperation, which improves our ability to deal with new foreign policy challenges

Prof. Joseph Nye 2004. (Professor of International Relations, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard; also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ) Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol 119 No. 2, Nov 2004 <http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C1104.pdf>

Finally, as the RAND Corporation’s John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so. As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

2. Medical Care

Link: U.S. military building health clinics and schools in Honduras

Ambassador Lisa Kubiske 2012. (United States Ambassador to Hondorus), April 16, 2012, “Remarks by Ambassador Lisa Kubiske for Beyond the Horizons 2012 Launch Ceremony,<http://honduras.usembassy.gov/sp-041612-eng.html>

“In addition to the medical services provided, U.S. military construction and engineering experts are working together with their counterparts in the Honduran military to construct health clinics and schools, and renovate other facilities in select communities. These joint efforts during this year's Beyond the Horizon exercise will result in the construction of two new school buildings with sanitation facilities, and the renovation of a third school site, to better serve the needs of Honduran youth. In addition, new two health clinics being constructed to replace damaged or outdated facilities will improve medical services and increase access to care for local communities.”

Brink: Over ½ of Hondurans have little or no access to medical care facilities

Pacific Prime 2010. (international health insurance company) “Honduras Medical Insurance” Ethical disclosure on the date: the article is undated, but contains references to events in 2010, so it was written no earlier than that year; it could be 2011 or 2012, but to be completely fair we used the oldest possible date. <http://www.pacificprime.com/countries/honduras/>

Over half of the country’s population is confined to rural areas. This is a concern as public services and government presence within rural Honduras is very limited and basic. Health care is provided by medical clinics, which are spread out sparingly and provide only basic medical care. Some areas in rural Honduras are very remote, having virtually no presence of health care facilities.

Link & Impact: 14,000-18,000 Hondurans get medical help every year, directly impacting productivity

Ambassador Lisa Kubiske 2012. (United States Ambassador to Hondorus), April 16, 2012, “Remarks by Ambassador Lisa Kubiske for Beyond the Horizons 2012 Launch Ceremony,” <http://honduras.usembassy.gov/sp-041612-eng.html>

“On average, U.S. military medical personnel treat 14,000 to 18,000 Honduran patients per year, and have been doing so for the past 23 years! These health services have a direct and lasting impact on the lives of Hondurans all over the country —from Tegucigalpa to Cortés to Gracias a Dios. Health impacts every single aspect of a person's life. On a personal level, better health means less lost income and fewer days off school, leading to more resources for families. Society-wide, better health translates directly to more productive economies. According to a United Nations study, a one percentage point increase in the adult survival rate can increase labor productivity by as much as 2.8%.”

3. Drug Trafficking

Links:

Honduras is the latest focal point in America’s drug war

Thom Shanker 2012, (journalist) “Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. Fight a Drug War in Honduras,” May 5, 2012, New York Times, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw#](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw)

“Honduras is the latest focal point in America’s drug war. As Mexico puts the squeeze on narcotics barons using its territory as a transit hub, more than 90 percent of the cocaine from Colombia and Venezuela bound for the United States passes through Central America. More than a third of those narcotics make their way through Honduras, a country with vast ungoverned areas — and one of the highest per capita homicide rates in the world.”

Honduras is the primary destination for cocaine coming out of South America and much of U.S. military mission is aimed at countering

Col. Jane E. Crichton 2011. (with US Army South, public affairs office) July 25, 2011, “Under Secretary of the Army Continues Regional Visit in Honduras,” ASOUTH Public Affairs Office, <http://www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsarchive/3207-under-secretary-of-the-army-continues-regional-visit-in-honduras.html>

“Much of the U.S. military mission in Honduras is focused upon working with Honduran forces to counter illicit narcotics trafficking. According to Drug Enforcement Administration and Joint Interagency Task Force South officials, Honduras is the primary destination for cocaine coming out of South America and is a major stopping point for cocaine heading to the U.S. The military group’s efforts are aimed at raising Honduran capability in order to build a Honduran solution to the trafficking issue that is integrated with U.S. efforts.”

In one incident, with Honduran help, the U.S. Coast Guard captured 5 tons of cocaine

Fox News Latino 2011. “Honduras Becomes New Cocaine Hub for West,” October 30, 2011, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/10/30/honduras-becomes-western-hemisphere-cocaine-hub/>

“Most of the cocaine arrives in Honduras via the sea, in speedboats, fishing vessels and even submersibles. In July, the U.S. Coast Guard, with Honduras' help, detained one such craft that had been plying the waters with about 5 tons of cocaine per trip.”

U.S. has three bases in Honduras in locations crucial to interdicting cocaine smugglers

Thom Shanker 2012, (journalist) “Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. Fight a Drug War in Honduras,” May 5, 2012, New York Times, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw#](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw)

“FORWARD OPERATING BASE MOCORON, Honduras- The United States military has brought lessons from the past decade of conflict to the drug war being fought in the wilderness of Miskito Indian country, constructing this remote base camp with little public notice but with the support of the Honduran government. It is one of three new forward bases here — one in the rain forest, one on the savanna and one along the coast — each in a crucial location to interdict smugglers moving cocaine toward the United States from South America.”

Brinks:

Honduran Navy Officer involved in interdiction says he is powerless without air support and American help

Thom Shanker 2012, “Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. Fight a Drug War in Honduras,” May 5, 2012, New York Times, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw#](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw)

“One of those partners, Cmdr. Pablo Rodríguez of the Honduran Navy, is the senior officer at the second of the forward bases, at Puerto Castilla on the coast. He pointed to his “bonus fleet” of several dozen vessels seized from smugglers, the fastest of which were retrofitted with Kevlar armor over outboard engines and mounts for machine guns for chasing drug runners. The improvements were financed by the State Department. “We have limitations on how quickly we can move, even when we get strong indications of a shipment of drugs,” Commander Rodríguez said. “We can’t do anything without air support. So that’s why it’s very important to have the United States coming in here.”

Honduras needs US military aid because it’s under-equipped to confront drug trafficking

Christopher Looft 2012. (B.A. in international affairs from the University of Georgia and a Researcher/Writer at Insight Crime) February 16, 2012. “With Brazil's Help, Honduras Seeks to Upgrade Air Force,” INSIGHT CRIME (A joint project between American University, Open Society Foundations, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz to connect the pieces, the players and organizations and give a cohesive look of the South American region’s criminal enterprises and the effectiveness of the initiatives designed to stop them), <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2228-with-brazils-help-honduras-seeks-to-upgrade-air-force>

“Military authorities have repeatedly said that Honduras is under-equipped to properly confront the increased levels of drug trafficking inside the country. The former head of Honduras' armed forces, Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, recently told La Prensa that the country cannot make progess in the "drug war" without modern radar systems. As InSight Crime has reported, Honduras' 2012 military budget has allocated few funds towards the purchase of technology needed to fight drug trafficking. The gaps have forced Honduras to solicit aid from donors like Brazil and the US.”

Impact: Countering transnational crime promotes stability

Thom Shanker 2012, (journalist) “Lessons of Iraq Help U.S. Fight a Drug War in Honduras,” May 5, 2012, New York Times, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw#](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?pagewanted=1&hpw) (brackets added)

“By countering transnational organized crime, we promote stability, which is necessary for external investment, economic growth and minimizing violence,” Colonel [Ross A.] Brown [of the U.S. military] said. “We also are disrupting and deterring the potential nexus between transnational organized criminals and terrorists who would do harm to our country.”

4. U.S. National Security

We must be a stronger partner of Honduras to ensure freedom, security, and prosperity for the hemisphere

U.S. Congressman Connie Mack 2010. (member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee) “Mack Opening Statement for Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing on Honduras,” March 18, 2010, <http://mack.house.gov/index.cfm?p=CommitteeStatements&ContentRecord_id=1ff76a59-b672-49d7-9115-aa84a42f3902&ContentType_id=5e381b8b-6cb6-4547-86e8-acca7e10af56&Group_id=12a9b509-c64e-4a1f-af45-ff681c1dc07f&MonthDisplay=3&YearDisplay=2010>

“Honduras is a strong partner and a friend of the United States. And for the freedom, security and prosperity of the hemisphere, we must be a strong partner and friend to them.”

It is in America’s national interest to increase funding for Honduras

Dr. James F. Creagan 2012. (former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras from 1996 to 1999, PhD from the Unviersity of Virginia and former professor of political science at Texas A&M) Letter to the Editor, January 31, 2012, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/opinion/us-policy-on-honduras-views-of-two-diplomats.html>

“In a decade-long crescendo of troubles pushing down from the United States and Mexico, the cartels and gangs are ever more aggressive. Police corruption follows. It is now early 2012. What an astoundingly wrong time to “cut off all police and military aid,” as suggested by Dana Frank. No, the evils of the drug trade must be met by an increased focus by the United States government to counter cartels. Security and hope for the future demand renewed commitment and funds for the Honduran part of the Mérida Initiative, an international agreement to fight drug trafficking and crime. It is in America’s national interest.”

5. Violence in Honduras

Link: Honduras needs US involvement to deal with its drug trade and criminal violence, and the damage from violent crime justifies the risks associated with US military support

Michael Shifter 2012. (M.A. sociology, Georgetown Univ.; President of the Inter-American Dialogue; Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; directed the Ford Foundation's governance and human rights program in the Andean region and Southern Cone. Subsequently he directed the Latin American and Caribbean program at the National Endowment for Democracy) 8 May 2012 NEW YORK TIMES, “Military Aid Is Unattractive, but Unavoidable” <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2967&s>=

The reality is that in today’s Honduras a government of any ideological stripe would turn to the military to counter the rampant drug trade and criminal violence. Honduras and other Central American nations are interested in greater collaboration with the United States, which offers a real opportunity for partnership. The rationale for U.S. involvement is compelling. As the largest consumer of cocaine, with an unhappy record of intervention in Central America, the United States bears responsibility to do what it can to help Honduras and other nations under siege. Concerns about destabilization as a result of U.S. military support are legitimate and should be addressed, but they should be viewed in relation to the immense damage that is already being done.

Brink: Honduras is in a “perfect storm” scenario of social crisis

Michael Shifter 2012 quoted in South African newspaper The Mail & Guardian. (M.A. sociology, Georgetown Univ.; President of the Inter-American Dialogue; Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; directed the Ford Foundation's governance and human rights program in the Andean region and Southern Cone. Subsequently he directed the Latin American and Caribbean program at the National Endowment for Democracy) Poverty and crime bring Honduras to its knees, 27 Feb 2012 MAIL &GUARDIAN ,<http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-27-poverty-and-crime-bring-honduras-to-its-knees/>

“The situation in Honduras is dire, arguably the most troubled in the region,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue think-tank. “The country presents a perfect storm: endemic poverty and notably fragile institutions buffeted by uncontrolled crime, aggravated by spillover from Mexico’s drug war and a profound political crisis.”

Link & Impact: Withdrawal of outside support opens the way for more crime

Michael Shifter 2012 quoted in South African newspaper The Mail & Guardian. (M.A. sociology, Georgetown Univ.; President of the Inter-American Dialogue; Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service; directed the Ford Foundation's governance and human rights program in the Andean region and Southern Cone. Subsequently he directed the Latin American and Caribbean program at the National Endowment for Democracy) Poverty and crime bring Honduras to its knees, 27 Feb 2012 MAIL &GUARDIAN ,<http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-27-poverty-and-crime-bring-honduras-to-its-knees/>

“Honduras’s isolation from the international community for two years did not help matters. The withdrawal of outside support as a way to punish the acting government only opened the way to heightened criminal activity.”

Impact: People die. Homicide rates rose after the U.S. suspended military & law enforcement aid in 2010

U.S. Congressman Connie Mack 2011. (Chairman of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS), “Holding Honduras Hostage: Revoked Visas and U.S. Policy,” Opening Statement, June 14, 2011, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/66899.pdf> (brackets added)

“On January 27 [2010], President Micheletti stepped down from power in accordance with the Constitution and handed over power peacefully to a democratically elected President-elect Pepe Lobo. What were the U.S. responses to these actions? After harshly labeling the situation a coup, the State Department cut funding for Honduran military and law enforcement programs. Since then, the homicide rate in Honduras has become one of the highest in the world.”

NEGATIVE BRIEF: HORN OF AFRICA/SOMALIA - US needs to stay involved

OVERVIEW / NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / OPENING QUOTE

This is the enemy we’re fighting: Suicide bombing college students and giving live hand grenades to kids

Morgan Roach 2011. ( research associate for Heritage Foundation; bachelor of arts degree in government from Sweet Briar College; master of science degree in European studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science) Al-Shabab’s Return to Mogadishu Signifies a Change in Strategy, 4 Oct 2011 (AMISOM = African Union multinational intervention force in Somalia. TFG = Transitional Federal Government, supported by the USA) <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/10/04/al-shabab%E2%80%99s-return-to-mogadishu-signifies-a-change-in-strategy/>

Though al-Shabab targets primarily AMISOM troops and TFG officials, the group has been known to launch attacks against Somalia’s academic community and educated elite. In December 2009, a suicide bomber attacked a university graduation ceremony in Mogadishu, killing 23, including government ministers, medical students, and doctors. Three months prior to the attack, al-Shabab warned the Ministry of Education about its use of “un-Islamic” textbooks. Al-Shabab’s educational methods range from awarding children fully automatic assault rifles and live hand grenades for their knowledge on al-Shabab trivia, to outlawing bells in schools because they sound too similar to church bells. According to al-Shabab’s deputy commander in chief, ShiekhMukhtarRobow, “Youths should use one hand for education and the other for a gun to defend Islam.”

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

We need to support TFG to bring stability to Somalia and fight off Al Shabaab

Rep Donald M. Payne 2011. (D-NJ, member of the House SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, and personally visited Somalia several times. He died in March 2012.) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

The TFG is planning a conference in Mogadishu, sponsored by the U.N., to bring together all of the Somali stakeholders. It is unclear whether Somaliland officials will attend. President Ahmed must be given support as he attempts to increase dialogue, promote stability, and fight off al-Shabaab, which continues to wreak havoc on the population.

We need to support creation of a central government in Somalia, or else its problems will get worse

former Ambassador David Shinn 2011. (Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington Univ; served for thirty-seven years in the US Foreign Service with assignments at embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sudan and as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

The problem is that you have an entity which has been a failed state since 1991. If that entity kept its problems entirely to itself, there probably wouldn’t be a great deal of concern in the United States about what was happening there. But it has gone far beyond that, now. Not only is it harming the Somali people themselves—and there are some Americans who inherently are interested in the Somali population, particularly the Somali-American population. So there is that direct interest. But now that it has gone so far beyond the borders of Somalia, with piracy, with terrorism that has extended outside, with even American links to terrorism in the form of Somali-Americans, some 30 of them or so who have been directly implicated, and the fact that it is impacting the stability of neighboring countries which are allies of the United States, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya, it is an issue that I think is properly of concern to the United States Government. It is in our interest to try to do something to help create a government that can, in fact, control the country. And until that time comes, my guess is these problems are going to get worse, not get better. I think that, essentially, is the rationale for it.

SIGNIFICANCE

US military presence in the Horn of Africa is insignificant

Sean Naylor 2011. (journalist) ARMY TIMES, “The Secret War: Africa ops may be just starting” 5 Dec 2011 (bracckets added) <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/12/army-africa-mission-may-be-just-starting-120511w/>

“There’s been a lot of very challenging things done there and, sadly, we’re going to have to do,” said the senior intelligence official. But although the CIA and JSOC continue to be active in Somalia — a recent article in The Nation outlined close links between CIA and the TFG’s intelligence agency — the military has no permanent presence in the country, the intelligence official said. After expanding for most of the past seven years, JSOC’s presence in the Horn “is steady — it’s definitely plateaued,” the senior intelligence official said. In fact, the official said, it’s probably dropped a bit” because a couple of “the key targets” have been killed. There are no JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] personnel in Somaliland, Sudan or Eritrea and only a very small intelligence team in Ethiopia, the official said. “On a given day in Kenya, you probably have a couple of dozen guys — that’s about it,” the official said.

INHERENCY

Obama’s approach is working in Somalia: Kill Al-Qaeda leaders without civilian casualties

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

Under the Bush administration, the use of airstrikes against al-Qaeda targets resulted in heavy collateral damage and outraged the local population. The Obama administration’s approach promises to be more fruitful. The U.S. Navy’s September 14, 2009, strike against Saleh Ali SalehNabhan, a top East Africa al-Qaeda operative, could provide a blueprint for future military counterterror operations in Somalia. In the precision strike, which was preceded by extensive surveillance, several navy helicopters swept in and attacked Nabhan while he was in transit through an isolated rural area, thus reducing the likelihood of civilian casualties and a popular backlash against the attack. Indeed in the absence of civilian casualties, the Somali public barely seemed to register the assault. If the Obama administration is careful to avoid collateral damage, it might be able to eliminate foreign al-Qaeda targets without undermining important political objectives in Somalia.

New “Second Track Strategy”: We’re reaching out to other groups inside Somalia besides TFG

Dr J. Peter Pham 2011. (DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL; was a tenured associate professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and Africana Studies at James Madison Univ.; has served on the Senior Advisory Group of the US Africa Command since its creation) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf> (brackets added)

Last fall, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, announced a "second-track strategy" that would supplement America's hitherto policy of virtually unconditional -- and, quite frankly, at times poorly -informed -- support for the TFG. The new approach included greater formal engagement with government officials from Somaliland and Puntland with an eye to "looking for ways to strengthen their capacity both to govern and to deliver services to their people." America's top Africa diplomat acknowledged both that Somaliland and Puntland were "zones of relative political and civil stability," and that "they will, in fact, be a bulwark against extremism and radicalism that might emerge from the south." Significantly, he also held out the prospect of dealings with other forces in Somalia and delinked them from the feckless TFG: [quoting Carson]

Equally as part of the second-track strategy, we are going to reach out to groups in south central Somalia, groups in local governments, clans, and sub-clans that are opposed to Al-Shabaab, the radical extremist group in the south, but are not allied formally or directly with the TFG. And we will look for opportunities to work with these groups to see if we can identify them, find ways of supporting their development initiatives and activities. [end Carson quote]

Shortly after Secretary Carson announced the "second-track strategy," his example was followed by the African Union. After long refusing to even acknowledge their existence, the pan-African organization's Peace and Security Council directed AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping to "broaden consultations with Somaliland and Puntland as part of the overall efforts to promote stability and further peace and reconciliation in Somalia." While the new U.S. policy has yet to be fully worked out, it nonetheless represents a dramatic and long-overdue shift for which the administration deserves credit.

The new Dual-Track strategy is the shortest path to reconciliation in Somalia

Bronwyn Bruton 2011. **(**democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

Two, the State Department’s new Dual Track strategy better reflects the political reality on the ground in Somalia, and has the potential to do less harm than previous policies. If pursued cautiously, the Dual Track strategy could provide the space and resources for a much-needed period of stabilization, normalization, and economic growth in Somalia. Normalization is not as grand a goal as state-building, but it is not a modest policy goal either. It is the shortest path to reconciliation, and to the emergence of a truly homegrown solution to the Somali crisis.

Obama is limiting US military involvement in Somalia

Bronwyn Bruton 2011. **(**democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

Washington’s measured response to the Kampala bombings, when it wisely refused to bow to regional pressure to pump additional money and troops into Mogadishu, has made it painfully clear that the Obama administration will not allow Somalia to become a quagmire for U.S. troops, or funds, or forces, that the utility of al-Qaeda investment there is therefore limited, and that the only real victim of the ongoing military stalemate is Somalia’s endlesslysuffering civilian population.

MINOR REPAIR: Continue “dual track” strategy and add more food aid

Bronwyn Bruton 2011. **(**democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

Fifth and last, in order for the Dual Track strategy to stand any chance of succeeding, the U.S. needs urgently to revisit its de facto decision to suspend humanitarian funding to the Somali territories controlled by al-Shabaab. Without a dramatic increase in humanitarian aid, tens of thousands of Somalis will die. But providing food to Somalia is not solely a humanitarian imperative. The failure to meet the most basic human requirements of Somalia’s population conflicts with every precept of counterinsurgency strategy, and will undoubtedly deliver some desperate communities into the hands of al-Shabaab.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Al Shabab resurgence

Link: Affirmative cancels US military support for the fight against Al Shabab (militant Islamic group in Somalia)

Link: US is currently supporting African Union

Gen. William Ward 2010. (US Army, commander of US Africa Command) 11 Mar 2010 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4152&lang=0>

If you take the case of Somalia, obviously, with where we are, and the transitional federal government that's there, and the fact that the African Union -- which wasn't the case when we were there 17 years ago. There's a continental-wide organization that has said that we will do our best to help bring this Transitional Federal Government into a place where it can begin to exert some control over that vast territory. The problem with Somalia is the lack of a government. It's the lack of effective governance. But there are things being done to address that. It is truly an international effort. It requires the support of the global community. And the response that the United States has in that endeavor is -- and the thing that we are doing -- to try to reinforce the work of this transition government; to reinforce the work of the African Union, its mission in Somalia, AMISOM, as they have fielded peacekeeping forces, African peacekeeping forces, who have familiarity, have understanding.

Link: African Union is driving out Al Shabab

Associated Press 2012. Nations pledge help, demand progress in Somalia, 23 Feb 2012 USA TODAY <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-02-23/somalia-al-qaeda/53220606/1>

Somalia has had transitional administrations for the past seven years, but has not had a functioning central government since 1991, when warlords overthrew a longtime dictator and turned on each other, plunging the nation into chaos. In a joint communique, leaders hailed tentative signs of progress — with pirate attacks in decline and al-Shabab largely driven out of the capital Mogadishu by an African Union peacekeeping mission.

Link: Al Shabab has joined forces with Al Qaeda

Brink: Al Shabab has been divided and weakened, but they hope alliance with Al Qaeda will revive it

Morgan Roach 2012. (research associate for Heritage Foundation; bachelor of arts degree in government from Sweet Briar College; master of science degree in European studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science ) Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda Join Forces 14 Feb 2012 <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/02/14/al-shabab-and-al-qaeda-join-forces/>

Despite territorial claims to nearly all south and central Somalia, in the past 18 months al-Shabab has suffered internal divisions, tactical errors, and low levels of popular support, forcing it to reassess its viability as an independent organization. In August, Shabab militants unexpectedly withdrew from Mogadishu and vowed to wage asymmetrical attacks against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union peacekeepers (AMISOM). While al-Shabab followed through on this promise, its operations were severely disrupted by a Kenyan incursion last November, attacks by Ethiopian forces, and an increased level of AMISOM troops. By allying itself with al-Qaeda, al-Shabab hopes to revive its insurgency against the TFG. Just as Somalia’s neighbors and countries that are contributing to AMISOM have escalated their attacks against al-Shabab, the Somali terrorist organization is responding with the backing of al-Qaeda.

Brink: It’s almost game over for Al Shabab

KumerraGemechu 2012. (journalist) REUTERS news service, “Somali residents welcome Ethiopian troops after rebel rout” 4 Mar 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/04/us-somalia-conflict-ethiopia-idUSTRE8230M620120304>

The enemy forces were disoriented and disintegrated. They were incapable," said General YohannesGebre-Giorgis, Commander of the Ethiopian Forces in Somalia. "The people have now deserted them. So there is no way they can survive here. It is almost game over for al Shabaab."

IMPACTS TO AL-SHABAB:

IMPACT 1. Sharia (strict Islamic) law and its human rights abuses

Al Shabab is allied with Al-Qaeda and wants to impose strict Islamic law and eliminate infidels in Somalia

Dr. Ray Walser 2010. (PhD; former career foreign service officer with US State Dept.; directed the Foreign Service Institute's program of Western Hemisphere Area Studies; was a visiting professor of international relations and Latin America politics at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point) 13 July 2010 Somalia’s al-Shabab and the Long War on Terrorism, (brackets in original) <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/07/13/somalias-al-shabab-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism/>

Sunday’s terror attacks in Kampala, Uganda are now known to be the work of Somalia’s Al-Shabab [the Youth], a self-declared ally of Osama bin Laden and operating arm of al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabab is increasingly being run by foreign fighters trained in Afghanistan. The group is also closely linked to Islamists in Yemen and to Yemini-American cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi, the spiritual adviser to the Fort Hood shooter, Major Nidal Hasan. The venomous religious-ideological core of al-Shabab is readily apparent. As an Islamist organization, al-Shabab’s aims are to drive out or intimidate moderate Muslims in Somalia, impose strict *sharia* law, and eliminate infidels. While al-Shabab cast aspects of its radical views in nationalist and tribal terms, its core message is war against “Christian invaders.”

Al Shabab = Sharia law and human rights abuse

KumerraGemechu 2012. (journalist) REUTERS news service, “Somali residents welcome Ethiopian troops after rebel rout” 4 Mar 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/04/us-somalia-conflict-ethiopia-idUSTRE8230M620120304>

Al Shabaab, which announced in February that it was merging with al Qaeda, imposed a harsh interpretation of Islamic sharia law. In areas under its control, music, movies and soccer were banned and people were beheaded or had limbs amputated as punishments.

IMPACT 2. Killings & Violence within Somalia. Somalis welcome Ethiopians because they end Al Shabab’s killing and violence

KumerraGemechu 2012. (journalist) REUTERS news service, “Somali residents welcome Ethiopian troops after rebel rout” 4 Mar 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/04/us-somalia-conflict-ethiopia-idUSTRE8230M620120304>

After three years of killings and violence under the rule of al Shabaab rebels, residents of the Somali city of Baidoa said they were happy to see the arrival of Ethiopian soldiers, whose presence they once resented. Under al Shabaab's control, Baidoa's leaders say the city's people became poorer, conditions worsened and many were forced to flee. The return of Ethiopian troops, once seen as Christian invaders in a Muslim country, was a welcome relief. Ethiopian and Somali troops seized the city from al Shabaab insurgents last month, in a major blow to the militants battling Somalia's weak interim government.

IMPACT 3. Serious terrorism threat in the USA.

Al Shabab threatens terrorism against the US homeland

Rep. Christopher Smith 2011. (R-NJ; chairman of the House International Relations Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEFAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

On August 5th, 2010, more than a dozen Somali-Americans, permanent residents, were arrested. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 14 people were being charged with providing support for al-Shabaab. Two indictments unsealed in Minnesota stated that Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan raised funds for al-Shabaab, detailing 12 money transfers in 2008 and 2009. The danger to America posed by al-Shabaab and its supporters in this country continues to be very serious. In his nomination hearing to become Secretary of Defense last month, CIA Director Leon Panetta noted that al-Shabaab’s threat ‘‘to the U.S. homeland is on the rise.’

Al Shabab radicalizes Somalis abroad to commit terror in their adopted countries

Scott Erickson 2011. (Master of Science degree in Criminal Justice Studies from the University of Cincinnati) 4 Nov 2011 “Suicide Blast in Somalia Raising Concerns at Home” <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/11/04/suicide-blast-in-somalia-raising-concerns-at-home/>

Following a devastating suicide blast earlier in the week in Somalia’s capital city of Mogadishu, leaders from the regional terror group al Shabaab issued a statement declaring that the perpetrator of the attack was American Abdisalan Hussein Ali. In an audio tape released by al Shabaab, and purported to be of Abdisalan Ali, the speaker exhorts the virtues of jihad and calls on his Western brothers to join the fight: “My brothers and sisters, do jihad in America, do jihad in Canada, do jihad in England, anywhere in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in China, in Australia, anywhere you find kafir (unbelievers). Fight them and be firm against them.” Ali, 22, had been raised in the predominately Somali-American communities around Minneapolis. His transformation from a popular high school student to an Islamist radical willing to die for jihad underscores several disconcerting phenomena facing the American homeland, most notably that of domestic radicalization and the growing threat posed by foreign fighters.

Radicalized Somalis are a grave terrorist threat in the West

Note: In context, the author is talking about Somali “foreign fighters” - note the title of the article and the context established by the card above

Scott Erickson 2011. (Master of Science degree in Criminal Justice Studies from the University of Cincinnati) 4 Nov 2011 “Suicide Blast in Somalia Raising Concerns at Home” <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/11/04/suicide-blast-in-somalia-raising-concerns-at-home/>

Foreign fighters also pose a grave threat to their Western countries of origin. Having traveled overseas and experienced a level of terrorist training unlike what could be obtained at home, upon return the foreign fighter represents a far more sophisticated threat than that posed by individuals whose radicalization remained either local or cyber in nature. If their surreptitious travel overseas goes undetected, foreign fighters can return to their Western homelands and employ their terrorist inclinations in devastating ways. They possess an extensive level of training and experience coupled with an indispensable ability to travel freely within the country—critical elements to fomenting a potentially lethal act of terror.

IMPACT 4. Exporting terrorism to neighbors in Africa. Al Shabab is exporting terrorism to neighboring Uganda

Rep. Ed Royce 2011. (R-Calif; Chairman of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

And this is something that we are going to look at today—because Somalia has been a failed state for an awfully long period of time. But nowhere are the consequences of Somalia more evident than when it comes to international terrorism and the threat from al-Shabaab, which is, as we designate it, a foreign terrorist organization. And in the past few years, al-Shabaab threat, of course, has grown dramatically to the U.S. We have seen in the theater of Somalia, the roadside bombs, the suicide blasts that come out of this organization. Militant compounds resemble, as the press reports it, ‘‘Pakistan-style terror training camps.’’ And because of the influx of foreign fighters into this area, the neighborhoods around Mogadishu are referenced by locals there as ‘‘Little Afghanistan.’’ A year ago, al-Shabaab conducted its first attacks outside of Somalia. They killed 76 people, including one American, in Kampala, Uganda.

2. Safe haven for Al Qaeda

Link & Brink: We have to make sure Al Qaeda doesn’t find safe haven in Somalia

Rep. Christopher Smith 2011. (R-NJ; chairman of the House International Relations Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEFAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

On August 5th, 2010, more than a dozen Somali-Americans, permanent residents, were arrested. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 14 people were being charged with providing support for al-Shabaab. Two indictments unsealed in Minnesota stated that Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan raised funds for al-Shabaab, detailing 12 money transfers in 2008 and 2009. The danger to America posed by al-Shabaab and its supporters in this country continues to be very serious. In his nomination hearing to become Secretary of Defense last month, CIA Director Leon Panetta noted that al-Shabaab’s threat ‘‘to the U.S. homeland is on the rise.’’ Mr. Panetta also expressed concern that as al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan comes under pressure, that it is not able to find a safe haven in Somalia.

Brink: Al Qaida is in critical phase. If we sustain pressure, it will make AQ have only symbolic importance - Current focus needs to be on its regional affiliates, they are driving global jihad

James Clapper 2012. (Director of National Intelligence) 16 Feb 2012 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, <http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16b.html>

The intelligence community sees the next two to three years as a critical transition phase for the terrorist threat, particularly for Al Qaida and like-minded groups. With Osama bin Laden's death the global jihadist movement lost its most iconic and inspirational leader. The new Al Qaida commander is less charismatic, and the death or capture of prominent Al Qaida has shrunk the group's top leadership layer. However, even with its degraded capabilities and its focus on small, simpler plots, Al Qaida remains a threat. As long as we sustain the pressure, we judge that core Al Qaida will be of largely symbolic importance to the global jihadist movement. But regional affiliates, and to a lesser extent, small cells and individuals will drive the global jihad agenda.

Impact: Al Qaeda could use Somalia as a safe haven to launch terror attacks around the world

BRIAN ROSS, AVNI PATEL and DANA HUGHES 2008. (journalists) ABC NEWS, “Somalia: A New al Qaeda Safe Haven?” 1 Dec 2008 <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6363800>

A group of Islamic militants called al-Shabaab now controls much of southern and central Somalia, and U.S. officials fear that the group, which swears allegiance to Osama bin Laden, is now strong enough to take over the country's capital, Mogadishu, and defeat the weak, American-backed government there. "U.S. security interests are gravely threatened if a country again becomes what Afghanistan used to be: a safe haven for al Qaeda, a government run by al Qaeda affiliates, and a place where al Qaeda supporters from around the world can come safely and train to get ready to launch terrorist attacks around the world," said former White House counterterrorism advisor and ABC News Consultant Richard Clarke.

3. Famine

Link: Absence of unified Somali government exacerbated the 2011 famine

Dr. Richard Joseph 2012.( PhD; Professor of International History and Politics at Northwestern Univ) INSECURITY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN AFRICA <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2012/01_top_priorities_foresight_africa/01_insecurity_counter_insurgency_joseph.pdf>

The absence of a single national state and multifaceted warfare exacerbated the 2011 drought and famine. Several authors have suggested the need to resurrect the U.N. trusteeship system to manage countries in which no sovereign authority exists and where the people experience extreme suffering. Whatever the specific outcomes, a comprehensive global effort involving all necessary military, diplomatic and humanitarian actions should be undertaken to end the lawlessness in what used to be the nation of Somalia. It is not just the security of the Somali people and those of the region that has been undermined, but also world security, due to the crime and warfare in this largely ungoverned territory with an extensive sea coast.

Impact: Severe humanitarian crisis

Nancy Lindborg 2011. (ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT,AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT) 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

General insecurity and lawlessness prevents aid workers from reliably reaching more than 60 percent of the people in Somalia who need life-saving assistance, again primarily in the south. In January 2010, the World Food Program suspended their operations in southern Somalia because of threats and unacceptable conditions created by these armed groups, particularly al-Shabaab. Many other international NGOs are also unable to operate safely in southern Somalia, and this lack of access has created a severe, unabated humanitarian crisis and contributed to the significant outflow of refugees.

4. Piracy

Link: Piracy is caused by instability on land

Donald Yamamoto 2011. (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OFAFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

During 2011, we have used funding to assist Somalis in clearing the streets of Mogadishu of garbage and sand, provided streetlights in Mogadishu, and provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance to combat corruption. The increasing piracy problem off the coast of Somalia stems from years of instability, lack of governance, and economic fragility on land. The tragic death of four innocent Americans this past Februarywas tragic, and provided a sober demonstration of the need to do more to address this problem.

Link: Instability in Somalia fuels piracy - we need to target and confront it

Donald Yamamoto 2011. (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OFAFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

Right now, just something on the piracy. You know, the piracy is symptomatic of the instability within Somalia. When I was first the Ambassador in Djibouti, we saw the first cargo ship being hijacked, and we said, ‘‘That is not a good thing.’’ And so from that point on, we have seen the rates of hijackings and hostage-taking grow from about 11 ships, about 276 hostages, to earlier this year about 53 ships and over 500 hostages. And that has kind of gone down now, to 17 and 390 hostages, but that is because of the monsoon season. And this increase is taking place at a time when we are expanding the international presence of Task Force 150, 151. And so what it underscores is that the problem is basically not a piracy issue, but reflective of the instability in Somalia. And that is an issue that we need to target and to confront.

Link: Anti-piracy efforts at sea need land support to succeed

(“Pyrrhic” victories are scenarios where you win the battle but the cost is so high that the victory is worthless)

Tara Helfman& Dan O’Shea 2011.( Helfman teaches law at Syracuse University College of Law. O’Shea established and served as the coordinator of the Hostage Working Group at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq; a fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, and a Navy SEAL Commander in the Naval Reserves) Terrorism and Piracy: The New Alliance COMMENTARY, Feb 2011 [http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/#](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/)

This is not to say that the international community has ignored Somali piracy altogether. The U.S. Navy and the European Union Naval Force have been conducting active operations to deter and repress Somali piracy. Reports of their successful interruption of pirate attacks abound, from 2009’s dramatic rescue of the captain of the *Maersk Alabama* by Navy SEALs to the successful protection of humanitarian aid ships by the European Union’s naval contingent. But without sufficient support on land, many of their victories at sea have been Pyrrhic. When pirates are captured, they are generally handed over to local East African authorities that lack either the capacity or the will to prosecute them. Though in October 2010, the Somali government and the African Union Commission asked the UN Security Council to impose a full blockade on the Somali coast to curtail piracy and the influx of foreign fighters and weaponry, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon responded with only a pledge to continue international engagement in Somalia with a “light footprint.” But as conditions in Somalia deteriorate, it is hard to imagine a lighter footprint than the one already left by the world body.

Brink: We have to break the link between piracy and terrorism in Somalia soon, or else the consequences will be incalculable

Tara Helfman& Dan O’Shea 2011.( Helfman teaches law at Syracuse University College of Law. O’Shea established and served as the coordinator of the Hostage Working Group at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq; a fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, and a Navy SEAL Commander in the Naval Reserves) Terrorism and Piracy: The New Alliance COMMENTARY, Feb 2011, [http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/#](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/)

Allowing Somalia to become the stronghold of what must increasingly be seen as a new variant on the Islamist terrorist network that is already in a state of war with the West would be a major blow to international security. If the link between these two forces is not soon broken, the consequences will be incalculable. Seen from the perspective of an Islamic world that is testing the will of the democratic West to prevail over terrorism, the spectacle of captured pirates being allowed to slip through the cracks of international law is proof that Islamists are poised to prevail. Just as the “broken windows” theory of urban policing illustrates the importance of not letting any crime go unpunished, so the West must see piracy as a potent threat that must be vanquished and not merely a series of human-interest stories about released hostages; otherwise the problem will only fester. Even worse, despite the unique nature of Somalia’s problems, the West’s inability to cope with the pirates will come to be seen as a new model of success for terrorism.

Impact 1: Piracy funds terrorism and jihad

Tara Helfman& Dan O’Shea 2011.( Helfman teaches law at Syracuse University College of Law. O’Shea established and served as the coordinator of the Hostage Working Group at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq; a fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, and a Navy SEAL Commander in the Naval Reserves) Terrorism and Piracy: The New Alliance COMMENTARY, Feb 2011, [http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/#](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/)

At this point, however, the absence of any effective legitimate authority in Somalia is a greater threat to the growth of transparent, independent government in that country than anything else. Piracy and al-Shabaab rose from the ashes of the Somali conflagration of the 1990s and early 2000s, and now they are fueling a new fire. Two forms of hostage-terrorism—one for profit and one for ideology—are finding common ground in their mutual utility. Allowing this connection to proliferate will not only shatter any hope of a free and stable Somali state; it will also create a new sanctuary from which Muslim extremists can project jihad abroad.

Cash-strapped Islamic terrorists can ally with wealthy pirate militias

Tara Helfman & Dan O’Shea 2011.( Helfman teaches law at Syracuse University College of Law. O’Shea established and served as the coordinator of the Hostage Working Group at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq; a fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, and a Navy SEAL Commander in the Naval Reserves) Terrorism and Piracy: The New Alliance COMMENTARY, Feb 2011, [http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/#](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/terrorism-and-piracy-the-new-alliance/)

Somalia’s pirate militias pose a threat not only to worldwide commerce but also to global security. As Somali pirates gain strength at sea, they strengthen their position on land. A fragile transitional government propped up by the international community is under threat from two directions. From the south, the al-Qaeda-backed militant group al-Shabaab has pledged the overthrow of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in the cause of global jihad. In the north, pirate militias have all but wrested control of the province of Puntland from the central government. The potential for collaboration between the cash-strapped but powerful al-Shabaab and the wealthy, strategically positioned pirate clans of the north makes Somalia a new frontline in the global war against Islamic terrorism.

Impact 2: Economic impact of piracy

Rep. Christopher Smith 2011. (R-NJ; chairman of the House International Relations Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEFAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

However, the most serious involvement of Somalia in international criminal activity is, by far, piracy. Pirate attacks in the waters off Somalia, and off the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S. flag vessels, have brought renewed international attention to the long-standing problem of maritime piracy. According to the International Maritime Bureau, at least 219 attacks occurred in the region in 2010, with 49 successful hijackings. Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia’s eastern coastline, and outward into the Indian Ocean. Using increasingly sophisticated tactics, these pirates now operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far south as the Mozambique Channel. Somalia’s pirate economy has grown substantially in the past 2 years, with ransoms now averaging more than $5 million. The annual cost of piracy to the global economy ranges from some $7–12 billion, by some estimates.

5. International menace: Drug & Human Trafficking

Rep. Christopher Smith 2011. (R-NJ; chairman of the House International Relations Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEFAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

While al-Shabaab appears more focused at this point on carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and African Union peacekeeping forces in Somalia, it has, however, threatened to attack neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Kenya. For far too long, Somalia has been a cancer on the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere on the continent. Criminals from Somalia have not only plagued surrounding countries, but have been reportedly involved in drug and human trafficking as far south as South Africa.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE - good

Strategy Notes:

Some of the Negative strategy depends on what position the Affirmative takes with regard to Russia’s view of the US missile defense program in Europe. If the Affirmative is arguing that we should stop the MD program because Russia opposes it (and Russia may pull out of the START treaty in retaliation), you have to choose whether you want to argue A) that Russia does not really oppose it very badly and would not actually pull out of START; or B) agree that Russia opposes it and would pull out of START and that would be a good thing, so we should continue with the Status Quo -- then run Disadvantages on why the START treaty is bad. In this brief, the “Russia will not oppose missile defense evidence” is in the front of the brief, and the “Russia will oppose and drop out of START” evidence is in the Disadvantages section, since preserving the START treaty could be a bad thing.

We have evidence for both positions in this brief, but you may run into trouble if you try to run both. You could always try to argue in the alternative: “Russia won’t get mad enough to pull out of START, but even if they did, that would be a good thing because START is bad.” If you think a judge will buy that line of argumentation, that could work and would give the judge more reasons to vote Negative. Otherwise, pick one or the other and be careful to argue consistently with whatever position you choose. In either case, explain your Negative position on Russia to the judge in the 1NC.

RUSSIA OPPOSES MISSILE DEFENSE - RESPONSES

Having it both ways: You can't claim missile defense won't work and then claim that Russia fears it because it will take out their missiles

Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering 2008. (Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. As Director, General Obering is the Acquisition Executive for all ballistic missile defense systems and programs ) 30 May 2008 RESPONSE TO "MISSILE DEFENSE MALFUNCTION": Setting the Record Straight (ellipses in original) <http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/002.html>

Coyle and Samson have it both ways when they claim the operational performance of Ground-Based Midcourse Defense has not been demonstrated against real-world threats. Yet they give full credence to a concern that a system in Europe would be capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs. They also accept too readily Russian "fears" that defensive interceptors could be converted to offensive missiles. Besides the fact that our future activities with the European sites will be transparent to the Russians and the host nations, this concern does not make military sense. We already have mature mobile offensive forces on sea-based and airborne platforms.

1) Russia is now taking a more open stance

2) Some allied governments are considering Russia’s position before deciding to accept missile defense

Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek 2011. (Hildreth - Specialist in Missile Defense; Ek - Specialist in International Relations) 11 Jan 2011 Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Congressional Research Service <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41549.pdf>

Russia, although initially positive over the cancellation of the Bush Administration’s plan, later found reason to criticize the Obama plan, reviving the argument that it would compromise Russia’s nuclear forces. Regarding possible NATO cooperation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in January 2010 that Russia had “told the U.S. and NATO that it is necessary to start everything from scratch—to jointly analyze the origin and types of missile proliferation risks and threats.” In the ensuing months, however, the Russian government appeared to take a more open stance toward the program. In addition, analysts maintain that eventual Russian acceptance of — and possible participation in—the PAA system would be an important consideration for some allied governments as they decided whether to accept adoption of an alliance territorial missile defense.

Russian opposition to missile defense can be dismissed - they probably oppose it because we can afford it and they can't

Agence France Press 2010.(French news agency). 18 May 2010 START places no limit on US missile defense: Clinton, Gates (brackets added) <http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/START_places_no_limit_on_US_missile_defense_Clinton_Gates_999.html>

Russia has said it reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if Washington presses ahead with missile defense systems in a way that Moscow opposes. But [Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates dismissed concerns about Russian opposition, saying Moscow has always objected to anti-missile programs. The defense secretary, a Washington veteran and former CIA director, said "the Russians have hated missile defense ever since the strategic arms talks began in 1969." "And so the notion that this treaty has somehow focused this antagonism on the part of the Russians, toward missile defense, all I would say is it's the latest chapter in a long line of Russian objections to our proceeding with missile defense," he said. He said Russia had always opposed it probably "because we can afford it and they can't."

Russia says Obama's modified missile defense policy is a "responsible approach" and they will continue dialog

Congressional Research Service 2010.(Jim Nichol, Coordinator, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs; William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance; Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations; Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs; Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy; Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense; Vincent Morelli, Section Research Manager) CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 29 Jan 2010 Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf>

One day after the meeting, however, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that if the Obama administration decided to pursue missile defense unilaterally, Russia might be reluctant to reduce its nuclear arsenal. As noted above, in September 2009 the Obama Administration’s announced that it would modify the U.S. approach to missile defense. In Russia, President Dmitry Medvedev called the change “a responsible move,” adding that “we value the responsible approach of the U.S. President to our agreement. I am ready to continue our dialogue.”

Russian Foreign Minister says Obama's current missile defense plan poses little to no threat to Russia

Justin Baker 2010. (second year master’s candidate at the University of Southern California, specializing in homeland security and statistical risk analysis. In 2009, he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from UC Davis with bachelor degrees in both political science and history) May 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOURNAL, Univ. of Calif.-Davis, The Russo-American Missile Shield: A Tenuous Display of Transnational Cooperation on Global ICBM Defense (ellipses in original) <http://www.davisiaj.org/?p=595>

After an April 2010 summit in Estonia, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the United States have expressed optimism that substantial missile defense talks will involve Russia in the coming months. However, Moscow warns that an attempt by the U.S. to significantly expand its own missile defense would compel Russia to exit any prospective agreements. Still, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov affirmed in an April 2010 interview that Obama’s current plans for missile defense expansion posed little-to-no threat to the national security interests of Russia.

Just bluffing: Russia actually cannot afford to escalate an arms race in response to missile defense

Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek 2011. (Hildreth - Specialist in Missile Defense; Ek - Specialist in International Relations) 11 Jan 2011 Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Congressional Research Service <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41549.pdf> (ellipses in original)

In an address to the nation on November 30, Russian President Medvedev buttressed his case for striking a deal with Washington on missile defense. The Russian leader emphasized that the absence of such an agreement might lead to a new arms buildup—one that a financially-strapped Russia could ill afford: “We will either come to terms on missile defense and form a full-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation or ... we will plunge into a new arms race and have to think of deploying new strike means, and it’s obvious that this scenario will be very hard.” A Russian political analyst noted that “we know that it was the arms race that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. ... Russia is not ready financially for a new arms race.”

MISSILE DEFENSE IS GOOD / WILL WORK

Missile defense testing has shown it to be effective, and it can deal with countermeasures

Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering 2008. (Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. As Director, General Obering is the Acquisition Executive for all ballistic missile defense systems and programs ) 30 May 2008 RESPONSE TO "MISSILE DEFENSE MALFUNCTION": Setting the Record Straight <http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/002.html>

We have demonstrated the effectiveness of our integrated missile defense system in our tests with 34 of 42 successful intercepts since 2001. These include six of nine successes against long range targets, with four using warhead decoys or countermeasures. While we expect countermeasures could be used by our adversaries, we also believe significant numbers of missiles are deployed today without them. With respect to countermeasures, Coyle and Samson look only at the performance of the kill vehicle sensor. In fact, our capability against countermeasures is significantly greater when you consider we are employing layered defenses, a redundant network of land-based and sea-based sensors, and advanced algorithms. Our ability to defeat countermeasures will be greatly improved in the future as we introduce a capability to destroy many objects with a single interceptor.

Missile defense can deal with decoys

Dr. James Carafano 2009. (PhD; former Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point; visiting professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University, directs Heritage Foundation's Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ) 26 May 2009 Press Release Reporting on Missile Defense (brackets in original) <http://nrinstitute.org/mediamalpractice/?p=245>

Warrick and Smith wrote that “[m]oreover, if Iran were to build a nuclear-capable missile that could strike Europe, the defense shield proposed by the United States ‘could not engage that missile,’ the report says. The missile interceptors could also be easily fooled by decoys and other simple countermeasures, the report concludes.” This statement is factually incorrect. The report acknowledges that the X-Band radar can “collect high-resolution data on each target.” Thus, the US system would have some capability to distinguish between decoys and warheads. In addition, Iran does not currently have functional decoys. Furthermore, the US has the technical capability to develop countermeasures to the employment of decoys before Iran could field an effective decoy system. Thus, a ground-based system in Europe would be much more effective against an Iranian missile threat than the article suggests.

Missile defense system will work and is the only option left after diplomacy, arms control and deterrence fail

Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering 2008. (Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.; he is Acquisition Executive for all ballistic missile defense systems and programs ) 30 May 2008 RESPONSE TO "MISSILE DEFENSE MALFUNCTION": Setting the Record Straight <http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/002.html>

Year after year, test after test, we are taking the technical challenges we face in missile defense off the table and therefore undermining long held positions of our critics. Not only will the missile defense system work, but it can bring stability that would not have been possible otherwise. But if diplomacy, arms control and deterrence fail, missile defense is the option left to protect our nation, allies and forces.

Missile defense tests are successful

Baker Spring 2011.( master’s degree in national security studies from Georgetown University; F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation) “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Success a Major Step Forward” <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/04/15/sea-based-missile-defense-test-success-a-major-step-forward/>

In the wee hours of the morning of April 15, the U.S. Navy conducted a successful test of its Aegis ballistic missile defense system. The test marks a major milestone in U.S. missile defense capabilities because it signals that the Aegis system’s existing interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 Block IA (SM-3 IA), likely has an inherent capability to counter strategic missiles. This is because the target missile destroyed in this intercept test, which is of intermediate range, has characteristics that are not that different from strategic missiles. On this basis, the U.S. may be able to accelerate the fielding of sea-based missile defenses, as well as their land-based counterpart (called Aegis Ashore), for countering strategic missiles well in advance of the current 2020 target date.

Missile defense testing is successful

Ronald O'Rourke 2012. (Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service) 19 Mar 2012, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf>

Table A-1 presents a DOD summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. As shown inthe table, DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 18 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 23 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful intercepts in 4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 3 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 21 successful intercepts in 26 attempts.

Missile threat from 30 countries justifies NATO missile defense

Pieter-HenkSchroor 2012. (an official with the Dutch Ministry of Defense) 13 Mar 2012 “Enhancing NATO’s Missile Defence” <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85153.htm?selectedLocale=en>

“From intelligence we know that now more than 30 countries have or are acquiring ballistic missiles. They do not pose an immediate threat, but in the long run it could become a threat and in order to be prepared for that, we think it is important that NATO develops ballistic missile defence capability and that the Netherlands participates in contributing to that capability,” says Pieter-HenkSchroor from the Dutch Ministry of Defence.

Defense Science Board task force review says: European missile defense is on the right track and will provide effective defenses

Admiral William J. Fallon, General Lester Lyles & Paul Kaminski 2011. (Members of a Defense Science Board task force on missile defense. Fallon - U.S. Navy, retired, task force co-chairman. Lyles -U.S. Air Force, retired, task force co-chairman and DSB vice chairman. Kaminski - DSB chairman) published under the title “‘Early Intercept’ Not Flawed,” Washington Times, July 6, 2011, quoted by Ronald O'Rourke (Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service) 19 Mar 2012, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf> (brackets added)

The DSB [Defense Science Board] concluded that the Missile Defense Agency is on the right track in developing European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA) options, including continued evolution of the SM-3 family of missiles, which will expand the battle space and provide more engagement opportunities in the regional defense provided by the EPAA. The DSB also examined the potential in the EPAA context for EI [early intercept] in regional defense against short-range missiles before threat payloads could be deployed, and concluded that this was not a viable option because of technical constraints - primarily related to the very short payload deployment times and the present absence of adequate sensors/Ballistic Missile C3 to overcome this. The fact that this form of EI is not viable in shorter-range regional applications does not imply that either SM-3 family interceptors or the EPAA concept are flawed. In general, EI [early intercept], including intercepts of longer- range missiles before the threat missile reaches apogee, can provide for multiple engagement opportunities and more effective defenses. MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is on the right track in pursuing this capability for national missile defense, and examining the potential application in regional defense as a function of the range of threat missiles.

Iran is building missile defense

Russian news agency RIA NOVOSTI 2010. 22 Apr 2010 Iran plans to produce missile defense systems similar to Russia's S-300 <http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100422/158694709.html>

Iran intends to produce missile defense systems similar to Russia's S-300 system, the county's PressTV channel said on Thursday, quoting Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi. Answering the question on whether Iran has plans to produce an S-300 defense system, Vahidi said, "We don't need to produce the S-300 system, but we have plans on the agenda to produce similar weapons."

MINOR REPAIRS (MRs): These minor repairs could solve for some or all the issues with European missile defense without canceling it

MR 1. Provide legally binding guarantee to Russia - no use of missile defense against them.

Analysis: Russia wants “either” a legally binding guarantee that we won’t use MD against them OR full participation in the MD program and changing its scope. The second option is complicated and the US and NATO won’t do it, but it’s easy to do the first option. Just offer Russia a treaty where we agree to that condition, have the Senate ratify it, and Russia will be happy. Since MD isn’t intended to be used against Russia anyway, it shouldn’t make any difference to us.

Dr. Polina Sinovets 2011. (PhD with dissertation on US/Russia nuclear deterrence; currently with National Strategic Studies Institute, Department of Middle East and Black Sea Studies, Ukraine) The New European Missile Defense Architecture, IS THERE A ROLE FOR UKRAINE? - PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 183, September 2011 <http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_183.pdf>

It should thus come as no surprise that Moscow has been urging NATO for either a legally binding guarantee that the new missile defense system will not be developed to intercept Russian ICBMs or for full participation in the creation of the new system. The United States and NATO have rejected the first idea, while supporting the second. The devil, however, is in the details. Russia favors a sectoral missile defense variant, whereby it will be responsible for the security of NATO’s eastern flank, Poland and the Baltic states in particular. For Moscow, a sectoral approach would mean a guarantee that the new missile defense system would not be directed against its strategic capabilities. The Alliance, however, considers such an idea a contradiction of NATO’s principle of collective self-defense. Moscow regards this unwillingness to include Russia as a full participant as proof of the hidden adverse motivations of NATO and United States.

MR 2. Postpone Phase 4 of the missile defense program - would lower the stakes with Russia

[EPAA = European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense system. Phase 4 is the point in the project where some believe the European missile defense system would achieve the capability to shoot down Russian missiles. ]

Dr. Jeffery Mankoff 2012. (PhD history; was Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University and adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; currently International Affairs Fellow at U.S Department of State) “The politics of US missile defence cooperation with Europe and Russia” INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_2/88_2mankoff.pdf>

The US will also need to do a better job of managing expectations. The aim of having Phase 4 of the EPAA in place by 2020 appears hopelessly ambitious given the present state of technology and concerns about funding when the Pentagon is set to absorb a massive budget cut. Openly acknowledging that the deployment of future phases remains far off will help lower the stakes in discussions with Moscow, and enhance Washington’s credibility with allies who are themselves often suspicious of US MD plans.

MR 3. Restore funding for boost-phase systems. This would shoot down a missile before it could deploy decoys

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon 2009. ( PhD from Princeton; director of research in the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution) Star Wars Retreats? Rethinking U.S. Missile Defense in Europe, 23 Sept 2009 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65420/michael-ohanlon/star-wars-retreats?page=2>

There is one problem with the Obama administration's missile-defense policies, however: boost-phase systems are no longer being seriously developed. Such systems act early in an enemy missile's flight, depriving that missile of the chance to deploy decoys that can fool many systems -- such as the U.S. sites in Alaska and California, the SM-3, and the proposed Czech-and-Polish system. In April, Gates canceled both of the United States' two main boost-phase programs: the airborne laser and the kinetic-energy interceptor. Critics of the Obama administration's missile-defense policies should focus their concerns on this set of decisions. It may, for example, make sense to purchase more than just the one airborne laser system that is being retained as a test platform, even if the original plan to buy 20 was too much.

MR 3 funding could come from partially cutting the US Dept. of Education: $68 billion budget

US Dept of Education official website, last modified in 2012. “Budget Office—U.S. Department of Education” last modified 16 Feb 2012. <http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/index.html>

Welcome to the Budget home page of the United States Department of Education (ED). Here you'll find a wealth of information about the President's FY 2013 Budget Request for ED, including a program-by-program description of the request. In Budget News, we track Congressional action on the Department's budget and keep you updated on other important budget-related news. We also provide a variety of detailed budget tables on key aspects of the Department's budget, including the President's Budget Request, Congressional action on appropriations, State allocations, and historical funding levels. ED currently administers a budget of $68.1 billion in discretionary appropriations (including discretionary Pell Grant funding) and operates programs that touch on every area and level of education.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Iranian Missile Threat

Link: We need NATO missile defense because Iranian missile threat is accelerating

Thom Shanker& David Herszenhorn 2011. (journalists) NEW YORK TIMES, 2 Dec 2011 “U.S. Official Says Missile-Defense Shield Will Move Forward” (brackets added) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/world/europe/us-official-says-missile-defense-shield-will-move-forward.html>

The American commitment to work with NATO allies and deploy the missile shield is founded on a belief that Iran is accelerating its program to field missiles capable of reaching across NATO territory in Europe, Mr. [Ivo] Daalder [US Ambassador to NATO] said. Since President Obama announced new plans for the shield two years ago, Mr. Daalder said, “our estimate of the threat has gone up, not down. It is accelerating — this is the Iranian ballistic missile threat — and becoming more severe than even we thought two years ago.”

Link: Iran is developing nuclear missiles

Robert Maginnis 2011. (retired Army lieutenant colonel, and a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television) 28 June 2011 HUMAN EVENTS, “Obama's European Missile Defense Malpractice Paves Way for Iran Nukes” <http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=44503>

To make matters worse for those concerned about missile defense, Iran is racing toward the development of an atomic-tipped ballistic missile arsenal in spite of international efforts to isolate the rogue. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified that “Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons.” Tehran also continues to “expand the scale, reach and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload,” Clapper said. The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), draws a similar conclusion with its report dated May 24, 2011. The nine-page report states that its own inquiries show “the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”

Link: Iran is developing missiles

US Dept. of Defense April 2010. Secretary of Defense, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN, April 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/IranReportUnclassified.pdf>

With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States by 2015. Iran could also have an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of threatening Europe.

Link: Capability to make Iranian & other foreign missiles useless already exists and should be deployed

Ilan Berman & Clifford D. May, 2009. (Berman - Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.; consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense;Adjunct Professor for International Law and Global Security at the National Defense University, and a member of the Associated Faculty at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. May - President of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism created immediately following the 9/11 attacks on the United States; Chairman of the Policy Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, an international, non-partisan organization based in Washington D.C. comprised of leading members of the national security community) 24 Aug 2009 WALL STREET JOURNAL Hillary's Right About the 'Defense Umbrella' <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204884404574362771820985060.html>

Our enemies and competitors should be forced to conclude that energy and funds spent developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them will be wasted because Americans have the know-how and hardware to prevent them from reaching their intended targets. During the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, the U.S. government made major investments in the types of technologies (space-based sensors, interceptors and propulsion) necessary to field a robust defense against foreign ballistic missile arsenals, irrespective of origin. The capability to make Iranian, North Korean and other foreign missiles useless has already been developed and field-tested. Only America has it, and we should deploy it.

Link: Defense Secretary Gates said - Obama's missile defense policy will provide significantly greater capability to deter Iran

Jake Tapper ABC NEWS 2010. (Senior White House Correspondent), ABC NEWS 11 April 2010 Clinton on Iran Nukes: "Their Belligerence is Helping to Make Our Case" <http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/04/clinton-on-iran-nukes-their-belligerence-is-helping-to-make-our-case.html>

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told me Iran’s “belligerence is helping to make our case every single day” when it comes to that country’s nuclear intentions. When I asked Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates about changes in the U.S. nuclear posture in my “This Week” joint interview Gates said, “We have more robust deterrents today, because we've added to the nuclear deterrent missile defense. And -- and with the phased adaptive approach that the president has approved, we will have significantly greater capability to deter the Iranians, because we will have a significantly greater missile defense.”

Impact #1 - Suicide Option: Can't assume Iran would be deterred by nuclear retaliation - their ideology is different and they may be willing to accept mass death

Analysis: If they aren't deterred by our ability to retaliate, then the best we can do is either deter them by removing the likelihood that their missiles would hit anything or reduce the damage if they did.

Michael Rubin 2008. (resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and former Pentagon adviser on Iran and Iraq during George W. Bush’s first term) Nov 2008 Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred? <http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896>

Despite mutually assured destruction, deterrence almost broke down on several occasions, bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war: the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, and the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 each nearly escalated beyond control. In retrospect, deterrence brought neither the security nor the stability to which some historians and many current policymakers ascribe it. At the very least, nuclear deterrence is a highly risky strategy. The Soviet leadership was not suicidal, but how does the Iranian leadership approach questions of mass death? If Western politicians project their own value system onto their foes when calculating opponent decision-making, then they would assume that their Iranian counterparts would not be willing to absorb a nuclear attack. Such reasoning, however, ignores the role of ideology in the Islamic Republic. Regardless of what most Iranians think, the Islamic Republic ascribes to a set of values far different from our own.

Link/Brink: NATO needs missile defense to protect Alliance territory and forces from threats caused by Iranian Bomb

Impact #2 - The Brinksmanship Option: Higher risk of nukes being used if Iran is armed with nuclear weapons -- even if Iran isn't suicidal, nukes could be used through other scenarios

Gregory Schulte 2010. (visiting fellow at National Defense University in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction; was U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency; worked at NATO Headquarters on crisis management and nuclear planning) 8 Feb 2010 IRAN'S NUCLEAR THREAT TO NATO <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/iran-nuclear-threat-nato>

Once armed with nuclear weapons, Iran’s leaders may not be so suicidal as to detonate them on NATO territory. However Iran’s leaders may engage in nuclear brinksmanship to try to intimidate neighbors, deter outside intervention, or impress their own public. They may feel emboldened to use surrogates, asymmetric means, or conventional force to seize territory, extend influence, or attack neighbors. And whether Tehran intends it or not, groups like Hezbollah may see Iran’s atomic arsenal as a “nuclear umbrella” for more aggressive action against Israel and others. Mishandled brinksmanship or nuclear-emboldened aggression may escalate, deliberately or not, to nuclear use. Others in the region may decide to acquire their own nuclear arsenals. Candidate proliferants include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even Turkey, the NATO ally most exposed. A nuclear arms race is not inevitable, nor would it necessarily be fast. But it would magnify the risk of accident, miscalculation, or nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. NATO must prepare to contain the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. It should do so in several ways. First, NATO should reinforce its ability to protect its territory, population, and regional interests. This requires military capabilities to project force, ensure the security of energy supplies, and conduct operations despite the threat or use of nuclear weapons. This requires missile defenses that can protect Alliance territory and deployed forces. This requires command and control and logistical arrangements, perhaps taking advantage of existing U.S. and French bases in the Gulf countries.

ADDITIONAL IRAN MISSILE THREAT EVIDENCE

Iran wants to wipe Israel off the map, destroy Anglo-Saxon civilization and hurt Europe

John C. Rood 2008. (Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security) Remarks at Sixth Annual Missile Defense Conference 31 March 2008 U.S. Missile Defense Plans for Europe (ellipses in original) <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/105483.pdf>

I have talked a lot about Iranian capabilities – one element of what constitutes the definition of a “threat.” Let me take a few moments to talk about the other element – “intent.” President Ahmadinejad has spoken quite plainly about the intentions of the Iranian regime over the years. He has visualized “wiping Israel off the map,” his plans for the “destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization”, and, in the context of a possible Israeli-Palestinian war, threatened our European allies by noting that “…the Americans are far away, but you are the neighbors of the nations in this region…We inform you that the nations are like an ocean that is welling up, and if a storm begins, the dimensions will not stay limited to Palestine, and you may get hurt.”

The ability to do massive retaliation against Iran doesn't mean there's no threat: Iran can intimidate even without launching them, and radical factions may not care about retaliation

Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering 2008. (Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. As Director, General Obering is the Acquisition Executive for all ballistic missile defense systems and programs ) 30 May 2008 RESPONSE TO "MISSILE DEFENSE MALFUNCTION": Setting the Record Straight (ellipses in original) <http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/002.html>

Coyle and Samson cavalierly claim Iran would never launch a missile against us or our allies, given the resulting retaliation. Massive retaliation worked in the Cold War, but can they guarantee our security when ballistic missiles carrying unknown payloads are in the hands of Iranian leadership? In addition, ballistic missiles give a country a capability to coerce or intimidate even without launching them. This ability to heighten danger and uncertainty would restrict our diplomacy and freedom of action. Moreover, we cannot be certain command and control over missile systems will remain in rational hands...radical factions may not care about retaliation.

2. Other missile threats - not just Iran.

Over 30 countries have or are acquiring missile capabilities - NATO has a duty to protect its population

NATO’s offial website, last updated 2012. “Missile defence” North Atlantic Treaty Organization official website, last updated 30 Jan 2012, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm>

Ballistic missiles pose an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Over 30 countries have or are acquiring ballistic missiles that could be used to carry not just conventional warheads, but also weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its mission to protect its populations.

3. Increased risk of nuclear conflict if missile defense is delayed - reduced US ability to adapt to new nuclear threats

Dr. James Carafano 2010. (PhD; former Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point; currently a visiting professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University, directs Heritage Foundation's Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies) 20 Apr 2010 Missile Defense Whoppers <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/20/missile-defense-whoppers/>

If there are any delays in U.S. deployments then both Europe and the U.S. will be at risk. Under the Bush Administration’s proposal, the land-based missile interceptors would have been deployed in 2013. Last year, after the change of administration Secretary Gates suddenly changed the Pentagon estimate claiming the land-based interceptors would not be available until 2017, an assessment that conveniently coincided with Obama’s desire to dump the third site. Recently, Secretary Gates declared in a classified memo linked to the Washington Post that the US lacked an effective plan to stop the Iranian nuclear program. He also stated that Iran might have a nuclear bomb in a year. Yet, the US has till opted for “phased and adaptive” approach to missile defense rather than pushing full speed ahead to cut off the Iranian threat. The administration’s position on missile defense coupled with a nuclear disarmament strategy that strengthens Russia’s hand; gives Moscow a veto over US missile defenses; and limits the ability to adopt to new nuclear threats as they emerge–makes the risk of nuclear conflict more, not less likely.

4. START Treaty turn #1: Security risks for our European allies. If Russia drops out of the START Treaty, as Affirmative claims, that would be better. Saving the START Treaty would be a disadvantage.

Peter Huessy May 2010. (President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a Potomac, Maryland national security consulting firm; has been a guest lecturer at the Joint Military Intelligence College) 8 May 2010 <http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=36911> (brackets added)

These figures confirm that President Bush 41 [George H.W. Bush, the father of GW Bush] reduced our tactical nuclear weapons by over 90% at the end off the Cold War, and encouraged Russia to do the same. Moscow never complied with the terms off this “informal” agreement. Now the U.S. is faced with a Russia armed with over 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons, unconstrained by any treaty. Unfortunately, like all the strategic nuclear-weapons reduction treaties before it, the New START treaty leaves unsettled the question of the huge Russian advantage in such weapons, which further calls into question the security of our European allies on whose soil many of these weapons are targeted. America’s stockpile has certainly been reduced sharply over the past 30 years, but there is no question that our robust, effective and strong nuclear deterrent led to the nuclear agreements we signed with the Soviets and then the Russians, and the resulting remaining force that was sufficient to maintain deterrence.

5. START Treaty turn #2: Degradation of US nuclear weapons capability. If Russia drops out of the START Treaty, as Affirmative claims, that would be better. Saving the START Treaty would be a disadvantage.

Link: START creates unilateral US nuclear disarmament by allowing technologies, expertise and capabilities to degrade

Frank Gaffney 2010. (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy in the Reagan Administration; graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University; graduate degree from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies) 30 March 2010 "GAFFNEY: Ridding the world of U.S. arms" WASHINGTON TIMES [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/30/ridding-the-world-of-us-arms/](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/30/ridding-the-world-of-us-arms/)

The biggest problem of all with the New START treaty, however, is that it is a product of President Obama's fixation with "devaluing nuclear weapons" and ridding the world of them. On these grounds, he refuses to take the steps necessary to modernize America's deterrent. Even though he professes that a nuclear-free globe will not be realized anytime soon, he is condemning the nation to unilateral disarmament by allowing the steady and unavoidable obsolescence of the U.S. stockpile and the dissipation of the work force and infrastructure needed to maintain it, to continue unabated. The acuteness of this obsolescence has reached a point where the directors of the nation's nuclear laboratories have felt compelled to express strong concerns about the continued reliability of the arsenal.

Impact: Net benefits: World is more dangerous with START treaty than without it

Frank Gaffney 2010. (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy in the Reagan Administration; graduate of the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University; graduate degree from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies) 30 March 2010 "GAFFNEY: Ridding the world of U.S. arms" WASHINGTON TIMES [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/30/ridding-the-world-of-us-arms/](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/30/ridding-the-world-of-us-arms/)

President Obama announced Friday that he had concluded a follow-on to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia. He characterized the cuts that it would make in the two nations' nuclear arsenals as a major step toward his goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. In practice, however, the so-called "New START" accord will contribute primarily to the denuclearization of the United States and to making the world a more dangerous place. Accordingly, it would be more accurate to call it "False START."

6. Loss of NATO cohesion

Link: Missile Defense is a core alliance objective for NATO

Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek 2011. (Hildreth - Specialist in Missile Defense; Ek - Specialist in International Relations) 11 Jan 2011 Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Congressional Research Service <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41549.pdf>

The Lisbon Summit agreement is significant in that NATO officials identified territorial missile defense as a core alliance objective and adopted a formal NATO program in response. The agreement further outlined the development of territorial missile defense through an expansion of NATO’s ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense) program and its integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach.

Link: Missile defense is a great opportunity for cooperation between US and NATO

Dr. James Carafano April 2011. (PhD; former Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point; currently a visiting professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University, directs Heritage Foundation's Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies) Apr 2011 RESETTING MISSILE DEFENSES <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.carafano.missiledefense.html>

Missile defense also presents a great opportunity for cooperation between the U.S. and its allies. Significant steps have already been taken, for example when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided in its 2010 Strategic Concept to “develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defense, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.”

Link & Brink: MD (missile defense) cooperation is reducing discord and building NATO cohesion at a time when the alliance has been severely strained

Dr. Jeffery Mankoff 2012. (PhD history; was Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University and adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; currently International Affairs Fellow at U.S Department of State) “The politics of US missile defence cooperation with Europe and Russia” INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_2/88_2mankoff.pdf>

Transforming European MD into an aspect of NATO’s collective defence obligations helped mitigate the intra-European discord that had attended the Bush administration’s reliance on bilateral accords with Poland and the Czech Republic. It also gave the alliance a new focus for cooperation looking beyond the conflict in Afghanistan (and later Libya), which had severely strained NATO’s cohesion and called into question its continuing relevance in the security environment of the twenty-first century. And since EPAA was designated as the United States’ contribution to this common effort, NATO’s decision to make MD part of its collective defence mandate helps encourage Washington’s long-term commitment to NATO and to the defence of its European allies, though it does not resolve the underlying political, technical and financial challenges to deploying an effective European MD system.

Link & Brink: With other changes happening now, missile defense is a tangible symbol of US commitment, and it’s important to new NATO members

Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek 2011. (Hildreth - Specialist in Missile Defense; Ek - Specialist in International Relations) 11 Jan 2011 Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Congressional Research Service <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41549.pdf>

In a time when U.S. forces are being redeployed within and away from Europe and the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is being debated, territorial missile defense is a tangible symbol of the continued American commitment to the defense of the continent; this is particularly important for new member states.

Link: Without solidarity NATO will not survive

Prof. Julian Lindley-French and Prof. Yves Boyer in April 2010. Julian Lindley-French (Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London) Yves Boyer (Professor of Geopolitics at EcolePolytechnique and Deputy Director of Fondation pour la RechercheStratégique, Paris) writing for Strategic Advisors Group, Co-Chairs: Senator Chuck Hagel and Tom Enders; Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board: General Brent Scowcroft, STRATCON 2010:An Alliance for a Global Century, Apr 2010 [www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/3/STRATCON%202010%20REPORT\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/STRATCON%202010%20REPORT_FINAL.pdf)

“Solidarity – The True Test. The process of preparing a new Strategic Concept must restore a sense of trust and solidarity among allies. A true test of the Strategic Concept will be whether or not it offers a frank assessment of security, the place of the Alliance in it and makes a convincing case for the continued relevance of NATO. Alliances are built on solidarity and today NATO’s solidarity is under challenge, often more from rhetorical than actual challenges. Strategic credibility and strategic reassurance are the twin pillars of Strategic Concept 2010. However, these pillars must themselves be established on credible political will. Alliance solidarity must be strong enough to survive contact with danger. Today too many allies lack a shared conviction of the Alliance’s core commitments and their own responsibilities, and without it no alliance (nor indeed Union) can survive over time.”

Impact: WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without NATO would be more vulnerable to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism

Dr. Hans Binnendijk& Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy .Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University ) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH35.pdf>(WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

“Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.”

Impact: We need NATO for a more peaceful world

Prof. Alfred van Staden April 2005. (Director, Netherlands Institute of International Relations) , Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," , p. 52-53 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cli_diplomacy_paper_1.pdf>("which is clearly needs" was misspelled in the original; it should say "which IT clearly needs")

“Although in the more distant future China and perhaps India may pose the most serious challenge to American power, in the short term Europe is in the best position to moderate the worst impulses of the US. While the EU is no match to the US in terms of military capabilities, the experience with supporting nascent democracies demonstrates the Union has something to offer America which is clearly needs: an extensive arsenal of civilian foreign-policy tools. Since the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable pillars of the international order, the survival of NATO should be of immediate concern to all those who care about a more peaceful world.”

NEGATIVE BRIEF: NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS - Good

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

We should maintain NATO nuclear weapons until Russia negotiates mutual reductions

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The ultimate goal of both deterrence and disarmament is peace and security. NATO should not cling to its current nuclear posture in all possible scenarios. For instance, if Russia were to express a willingness to negotiate the complete dismantlement of its non-strategic forces (those not covered by the bilateral US-Russian arms control treaties), then of course the end of the NATO nuclear arrangements could be put on the table. Today, however, this remains a highly unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, NATO should perhaps consider a new “dual-track” decision by which it expresses its readiness to give up all non-strategic nuclear weapons if Russia is ready to do the same and, conversely, its readiness to modernize its aircraft and weapons in case Moscow refuses.

Nuclear weapons should be reduced in small steps, without destabilizing alliances - Like Status Quo policy

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Advisors to Chancellor Merkel say that Germany is just doing its part to further President Barack Obama’spolicy (the US president has called in early 2009 for a world without nuclear weapons, in order to stop thecircle of nuclear powers from expanding). But this is self-serving. Nuclear disarmament, were it to happen, would need to take place in carefully orchestrated moves, which avoid destabilising existing alliances. The US government has proceeded in small steps, focusing initially on reducing strategic nuclear arsenals with Russia.

HARMS

NATO nukes don’t violate NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondationpour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

As far as the NPT is concerned, nuclear sharing existed before the Treaty was signed, and it was stipulated that US weapons would remain under American control until the very last moment.

No real risk of weapons theft from European nuclear sites

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

It is true that physical security at European nuclear sites has not always been maintained to American standards and that intrusions on some military bases have confirmed the existence of security lapses; but it is equally true that no recorded incident has in any way shown that there is a real risk of weapons theft.

SOLVENCY

No arms control benefit. Removing all US nuclear forces in Europe doesn't make much sense for arms control - we should use them to bargain with Russia instead

Dr. Oliver Thränert 2008. (Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin ) PROLIFERATION ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 10, 2008, U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533>

“First: Arms control. In that regard, eliminating all U.S. nuclear forces in Europe does not make much sense. The aim of Soviet as well as Russian political leaders has always been to achieve a Western Europe free of U.S. nuclear weapons without removing its own non-strategic nuclear forces in which it enjoys massive numerical superiority. At a minimum, NATO should use the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe as a bargaining chip. However, Russia will not go to zero with its own non-strategic nuclear forces. Moscow perceives them as a counterweight to NATO’s overwhelming conventional superiority and its ongoing expansion ever closer to the Russian border. Today, we do not even know how many non-strategic nuclear forces Moscow possesses, nor do we know where they are located and whether they are appropriately protected against unauthorized use. For NATO, therefore, a more important first step than bringing Russian non-strategic nuclear forces to zero should be enhanced transparency. Removing all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe without transparency and reciprocal reductions in return would run counter to Western interests.”

No Non-Proliferation Benefit: Proliferators ignored other nuclear weapons reductions, they will ignore NATO too

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

There are few, if any, reasons to believe that the unilateral withdrawal of US nuclear weapons – or a significant reduction of the existing Europe-based arsenal – would have any measurable non-proliferation and disarmament benefit. In the past fifteen years, the massive nuclear reductions undertaken by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France have had no apparent impact on nuclear proliferation dynamics and the non-proliferation regime. India, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea and Syria were obviously not impressed. And the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have not shown any interest in seriously reinforcing the regime.

Remove now / Deploy later during a crisis: Won’t deter, won’t happen, would be destabilising

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

It may be suggested that the alternative to permanent stationing is to ‘remove and deploy’. But a policy of storing nuclear weapons in the US and deploying them to Germany or other NATO countries in times of crisis would be destabilising: Russia would view such deployment as a drastic escalation. For that reason, deployment would be extremely unlikely to occur. This would give enemies every reason to doubt whether the United States would heighten tensions during a crisis by sending nuclear weapons to Europe. Or that a German government in the midst of a crisis would choose to accept them, either for use in defence of a NATO ally or even its own country. To use the clumsy language of NATO communiqués, if the alliance withdrew nuclear weapons from Europe it would make aggression “calculable”. In other words, a potential aggressor could more easily imagine splitting Europe off from the United States.

Bringing the nukes back to Europe in time of crisis isn’t realistic: It would be divisive and could lower the cost of aggression

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The adoption by NATO of what could be called a new “Turkish Clause” allowing for the return of B-61s in crisis time is not a credible option. This would imply that nuclear-capable aircraft and bases would continue to be certified, and that pilots would continue to be trained for nuclear missions. It is very dubious that NATO would be willing to bear such costs in the absence of real nuclear-sharing. More importantly, such a decision in crisis time would probably open a divisive debate within the Alliance, that would be highly escalatory. This might lower the possible cost of aggression, as cogently argued by a trio of former US and British officials.

“Use the Asian nuclear guarantee model” - Response: Credibility of that model depends on NATO

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

Note also that the so-called “Asian model” for NATO is an illusion: as the US 2010 Nuclear Posture Review made clear, assurance and deterrence in North-East Asia require that Washington can deploy nuclear forces to the region in time of crisis, but this option is credible only if there are NATO arrangements.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lose focus on the real problem

Link: NATO TNW focus distracts us from the real issue: World stability with expanding club of nuclear nations

Impact: Net benefits: Nuclear disarmament would produce at best marginal benefits, and more often it's harmful

Sergei Karaganov 2010. (Dean of the School of World Economics and Foreign Affairs at Moscow State University - Higher School of Economics) 29 Apr 2010 The Dangers of Nuclear Disarmament <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/karaganov14/English>

“Similarly, if the US withdraws its largely nominal tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, US-Europe strategic ties would weaken. Many Europeans, above all in the new NATO member-states, would then demand more protection from the mythical Russian Leviathan. The world community seems to be losing its strategic bearings. Instead of focusing on the real problem, namely the increasingly unstable international order, it is trying to apply Cold War-era concepts of disarmament. At best, these are marginally useful; more often, they are harmful in today’s circumstances. What is most needed nowadays is clear thinking about how to live with an expanding club of nuclear states while keeping the world relatively stable. To this end, the two great nuclear powers need a coordinated deterrence policy towards new nuclear states. Simultaneously, they should offer guarantees to non-nuclear states that might feel insecure.”

2. NATO-Russia Relations Backfire

Link: Moscow will respond to US nuclear withdrawal by raising issues about NATO

Dr. Pavel Podvig 2010. (physics degree from Moscow Institute of Physics & Tech.; PhD. in political science from Moscow Institute of World Economy & International Relations; researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univ.; worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology) 25 Feb 2010, What to do about tactical nuclear weapons, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/02/what_to_do_about_tactical_nucl.shtml>

“But if the United States actually removes its weapons from Europe, would Russia be ready to respond constructively? Certainly a reduction in the number of Russian tactical weapons is in order. Yet more than likely, Moscow would argue that the disparity in tactical weapons between it and Washington is there to compensate for the weakness of its conventional forces, spurring all kinds of issues related to NATO expansion and the often rocky Russia-NATO relationship.”

Link: Withdrawal of European nuclear weapons to the USA would require more military exercises

Link: Military exercises would escalate tensions with Russia

Franklin Miller, George Robertson &KoriSchake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

As a practical matter, the withdrawal of Europe-based weapons to the US would make it difficult for the allies to keep those portions of their forces tasked with deploying the weapons in top fighting shape. They would have to compensate by increasing exercises, which is also likely to raise tensions with Russia and cause concern among domestic critics of nuclear weapons.

Brink: Russia looks at NATO with fear for the future

Ambassador Ivo Daalder 2009. (Permanent Representative of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) "Resetting NATO-Russia Relations" August 17, 2009 <http://nato.usmission.gov/Speeches/Daalder_NUPI0817.asp>

“And most importantly, perhaps, a consensus seems to have emerged in Russia that NATO in particular is much more of a challenger to it than it is a potential partner of it. Russia sees enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the partnerships that NATO has developed with some of its neighboring countries, as a problem. It sees the planned deployment of missile defenses in Eastern Europe as a direct strategic threat to it. And it sees a changing conventional balance of forces that is distinctly leading it to be the lesser and the weaker in that balance. It looks at that and fears what the future may bring. That clearly is Russia’s perspective.”

Impact: We need NATO and Russia as partners to solve multiple world problems

Ambassador Ivo Daalder 2009. (Permanent Representative of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) "Resetting NATO-Russia Relations" August 17, 2009 <http://nato.usmission.gov/Speeches/Daalder_NUPI0817.asp>

“Now its most important partners are the partners that are part of its alliances and it will try to address most of the problems it can by working with its NATO and other alliance partners around the world. But there are many problems in the world in this age of globalization. That requires broader partnership than just the military alliances that the United States has with its allies. Russia is a potential partner on a broad range of issues, whether it’s dealing with proliferation, whether it’s dealing with violent extremism, energy, environment, climate change, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, you name it. In each of these instances the world is better off if the United States and Russia, and indeed if NATO and Russia, indeed if most of the countries in the world could find a way to cooperate to deal with them.”

3. Sign of weakness

Link: Withdrawal of US nukes would send a signal of weakness to Russia

Simon Lunn 2010. (Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) Nato’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, A Crucial Decision: NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century 2010 <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf>

“Other new members made similar comments and leave little room for doubt as to the importance they attach to the presence of American nuclear warheads on European territory. The new members see no reason, therefore, to change existing arrangements. As one said: ‘Why do it? No one will thank you, certainly not the Russians. We may get our weapons out but the Russians never will. So will we be safer or less safe?’ Furthermore, a withdrawal of the warheads would send all the wrong signals. Russia, another ambassador noted, is about power. ‘If you draw down it is a sign of weakening’.”

Link: Removal of NATO nukes won’t have positive impact on Russia - could even be a sign of weakness

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondationpour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

What about Russia? One should be skeptical of the possible “exemplary” value of any unilateral gesture that NATO could make in this domain. Calls for a formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 (a raft of unilateral initiatives to limit and reduce the US tactical nuclear weapons arsenal decided by US President George Bush Sr.), for instance, have always been opposed by Moscow. There is little evidence to suggest that unilateral disarmament has had any positive impact. A unilateral reduction or withdrawal of US nuclear forces in Europe could even be seen as a sign of weakness.

Impact: American interests undermined and millions of people affected by Russia's behavior in response to US weakness. Example: Russian invasion of Georgia

Daniel Benjamin, 2008. (was confirmed by the Senate as the U.S. State Dept's coordinator for counter-terrorism in ‘09; at the time this article was written, he was Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution ) 20 Aug 2008 (brackets in original) [www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0820\_russia\_benjamin.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0820_russia_benjamin.aspx)

“And we are very far from the foreign policy envisioned by Condoleezza Rice in her 2000 Foreign Affairs manifesto for candidate Bush's foreign policy, which promised a new focus on "comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system." As Rice wrote then but quickly seems to have forgotten, "These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people." There is another aspect of the current crisis that is made in America. It was summed up by a European diplomat who told me last week, "The Russians moved because they know you are weak." He hardly needed to explain. With the U.S. military overstretched and publicly complaining about not having enough troops for Afghanistan, Moscow knew it had a propitious moment. Had we not been so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House—which has been watching this crisis build for months—might have left a thousand or so troops in Georgia after our last joint exercise or sent more warships for a visit to the Black Sea. Few would argue that we should get into a shooting match with the Russians over Georgia. But the presence of U.S. forces on the ground, or even the knowledge that there was a significant reserve available in Europe, might have given the Russians pause or at least a healthy fear of miscalculation. As it was, they had a perfect set of circumstances for their strike. Chalk it up as another indirect cost of the U.S. engagement in Iraq—of the fact that for most of Bush's tenure in office, we have had an Iraq policy, not a foreign policy. Dick Cheney often repeats the platitude that "[t]errorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength. They are invited by the perception of weakness." Too bad that Cheney and the administration could only think about terrorists—of whom there were virtually none in Iraq—and not all the other American interests that would be undermined by palpable evidence of our weakness.”

4. Lost Deterrence

Link: Removal of NATO nukes would create a net loss of deterrence

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondationpour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

Would alternatives to US gravity bombs be available in the nuclear domain? To a certain extent, yes – but only to a certain extent: there would be a net loss in terms of deterrence. From a technical point of view, there is no question that US or UK strategic forces would be perfectly adequate to threaten nuclear retaliation in case of aggression. However, from a psychological standpoint, an adversary could judge that the use of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile or bomber would be less likely than the use of in-theater forces, especially if the adversary had the capability to strike the United States.

Link: Nuclear weapons are better at deterrence than conventional

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

For both physical and psychological reasons, conventional weapons do not have the same deterrent power as nuclear ones. Conventional deterrence has a long record of failure – in fact, as long as civilization itself. The threat of conventional bombing is not enough to make an adversary desist when the stakes become extreme or vital, or even when they are more limited: the crises of the past twenty years have shown that it does not always lead the adversary to change its strategic calculus. There is still a large difference today – at least one order of magnitude – between conventional and nuclear yields. For this reason, conventional weapons cost much more for an equivalent effect.

Link: NATO nukes deter by making the risk of attack on NATO far outweigh any possible gain

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary;Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Their presence in Europe, however, affirms the coupling of US nuclear forces – including US strategic forces – to the defence of NATO’s territory. Bluntly put, the nuclear arsenal in Europe serves to put the US homeland at risk to nuclear attack if NATO is forced to resort to using Europe-based nuclear bombs to defend its borders. This in turn signals to any potential aggressor that the risks of an attack against NATO far outweigh any possible gains.

Impact: Reverse Plan Advocacy - Deterrence value of NATO nukes justifies keeping Status Quo

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

An end to NATO nuclear arrangements would diminish transatlantic burden-sharing and solidarity, and weaken deterrence at a time when threats to NATO’s collective security are increasing. These arrangements should thus be maintained.

Impact: Need NATO nukes to deter threats from Russia and Iran

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The current trajectory of Russia’s policies is leading Moscow towards increasing friction with NATO in Europe and with the Western world in general. Likewise, the radicalization of the Iranian leadership and Tehran’s arrival at the nuclear threshold places it on a collision course with Western interests. Of course, the threat is far from being as grave and immediate as it was during the Cold War. But it is a credible hypothesis that by 2015 NATO, for the first time in its history, will face two revisionist nuclear-armed countries along its borders. This is not the right time to let down the nuclear guard.

5. Global Nuclear Proliferation Risk

Link: Withdrawal of NATO nukes leads to increased risk of nuclear proliferation

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

It is also possible that the end of NATO nuclear arrangements in Europe could create the perception that the American defense umbrella is folding. This could foster unease among US allies around the world, and perhaps become an additional factor for some of them to consider embarking on a nuclear program. This could also be an encouragement for potential adversaries to develop or continue their own nuclear programs. A historical example to bear in mind is North Korea. The withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1992 did nothing to slow down the North Korean nuclear program. Might it even have accelerated it? At the time, the White House was concerned that Pyongyang might see the end of the American nuclear presence on the peninsula as “the beginning of a US withdrawal”.

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN 2011 (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) March 7, 2011 “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html>

Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know-how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used. It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.

6. Turkey Develops Its Own Nuclear Weapons

Link: Turkey is holding off on building its own nuclear weapons only because of the credibility of US security commitments

Brink: US/Turkey/NATO relations are strained, giving importance to nuclear weapons

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondationpour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World (ellipses in original) <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

As noted by former UK Defense Secretary Des Browne, US weapons are important to Ankara “because the relationship between Turkey, the US and its NATO allies is under strain for other reasons. (…) Turkey is not wedded to US sub-strategic weapons but in the absence of its other concerns being addressed, they have become of symbolic importance”. Likewise, a researcher exploring the likelihood of a Turkish nuclear program recently argued that “it is Turkish faith in the credibility of US security commitments – not the presence of militarily insignificant tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish territory – that helps to constrain Ankara from pursuing nuclear weapons of its own”.

Link: Turkey may develop their own nukes due to worries about Iran

Malcolm Chalmers 2010. (Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf\>

“Finally, critics of a NATO ‘zero option’ point to the critical role that NATO extended nuclear deterrence has played in preventing proliferation within NATO. Today, the development of independent German and Italian nuclear weapons is not a serious possibility. Given current trends in Iran, however, the risk of Turkey moving in this direction cannot be dismissed so easily.”

Brink: Couldn’t be a worse time to open a debate about nuclear weapons in Turkey.

Link: Turkey may feel compelled to develop its own nukes if NATO’s are removed

Franklin Miller, George Robertson &Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

There could scarcely be a worse time to open the nuclear sharing debate in Turkey. Recent revelations of yet another secret Iranian nuclear enrichment plant and the determination by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the plant constitutes another Non-Proliferation Treaty violation have dramatically raised the stakes for Turkey. Ankara has in recent years pursued a rapprochement with Tehran; the government has been positioning itself as the natural interlocutor between the West and Iran. But Turkey also competes with its neighbour for power in the Muslim world. The possession of nuclear weapons would strengthen Iranian influence throughout the region. Also, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran could prompt other Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to follow suit. If so, and if NATO’s nuclear guarantee is called into question at the same time, the Turkish government may feel compelled to develop or buy nuclear weapons of its own.

Link + Brink: Survey shows majority of Turks want Turkey to build its own nuclear weapon

Baker Spring 2012.( master’s degree in national security studies from Georgetown University; F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation) 3 Apr 2012 “Turkish Survey Results Support Heritage Findings,” <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/03/turkish-survey-results-support-heritage-findings/>

According to a March 29 article in the *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 54 percent of Turkish survey respondents favor Turkey developing its own nuclear weapons in response to an Iranian nuclear threat. The alternative provided to the respondents was for Turkey to rely on NATO’s security umbrella. Just 8 percent of the respondents favor the latter option. The survey was conducted by the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies.

Link: Turkey would have motive to seek nuclear weapons of its own

Central European NATO members would worry about US commitment and feel vulnerable

Franklin Miller, George Robertson &Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary;Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Denied the protection of NATO’s nuclear weapons in Europe, Turkey would have additional reasons to worry about Iran’s nuclear programme – and perhaps to develop nuclear weapons of its own. Newer NATO members in Central Europe, who see in the nuclear weapons a symbol of US commitment to defend them, would be left feeling vulnerable. They are likely to respond by demanding that NATO move its forces and bases, now heavily concentrated in Germany, closer to Russian borders.

Impact: Preventing Turkey from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security

Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke 2009.( Bell - project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow. Loehrke - research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy) 23 NOVEMBER 2009, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>

“Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns.”

7. Broken Umbrella Leading to Russian Coercion

Link: Unilateral nuclear withdrawal will make it difficult to convince NATO states to provide nuclear umbrella over non-nuclear partners

Malcolm Chalmers 2010. Malcolm Chalmers (Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf> (brackets added; parentheses in original)

“Yet, as the first of these chapters makes clear, some other key NATO member states, together with influential policy experts, are far from convinced of the wisdom of unilaterally ‘going to zero’ in NATO DCA [dual-capable aircraft; nuclear + non-nuclear] deployments. Since their inception in the 1960s, dual-key nuclear deployments have played a critical role in symbolising the sharing of nuclear burdens between nuclear and non-nuclear member states. As long as extended nuclear deterrence plays a central role in NATO doctrine, they argue, it is important to ensure that as many member states as possible are involved in the maintenance of the forces that symbolise that policy, not least because this act ensures that non-nuclear states then have to ‘dip their hands in the blood’ of preparing to use these weapons. Were non-nuclear states no longer to have a role in preparing for nuclear use, they argue, it might be increasingly difficult to convince nuclear-armed alliance members (the US, UK and potentially France) to risk the lives of their own citizens to extend an ‘umbrella’ over their nonnuclear partners.”

Link: US nuclear capabilities are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

“Some U.S. allies believe that extended deterrence requires little more than stability in the central balances of nuclear power among the major powers. But other allies believe that their needs can only be met with very specific U.S. nuclear capabilities. This point was brought home vividly in our work as a Commission. Some allies located near Russia believe that U.S. non-strategic forces in Europe are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow and indeed that modernized U.S./NATO forces are essential for restoring a sense of balance in the face of Russia’s nuclear renewal. One particularly important ally has argued to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.”

Link: Russia is increasing its non-strategic nuclear forces

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

“As part of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces, Russia’s military leaders are putting more emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF, particularly weapons intended for tactical use on the battlefield). Russia no longer sees itself as capable of defending its vast territory and nearby interests with conventional forces.”

Link: US needs to hedge against Russia's nuclear threats to coerce its neighbors

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

“The risk of direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia is much lower than during the Cold War. But the risk of nuclear coercion is another matter. After all, Russia has used nuclear threats to attempt to coerce some of its neighbors, including U.S. allies, and this is a problem for which U.S. nuclear strategy and capabilities remain relevant. It is also conceivable that these assessments might change for the worse at some future time, and the United States needs to hedge against that possibility.”

Link: Russia has opened up new possibilities of using or threatening nuclear weapons in regional conflicts

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 (brackets added; parentheses in original) <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

“As the Cold War ended, and as noted above, these NSNF [non-strategic nuclear forces] were reduced under the auspices of the PNIs [presidential nuclear initiatives] and also the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces of 1987. Nonetheless, Russia reportedly retains a very large number of such weapons. Senior Russian experts have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads with a large additional number in reserve. Some Russian military experts have written about use of very low yield nuclear “scalpels” to defeat NATO forces. The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile (known as the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.”

Brink: Russia's coercion of its neighbors is a looming flash point

Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz 2009. (Corboy - director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at King's College London and a former European Commission ambassador to Georgia. Courtney - was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Yalowitz - was U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia) 6 Jan 2009 NEW YORK TIMES, Russia's next flash point, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/opinion/06iht-edcourtney.1.19125285.html>

“Russia's coercion of its neighbors is a looming flash point for Europe and the United States, and President-elect Barack Obama. Autocratic Russia is bent on exploiting weak neighbors and reversing perceived humiliations since the breakup of the Soviet Union.”

Impact: Threatens important US & European interests; tens of billions of dollars at stake

Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz, 2009. (Corboy -director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at King's College London and a former European Commission ambassador to Georgia. Courtney - was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Yalowitz - was U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia) 6 Jan 2009 NEW YORK TIMES, Russia's next flash point, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/opinion/06iht-edcourtney.1.19125285.html>

“Russian use of force could threaten important U.S. and European interests. Gaining control over Caspian energy would jeopardize tens of billions of dollars of Western investment and heighten Europe's energy dependence on Russia. U.S. and European forces in Afghanistan will increasingly depend on ground-based logistics through Central Asia and the South Caucasus.”

8. Fairness violation

Link: Germany doesn't want nuclear weapons but does want nuclear protection.

Impact: USA and other allies are stuck with the burden and risk while Germany enjoys the benefits

Franklin Miller, George Robertson &Kori Schake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary;Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

“The problem with Germany piously stepping first in line to renounce nuclear weapons on its territory is that the country has not concurrently renounced nuclear deterrence. It wants to continue to enjoy the protection of America’s nuclear umbrella, without sharing the burden of risk associated with stationing weapons in Germany. In other words, the country wants others to risk nuclear retaliation on its behalf, but it would rather not be a target itself. That would be a nice deal if Germany could get it. But it is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Germany is expecting Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey and the United States to do the hard work of explaining the logic of nuclear deterrence to their own publics so that Germany may enjoy the benefits. Or, worse still, if the German policy were taken up by other governments on the continent, the US would be left alone to bear the burden of defending its European allies. That would not be well regarded by the American public or by their elected representatives. Nor are other allies satisfied with the current arrangement likely to be impressed.”

9. Loss of NATO solidarity

Link: Removal of NATO nukes would lead to corrosive debate and division within NATO

Franklin Miller, George Robertson &KoriSchake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and KoriSchake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Poland and the Baltic states in particular are likely to argue with merit that a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would constitute a material change to those commitments, and to NATO’s mutual defence guarantee, ‘Article V’, as they understood it. They will be particularly worried that the security of the United States is being decoupled from the security of Europe – the new NATO countries still trust the US more than their west European counterparts. The new allies will probably compensate by demanding from NATO a series of war plans and exercises to determine how to adjust operationally to the changes in nuclear posture. This would spark a corrosive internal debate within NATO. Russia can be relied upon to claim that any steps to revise NATO defence planning or exercises are provocative (despite the fact that it still possesses 5,400 tactical nuclear weapons. It has also recently completed military exercises in Kaliningrad involving 13,000 Russian and Belarusian troops, which featured a notional nuclear attack on Poland). While without foundation, Moscow’s protests would divide the allies, who, even after the Russian exercise, have been unable to agree that full planning should be undertaken for defence of the countries bordering on Russia (though limited planning has taken place, and the United States has agreed to conduct annual military exercises in the Baltic states beginning in the autumn of 2010).

Link: Affirmative doesn't consult with NATO allies, it's unilateral US action

Link: NATO solidarity rests on the principle of sharing the defense burden, including nuclear weapons

Franklin Miller, George Robertson &Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf> (brackets in original)

“As NATO’s 1999 strategic concept states, the alliance believes that “the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provides an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the alliance, demonstrates alliance solidarity [and] the common commitment of its member countries to maintaining their security.” This formula has worked well over the decades, even as the threats facing NATO have changed, as has the alliance’s nuclear posture. Solidarity among NATO countries rests on the principle that all allies share the burden of defending NATO, and that defence still requires nuclear weapons.”

Link: Reducing NATO nukes to zero will be very controversial within NATO

Prof. Malcolm Chalmers & Simon Lunn, March 2010. Malcolm Chalmers (Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London) & Simon Lunn (former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; initiated and directed the Assembly’s outreach program for the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe) 1 Mar 2010 RUSI: NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21695/rusi.html>

“Yet the prospect that this protracted drawdown might soon lead to their final elimination has now triggered a major debate on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. This is between those who believe that elimination could be a relatively cost-free approach to taking forward the disarmament agenda set out in President Obama's April 2009 Prague speech; and those who fear it could do serious damage to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. As a result, reducing from 200 weapons to zero looks set to be much more controversial than the 90 per cent reduction (from 2,500 to 200) that has taken place since 1991. What these weapons lack in operational utility (given their short range and location, together with the continuing availability of larger and more powerful strategic arsenals) is now greatly outweighed by their symbolic significance.”

Link: Have to find consensus about nuclear weapons in NATO, else it could become a source of contention

Malcolm Chalmers & Simon Lunn 2010. (Chalmers - Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London. Lunn - former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; directed the Assembly’s outreach program for the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf>

“It is in the collective interest of all NATO member states that this issue is managed sensitively. There is a danger that it could become a source of contention between members, in the process sapping political energy from the need for progress on more central issues. If a new consensus is to be reached, it will be important to look for a way forward that meets both deterrence and disarmament concerns, ensuring that all member states have gained something in the process. Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson, together with former US administration officials Franklin Miller and KoriSchake, recently published a strong criticism of Germany’s decision to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons on its soil. Instead, they called for NATO to ‘collectively negotiate with Moscow asymmetric but multilateral reductions to Russian and allied tactical nuclear arsenals’.”

Link: Without solidarity NATO will not survive

Prof. Julian Lindley-French and Prof. Yves Boyer in April 2010. Julian Lindley-French (Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London) Yves Boyer (Professor of Geopolitics at EcolePolytechnique and Deputy Director of Fondation pour la RechercheStratégique, Paris) writing for Strategic Advisors Group, Co-Chairs: Senator Chuck Hagel and Tom Enders; Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board: General Brent Scowcroft, STRATCON 2010:An Alliance for a Global Century, Apr 2010 [www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/3/STRATCON%202010%20REPORT\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/STRATCON%202010%20REPORT_FINAL.pdf)

“Solidarity – The True Test. The process of preparing a new Strategic Concept must restore a sense of trust and solidarity among allies. A true test of the Strategic Concept will be whether or not it offers a frank assessment of security, the place of the Alliance in it and makes a convincing case for the continued relevance of NATO. Alliances are built on solidarity and today NATO’s solidarity is under challenge, often more from rhetorical than actual challenges. Strategic credibility and strategic reassurance are the twin pillars of Strategic Concept 2010. However, these pillars must themselves be established on credible political will. Alliance solidarity must be strong enough to survive contact with danger. Today too many allies lack a shared conviction of the Alliance’s core commitments and their own responsibilities, and without it no alliance (nor indeed Union) can survive over time.”

Impact: WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without NATO would be more vulnerable to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism

Dr. Hans Binnendijk& Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy .Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University ) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH35.pdf> (WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

“Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.”

Impact: We need NATO for a more peaceful world

Prof. Alfred van Staden April 2005. (Director, Netherlands Institute of International Relations) , Apr 2005, "Power and legitimacy - The quest for order in a unipolar world," , p. 52-53 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cli_diplomacy_paper_1.pdf> ("which is clearly needs" was misspelled in the original; it should say "which IT clearly needs")

“Although in the more distant future China and perhaps India may pose the most serious challenge to American power, in the short term Europe is in the best position to moderate the worst impulses of the US. While the EU is no match to the US in terms of military capabilities, the experience with supporting nascent democracies demonstrates the Union has something to offer America which is clearly needs: an extensive arsenal of civilian foreign-policy tools. Since the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable pillars of the international order, the survival of NATO should be of immediate concern to all those who care about a more peaceful world.”

10. Loss of European Missile Defense

Link: Ending nuclear sharing could motivate Congress to cancel European missile defense

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondationpour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

There could also be negative consequences on NATO solidarity at large. If several NATO nations signaled that they did not want to carry on with their share of the nuclear burden, there could be reluctance in the US Congress to continue funding a missile defense system that is meant to protect Europe.

Impact: We lose stability and we lose the last option to protect our forces and allies when everything else fails

Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering 2008. (Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.; he is Acquisition Executive for all ballistic missile defense systems and programs ) 30 May 2008 RESPONSE TO "MISSILE DEFENSE MALFUNCTION": Setting the Record Straight <http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/002.html>

Year after year, test after test, we are taking the technical challenges we face in missile defense off the table and therefore undermining long held positions of our critics. Not only will the missile defense system work, but it can bring stability that would not have been possible otherwise. But if diplomacy, arms control and deterrence fail, missile defense is the option left to protect our nation, allies and forces.

ALTERNATE PHILOSOPHY / MINOR REPAIR / COUNTERPLAN LINKS & IDEAS

#1: Consult with Allies before we do anything

NATO does not have a common understanding about risks and threats

Oliver Schmidt, April 2010. (German Council on Foreign Relations; Germany's oldest non-partisan, non-governmental think tank) 27 Apr 2010 The Utility of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO: A European Perspective <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40680>

“What these three positions reveal is that NATO does not have a common understanding of risks and threats. While the countries of central and Eastern Europe still fear the perceived threat of Russia, the countries of Western and Southern Europe are more focused on new security challenges stemming mainly from non-state actors. The result of this security divide is the current controversy over the nearly 200 remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Germany. Eastern European countries like Poland view these weapons as a sign that the United States is taking the mutual defense clause enshrined in Article 5 of NATO's charter seriously. As a U.S. ally, and perhaps given Iran's nuclear ambitions, Turkey is also very cautious about the possible withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from its soil. More fundamental is the concern in Europe over the obvious imbalance between NATO's 200 tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s estimated 3,000 non-strategic weapons.”

US should consult with allies about requirements for deterrence and assurance

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

“The United States should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps to increase allied consultations should be expanded.”

Advocacy: US nuclear forces should not be changed without first consulting with allies

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

“Clearly, the U.S. nuclear force posture should not be re-designed without substantive and high-level consultations with U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia and we cannot prejudge the conclusions of such consultations here. The Commission’s own consultations on this topic have brought home to us that U.S. allies and friends in Europe and Asia are not all of a single mind concerning the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance.”

#2: Invite Russia to talks about European nukes

Russia has far more nukes - East European allies want mutual reductions to be negotiated with Russia, not unilateral withdrawal of nukes

Chalmers &Lunn in March 2010. (Chalmers - professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London. Lunn - Former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; initiated and directed the Assembly’s outreach program for the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf> (parentheses in original)

“At a time when Russia retains much larger arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, however, the Baltic states worry that unilateral withdrawal of all equivalent NATO weapons could be seen as diluting US guarantees of their security. The foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland have added to calls for Russian sub-strategic weapons to be included in the discussion, calling for sharp mutual reductions as part of US/Russian arms control talks, starting with Russian weapons deployed close to European Union member states (in the Kola peninsula and Kaliningrad).”

NEGATIVE BRIEF: NATO WITHDRAWAL - bad idea

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

US withdrawal from NATO = Reduced effectiveness of US foreign policy, fewer allies, and more instability

Ronald Asmus 2010. (Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center; Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) May/June 2010 FOREIGN POLICY magazine, "Who Needs NATO?" <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/who_needs_nato>

There is no push in Europe for the United States to go home. Opinion polls regularly show that the U.S. and European publics have similar views of the threats they face and the agenda they want their leaders to pursue. The fact that Europeans have largely banned war on the continent is to be welcomed. But European officials often tell me in private they wish they had a few more sticks in their foreign-policy portfolio. The United States will certainly need their cooperation in managing a nuclear Iran or if it ever achieves a breakthrough in the Middle East. The United States is in NATO today because it is a power that shares values and interests with Europe. There is no effective multilateralism without Atlanticism. If the United States withdraws from NATO, it will simply find itself with fewer allies and more instability. You don't need to be Carl von Clausewitz to understand why that is not a good outcome.

NATO is doomed without the US

[Note: This can be used to link the AFF plan to any “abolish NATO” disads you want to run. If NATO is doomed without the US, then US withdrawal from NATO would create the same problems as abolishing NATO.]

JanuszOnyszkiewicz 2003. (former Minister of National Defense, Poland) presentation given at the State Department Conference on NATO, Washington DC, Oct.28-29th, 2003, “THE CENTRAL ISSUES FOR NATO” <http://csm.org.pl/fileadmin/files/Biblioteka_CSM/Inne/Janusz%20Onyszkiewicz_The%20main%20issues%20from%20the%20presentation%20given%20at%20the%20State%20Department%20Conference%20on%20NATO.pdf>

Naturally, NATO cannot be something else then what the member countries want it to be. It applies first of all to the US. “Tool box” concepts reduces NATO from an important forum of transatlantic political debate to a minor technical instrument of American policy. However, if the US loses an interest in NATO, the Alliance will be doomed. Without US leadership, NATO very likely will not be a dynamic, innovative structure and soon will become another WEU. On the other hand, strong and attractive NATO should not be seen as detrimental to justified and legitimate ambitions to make CFSP and ESDP important factors.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Losing Afghanistan

Link: Affirmative team disengages US from NATO. It’s in their plan.

Link: Europeans want their Afghan forces to be serving NATO, not serving the US

Col. Tarn Warren 2009. (US Army, instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College) ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on NATO's Future <http://www.ndu.edu/press/ISAF-and-Afghanistan.html> (ellipses in original; brackets added)

Apparently attempting to merge the more kinetic and COIN[counter-insurgency]-focused former Enduring Freedom mission with the necessarily vague and softer ISAF mission statement focused on "providing security and stability," the new mission statement asserts that "ISAF . . . conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency." For NATO, this is a radical change; words matter. In no other NATO document related to ISAF will we find the word insurgency or insurgent or mention of the intent to conduct operations against insurgents. NATO widely uses the more imprecise terms militant and security incident rather than insurgent attack. This should not be a surprise; as already stated, NATO technically operates under a UN Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. The fact that the North Atlantic Council allowed this new mission statement to stand might just be cosmetic; after all, contributing nations still have the ultimate "opt-out" card: the national caveat. As one expert noted, member nations no longer agree on the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Others point to the chronic tension between Europe and the United States over what is viewed in much of Europe as largely an American problem rather than a NATO problem. These European NATO members want their troops to serve NATO, not the United States.

Link: European allies’ in NATO are critical to the Afghan mission

Philip H. Gordon 2012. (US State Department, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC March 1, 2012 “The United States and Europe: Meeting Global Challenges**”** <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/185064.htm>

Take Afghanistan where our European allies have been critical to NATO’s efforts. With nearly 40,000 European troops on the ground fighting alongside our own, we have built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. For a decade now, the Alliance has held firm to the principle of “in together, out together”. That commitment has not faltered during discussions of the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2014, which will be one of the key topics of the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago. Despite the current difficulties, let’s also not forget that enormous progress has been made in decimating al-Qaida’s leadership. We remain committed to a partnership with the Afghan people and government as we work to realize our shared goals of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaida as well as building a safer, more secure and prosperous Afghanistan.

Brink: Afghan campaign is on the knife’s edge between success and failure

Dr. Christopher Paul 2012 (PhD sociology; social scientist at the Rand Corporation, a research group) 3 Apr 2012 History Favors More Time, NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/history-shows-that-more-time-is-needed>

We found that in Afghanistan, the government and counterinsurgency forces have realized many positive indicators, like uncontested air dominance, sufficient military strength to force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas, quality intelligence and forces seeking to establish positive relations with the population. But Afghanistan lacks several traits that have been crucial to success historically, like the legitimacy and competence of the imperiled government, and the ability to disrupt or prevent insurgents from obtaining sanctuary and materiel support across borders. The result: the campaign appears poised on a knife's edge between success and failure.

Link: We can successfully defeat Al Qaeda if we don’t give up the fight in Afghanistan

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

In other words, the moral case for Afghanistan is not only a matter of our being virtuous for the sake of virtue. Because we increasingly have the heretofore neglected population on our side, we can still win. As a result of the heroic efforts of coalition forces, al-Qaeda has largely been forced to relocate to the tribal areas of Pakistan or outposts in Yemen and Somalia. Still, the Afghan government’s stability is threatened as Taliban forces struggle to retake many districts. They can be stopped. But only if our leaders give our troops free reign to do so and avoid the temptation to give up the fight.

Impact: Global terrorism

Fawzia Koofi 2012.(a woman candidate for the Afghan presidential elections in 2014) April 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Dark Days If the U.S. Left Now <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/dark-days-would-return-if-the-us-left-now>

If the West abandons Afghanistan once again our country will become a playground for global terrorism and a risk to the world. I understand the pressure on President Obama to pull out of an unpopular war at a time of economic crisis. But by pulling out now we risk undoing all the fragile gains of the last 11 years.

2. Weaker security in Europe

Link: NATO provides the most effective security for its members

Philip H. Gordon 2012. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC March 1, 2012 “The United States and Europe: Meeting Global Challenges**”** <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/185064.htm>

Today NATO has 28 members, dozens of partners across the globe, a proven track record of providing stability within Europe and beyond its borders. NATO’s ongoing missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and off the horn of Africa as well as its recent operation in Libya demonstrate its significant contributions to global security. At a time of budgetary austerity across the industrialized world, it is worth remembering that NATO has proven to be the most successful alliance in history and provides the most effective security for its members.

Link: US presence in Europe with NATO provides assurance to allies and deterrent value

Jamie Shea 2012. (NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges ) Keeping NATO Relevant, Apr 2012 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9#](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9)

NATO will thus need to return to scenarios reminiscent of the Cold War in some respects: with plans for U.S. forces to return to Europe in a crisis situation honed through regular intensive exercises. The U.S. forces remaining in Europe must be configured to support this training. This would be helped if the United States left a disproportionate number of officers from all four U.S. services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) at the key U.S. training facilities, such as Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr, or at NATO’s European headquarters. Some of these should be Article 5, collective defense exercises to provide reassurance to allies, particularly to those on the periphery of the Alliance where the conventional military balance remains unfavorable. Exercises also demonstrate NATO’s cohesion and resolve, having in themselves a deterrent value.

Link: We need NATO for deterrence

Major General Mark Barrett 2011. (US Air Force, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany) June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

Deterrence by threat of overwhelming retaliation is self-evidentiary and has been fundamental to Alliance security since its inception. NATO’s nuclear capabilities, its declaratory policy, and its conventional forces back this deterrent posture, reinforced by a Strategic Concept that states unequivocally that NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear forces exist. Deterrence by denial on the other hand, rests on establishing defence capabilities robust enough to convince any adversary that a direct attack will not be successful. The NATO ballistic missile defence capability, while still evolving, will pave the way in this direction. Furthermore, broadening our partnership program will afford NATO a regional flexibility that under the right circumstances will provide a deterrent effect by bringing together nations with a shared vision. Bringing nations under this umbrella of “shared” intent may convince potential adversaries that they have more to gain from cooperation than from confrontation.

Impact: Independence of post-Soviet states is at risk from Russian aggression.

Zbigniew Brzezinski 2008. (National Security Advisor to Pres. Carter)Time Magazine, 14 Aug 2008, “Staring Down the Russians,”<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1832699,00.html>

“The stakes are high. Ultimately, the independence of the post-Soviet states is at risk. Russia seems committed to the notion that there should be some sort of supranational entity, governed from the Kremlin, that would oversee much of the former Soviet territories. This attitude reflects in part the intense nationalistic mood that now permeates Russia's political élite. Vladimir Putin, former President and now Prime Minister, is riding this nationalist wave, exploiting it politically and propagating it with the Russian public. Some now even talk of a renewed Russian military presence in Cuba as a form of retaliation against the U.S. for its support of the independence of the post-Soviet states.”

3. Loss of trans-atlantic cooperation. This disad argues that NATO as a means of promoting cooperation among allies results in better outcomes than if we tried to do the same foreign policy goals without NATO.

Link: Cooperation strengthens American power

Dr. Ivo H. Daalder& Dr. James Lindsay 2003. ( Daalder - PhD political science; was an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs, where he was director of research at the Center for International and Security Studies. Lindsay - AB in economics and political science from the University of Michigan and an MA, MPhil, and PhD from Yale University. He has been a fellow at the Center for International Affairs and the Center for Science and International Affairs, both at Harvard University. He is a recipient of the Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs and an International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations) “The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century” Winter 2003, <http://www.cfr.org/world/globalization-politics-american-foreign-policy-new-century/p6330>

Finally, cooperation can extend the life of American primacy. Working with others can spread the costs of action over a wider array of actors, enabling the United States to do more with less. By creating international regimes and organizations Washington can imbed its interests and values in institutions that will shape and constrain countries for decades, regardless of the vicissitudes of American power. And cooperation can build bonds with other countries, lessening the chances of cultural and political tactics that can over the years sap U.S. power.

Link & Impact: Net benefits of working multilaterally through NATO outweigh the costs

Dr. Dave Auerswald, Prof. Steve Saideman, Dr. Michael Tierney 2007. (Auerswald - Professor of Security Studies at the National War College; Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego. Saideman - prof. of political science, McGill University, Canada; Tierney - Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego; prof of polit. sci. College of William & Mary) The Perils of Multilateralism? American Influence in Multilateral Interventions, <http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/recent%20papers/Perils%20of%20Multilateralism%20Submission.pdf>

The current Bush administration has strongly preferred to avoid institutionalized collective action in its war on terrorism in Afghanistan. One apparent concern motivating this unilateralism is that the U.S. would have to accommodate its allies (bargaining costs), which might be more difficult in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Still, the Kosovo case shows that American control over NATO multilateral efforts can be substantial (or even overwhelming); hence, neither agency costs nor bargaining costs should necessarily drive U.S. policy decisions. On balance, multilateralism seems more beneficial to the U.S than the alternative of unilateral intervention.

Impact 1: Cost.

Cost Impact: Strong NATO has huge benefits for the US by bringing in our allies to share burdens in joint operations

Luke Coffey 2012. (Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation.; was special advisor to British Minister of Defense; master of science degree in European Union Politics from the London School of Economics; served as a Captain in the US Army as part of the Southern European Task Force and deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom) 24 Feb 2012 Shrinking America’s Global Reach: U.S. Military Bases in Europe Remain Vital <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/ib3516.pdf>

It is also in America’s interest to see a relevant and strong NATO. U.S. forces play a major role in the capacity building of key European allies. This has huge benefits for the United States. In 2010, the U.S. carried out 33 major multinational training exercises involving 50,000 troops from 40 countries in Europe. U.S. forces also help European allies prepare for missions like the one in Afghanistan. For example, today there is a Georgian infantry battalion fighting alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand province, one of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. The more America trains its allies to carry out challenging missions such as those in Afghanistan, the better the burden is shared with its partners.

Cost Impact: Complex military interventions cost less when we have international cooperation

Stefano Recchia 2011. (PhD candidate, Columbia University) “Limited Liability Multilateralism:The American Military, Armed Intervention, and IOs” (brackets added) <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&ved=0CD0QFjAEOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fdownload%2Ffedora_content%2Fdownload%2Fac%3A140135%2FCONTENT%2FRecchia_columbia_0054D_10402.pdf&ei=DoaZT7PfL8nL0QXXzp3vBQ&usg=AFQjCNE0JliWxsSI3QjCgcYad9z5Dojhww&sig2=6zHJHDcO8ptY0FOuOjhghw>

The endorsement of relevant IOs [international organizations], obtained before the launch of offensive operations, locks in international support and thereby reduces the costs to Washington of successfully implementing complex interventions, especially those that require open-ended troop commitments for post-combat peacekeeping and stabilization. Put differently, IO endorsement obtained from the outset facilitates burden sharing in the long run and therefore limits American liability. As former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sums it up: Particularly when it comes to intervening in either civil wars or failed states, it is much more sustainable if you have regional IOs and coalitions that are backed by global institutions to carry these things out, rather than having the United States with its much flaunted lift capability and military force come half around the world.

Impact 2: Better pursuit of American interests with NATO than without it

Dr. Dave Auerswald, Prof. Steve Saideman, Dr. Michael Tierney 2007. (Auerswald - Professor of Security Studies at the National War College; Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego. Saideman - prof. of political science, McGill University, Canada; Tierney - Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego; prof of polit. sci. College of William & Mary) The Perils of Multilateralism? American Influence in Multilateral Interventions, <http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/recent%20papers/Perils%20of%20Multilateralism%20Submission.pdf>

We argue that institutionalized multilateralism embodied in NATO procedures actually empowers the U.S., while also sharing burdens and providing international legitimacy. Our test case is the Kosovo conflict; the Bush administration’s poster child for all that is wrong with multilateral interventions. We show that the Kosovo conflict empowered the U.S. relative to its European partners through an understudied type of principal-agent relationship between NATO military commanders and their civilian superiors. In this context, military commanders are the agents of two principals; one an international organization (IO) with informal, norm-based decision rules and the other a powerful member state possessing the ability to act either independently or within the IO. In principal-agent parlance, the military agent reported to two principals, one a collective principal (the North Atlantic Council) and the other a single principal (the U.S. government) that was also a member of the collective principal. We argue that such hybrid principal-agent relationships actually provide advantages to powerful states like the U.S. when participating in multilateral interventions; advantages that offset most of the bargaining costs and the requirements for compromise within NATO. This paper contributes to a variety of current academic and policy debates. We describe and reinterpret the conventional wisdom regarding the chain of command within international organizations involved in multilateral interventions. To date, no one has explored the implications of the hybrid principal-agent relationships found in NATO for U.S. influence during the Kosovo conflict. From a practitioner’s perspective, these insights are progressively more relevant, as both homeland defense and the use of force increasingly involve both international organizations and individual states in a variety of chains of command. By studying the management of military operations by international organizations, we can offer informed advice to NATO policy makers as they seek to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of their operations around the world, including the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. The implication of our argument for the U.S. is more concrete. NATO interventions should not be feared. Instead, understanding patterns of civil-military relations in NATO suggests that the U.S. can better pursue its interests using the alliance then it can by acting unilaterally.

Impact 3: Today’s transatlantic community is indispensable for managing multiple world problems. Examples: Syria, democratic transitions in the Middle East, China, North Korea, Somali pirates

Philip H. Gordon 2012. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC March 1, 2012 “The United States and Europe: Meeting Global Challenges**”** <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/185064.htm>

The agenda that is still before us, most urgently the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Syria, clearly remains daunting. And of course there are many many other issues that I haven’t had time here to address, from helping North Africa and the Middle East in its democratic transition, the question of China’s emerging power, new leadership in North Korea, climate change, the threat posed by Somali pirates off the Horn of Africa and many many others. But I think by talking a little bit about the extensive list of areas where we are cooperating extraordinarily closely, and contrasting it, if you will, to previous periods, and I don’t mean just the previous years but even decades before that, I think it says a lot about the approach that the President brought to this relationship, what we’ve been trying to do over the past three years, and what we intend to do in the future. On every single one of the issues I mentioned, close transatlantic cooperation is an indispensable starting point. To retain an effective working relationship, countries on both sides of the Atlantic must continue, as we have done, to engage in frank dialogue, smart defense spending, and cooperative policy-making. Secretary Clinton could not have summed it up more succinctly than she did in a joint appearance with Secretary of Defense Panetta in Munich just last month when she said, “Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to the world we hope to build together in the century ahead.”

4. Unilateralism and loss of legitimacy. This disad argues that when the US acts alone we lose respect and legitimacy in the eyes of the world. If we act within the context of NATO, other nations see our foreign policy as more legitimate and will give us greater respect and acceptance, allowing us to have their cooperation in solving big world problems. “Unilateral” means “acting alone.” “Multilateral” means “acting with a group.”

Link: Unilateral foreign policy actions lack international legitimacy - NATO is the best multilateral option

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson 2011. (Army Joint Intelligence Coordination Staff ) “Defending NATO Distance learning” ARMED FORCES JOURNAL <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/10/7568438/>

Third, Meyers suggests “the U.S. may withdraw from NATO altogether” over concerns about disproportionate burden sharing. Broadly speaking, the U.S. can choose from several foreign policy approaches when dealing with geopolitical challenges: a unilateral approach, a regional alliance approach, or a multilateral approach (i.e., working through the United Nations). Where a unilateral approach often lacks international legitimacy, consensus in a multilateral approach is frequently difficult to achieve. In many instances, a regional alliance approach, such as NATO, offers the best option. NATO has been an extremely successful military alliance for over 60 years. Further, it is an effective alliance today as it faces adversaries on multiple fronts. We should focus our energy on finding ways to strengthen the NATO alliance in order to better face the potential threats of tomorrow.

Link: NATO is essential to multilateralism

Ronald Asmus 2010. (Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center; Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) May/June 2010 FOREIGN POLICY magazine, "Who Needs NATO?" (Carl von Clausewitz was a 19th century German military strategy expert and a general in the Prussian army) <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/who_needs_nato>

The United States is in NATO today because it is a power that shares values and interests with Europe. There is no effective multilateralism without Atlanticism. If the United States withdraws from NATO, it will simply find itself with fewer allies and more instability. You don't need to be Carl von Clausewitz to understand why that is not a good outcome.

Link: NATO gives legitimacy to US policies, adds to prestige, influence and military power

Col. Tarn Warren 2009. (US Army, instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College) ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on NATO's Future <http://www.ndu.edu/press/ISAF-and-Afghanistan.html>

From the U.S. perspective, NATO is still relevant and useful despite the apparent unfair burdens on American troops and taxpayers. NATO is still the best means for America to remain involved in the affairs of Europe, and it also "augments the global prestige, political influence, and military power of the United States." America cannot indefinitely solve the world's problems alone. NATO brings international legitimacy, the kind that matters when the United States has to defend its global adventures to a skeptical world.

Link: NATO confers legitimacy on military operations

Dr. James Joyner 2011. (Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Alabama) “Back in the Saddle” 15 Apr 2011 FOREIGN POLICY <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/15/back_in_the_saddle>

In truth, however, the political value in a NATO operation is that the alliance's name is a stand-in for the developed world and operating under its name confers a legitimacy that national flags don't. This is particularly the case for Britain and France, whose colonial histories bring enormous baggage in the Middle East and North Africa -- not to mention the United States, with its own more recent complicated history in the region. With the notable exception of Russia, NATO does not have imperialistic connotations. In its 62 years of operation, the alliance has deployed its might sparingly: humanitarian protection missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Libya; maritime missions against the Somali pirates; and fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. While not all uncontroversial, these operations all had widespread international approval. This is not insignificant.

Impact: Solutions to global challenges depend on America’s international legitimacy

Suzanne Nossel 2007. (Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation and previously served as deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) “Going Legit” DEMOCRACY: A Journal of Ideas, Winter 2007, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/3/6507.php?page=all>

While the United States remains preeminent in its military and economic strength, the most potent global challenges it faces–nuclear proliferation, terrorism, failed states, and the scramble for energy–are not amenable to resolution through money or firepower. They depend on America’s ability to forge agreements, build consensus, and persuade others, all of which in turn are contingent on whether Washington enjoys international legitimacy.

“We can use UN for multilateral legitimacy” - Response: UN is vulnerable to manipulation, blocking US influence

Dr. William J. Lahneman 2004. (PhD in International Relations, Johns Hopkins Univ; MA in National Security Affairs from Naval Postgraduate School) MILITARY INTERVENTION: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century <http://books.google.fr/books?id=7MEDymP3JNkC&pg=PA195&lpg=PA195&dq=international+legitimacy+essential+military+intervention&source=bl&ots=W7dyGFyr9g&sig=FLlrK4xMJk8uXF3ot31rqIdUP_Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=85WbT8qjMoe80QWswKHfDg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=international%20legitimacy%20essential%20military%20intervention&f=false>

However, states might use the new importance associated with UN authorization for self-serving reasons. For example, states might attempt to prevent UN authorization for a particular intervention to diminish U.S. influence in a region or enhance their own role as leaders of the international system. If such activities were to become commonplace, they would deal a blow to the potentially enhanced role of the United Nations as a positive influence on international stability and human rights.

“We can still cooperate, just don’t have to do it through NATO” - Response: NATO allies are tired of US unilateral behavior and will not help us

Col. Tarn Warren 2009. (US Army, instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College) ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on NATO's Future <http://www.ndu.edu/press/ISAF-and-Afghanistan.html>

According to the Spanish foreign minister, "The threat of mutual destruction during the Cold War had kept the boiling cauldron covered and the rifts hidden; Iraq blew the lid off to reveal all the fault lines in the Alliance." According to other experts, this time it is not politics as usual. Many European nations have had enough of what they view as excessively aggressive and militant American unilateralism, especially in Iraq. As a result, U.S. pleas for help in Afghanistan have received a muted response. Many question why Europeans should value an alliance that the Americans ignore when they choose. In particular, France's and Germany's political hostility over Iraq has seriously eroded transatlantic solidarity.

Definition of legitimacy and why it matters

Suzanne Nossel 2007. (Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation and previously served as deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) “Going Legit” DEMOCRACY: A Journal of Ideas, Winter 2007, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/3/6507.php?page=all>

International legitimacy is a measure of the acceptability and justifiability of a state’s actions in the eyes of other states and their citizens. Legitimacy, a kind of moral capital, reflects a collective judgment that the assertion of power, through a policy or an action, is valid even if it is unpopular. After all, leadership requires taking the occasional unpopular stand; but whereas popularity is inherently ephemeral, contingent on personalities and temporary alignments of interest, legitimacy is more enduring. It provides a foundation for respect and understanding that can transcend short-term, conflicting goals. Practically, when America’s purposes are well-founded, openly articulated, and broadly consistent with its professed values, the use of power toward those ends is generally judged legitimate. But when the United States misleads others about its motives, acts on inadequate or selective evidence, flouts its own principles, or unilaterally exempts itself from broadly agreed standards of conduct, its legitimacy suffers.

5. Loss of military bases in Europe

Link: Bases in Europe are critical to support operations in other parts of the world

Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., with American Forces Press Service 2012.(journalist) 13 Jan 2012 “Pentagon: Commitment to NATO, Europe is 'Unshakeable' “ THE DISAM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION MANAGEMENT, (first brackets added, second brackets in original) <http://www.disamjournal.org/articles/pentagon-commitment-to-nato-europe-is-unshakeable-423>

He [Pentagon spokesman Navy Captain John Kirby] also underscored the importance of maintaining some troop presence in the region. "The continent of Europe sits astride several lines of communication and avenues of transportation and proximity to other parts of the world which are important to us and our partners," Kirby said. "We saw [that recently] with the operations in Libya and NATO's involvement in that how critical the support was that we received, and other partners in the alliance received, from bases in Europe. It's still a very important part of the world."

Link: US troops & bases in Europe are important: they help achieve our policy goals in Eurasia and the Middle East

Luke Coffey 2012. (Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The HeritageFoundation.; was special advisor to British Minister of Defense; master of science degree in European Union Politics from the London School of Economics; served as a Captain in the US Army as part of the Southern European Task Force and deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom) 24 Feb 2012 Shrinking America’s Global Reach: U.S. Military Bases in Europe Remain Vital <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/ib3516.pdf>

There are some who believe that basing U.S. troops in Europe is a Cold War anachronism. However, the forward basing of U.S. troops in Europe today is just as important as it was during the Cold War, albeit for different reasons. The U.S. military presence in Europe helps to achieve American policy aims in the broader Eurasia and Middle East regions. From the Arctic to the Levant, from the Maghreb to the Caucasus, Europe is at one of the most important crossroads of the world. U.S. military bases in Europe provide American leaders with flexibility, resilience, and options in a dangerous world. Today, the garrisons of American service personnel in Europe are no longer the fortresses of the Cold War but the forward operating bases of the 21st century.

Link: Reducing US presence in Europe will make America weaker

Luke Coffey 2012. (Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation.; was special advisor to British Minister of Defense; master of science degree in European Union Politics from the London School of Economics; served as a Captain in the US Army as part of the Southern European Task Force and deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom) 24 Feb 2012 Shrinking America’s Global Reach: U.S. Military Bases in Europe Remain Vital <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/ib3516.pdf>

The U.S. military presence in Europe deters American adversaries, strengthens allies, and protects U.S. interests. Whether it is preparing and deploying U.S. and allied troops for Afghanistan or responding to a humanitarian crisis in the region, the U.S. is able to project power and react to the unexpected because of its forward-based military capabilities in Europe. Reducing this capability will only make America weaker on the world stage.

Impact: Increased risk of war. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com,<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies.

6. Friendly Fire.

Coordination with NATO improves cooperation with allies, which means less risk of friendly-fire during war time

Dr. James Joyner 2011. (Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Alabama) “Back in the Saddle” 15 Apr 2011 FOREIGN POLICY <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/15/back_in_the_saddle>

Though NATO's bureaucracy is a favorite butt of jokes by even the alliance's staunchest supporters, its existence provides a massive head start. As a standing alliance, NATO has been the main venue for making sure that different countries' command structures and systems can work together, creating standard operating procedures, and ensuring a degree of uniformity in weapons and equipment. The commencement of a war is a really awful time to work these issues out, as we saw in the first Gulf War and its numerous friendly-fire incidents.

7. Risk to the Global Commons. “Global commons” means areas that are not under the jurisdiction of any government, like the high seas or outer space.

Link: US+NATO needed to protect the global commons

Prof. James Sperling 2011. (Professor of Political Science at Akron University, Ohio) June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World “NATO and the Global Commons: A Perspective on Emerging Challenges, <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The four domains constituting the global commons—aerospace, maritime space, cyberspace and outer space—are inextricably linked, but cyberspace and outer space are the two domains underpinning NATO’s ability to operate globally on air, land and sea. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has employed the language of ‘collective action’ and ‘collective goods’ as the foundation for NATO participation in shaping future access to the commons in each domain. Yet the objectives of the alliance (and particularly those of its senior partner, the United States) clearly underscore the continuing importance and desirability of sustaining the NATO (and American) sponsored regimes governing the commons or ensuring that any modification of those regimes does not harm the interests of the Alliance or its member States.

Impact: Protection of the open seas is critical to prosperity and security. Advanced economies are vulnerable to any maritime disruption

Prof. James Sperling 2011. (Professor of Political Science at Akron University, Ohio) June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World “NATO and the Global Commons: A Perspective on Emerging Challenges, <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The maritime commons domain has the longest history as a sovereign-free domain facilitating commerce and conquest. Trading nations have had an asymmetrical interest in freedom of the seas to ensure the uninterrupted flow of trade, just as maritime powers have valued freedom of seas to facilitate the projection of power. In some cases, there has been a marriage of convenience between trading nations and maritime powers, while in others the maritime powers are states with a major interest in protecting global trade. The globalization of national economies has effectively rendered this distinction moot, but has reinforced the criticality of open seas for prosperity and security. The maritime commons domain retains an unparalleled security salience: the global and Atlantic economies are heavily dependent on sea-borne trade for manufactures and raw materials, and three quarters of global trade passes through vulnerable international straits and canals. The evolution of the global supply chain, particularly the manufacturing sector’s near universal reliance on just-in-time inventory management, has made the advanced economies particularly vulnerable to any disruption of maritime trade.

8. Loss of NATO nuclear weapons. See Blue Book Negative Brief against withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

9. Loss of NATO missile defense. See Blue Book Negative Brief against cancellation of US missile defense program in Europe.

10. WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without the US would be more vulnerable to WMDs and terrorism

Dr. Hans Binnendijk& Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy .Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University ) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH35.pdf> (WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

“Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.”

NEGATIVE BRIEF: PAKISTAN ALLIANCE - good

**Matthew Baker**

INHERENCY

Freeze #1- U.S. froze $700 million to Pakistan until the country improves efforts to counter IEDs

The Nation 2012. (Pakistan newspaper) “Obama signs bill freezing Pak aid,” January 2, 2012, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/02-Jan-2012/obama-signs-bill-freezing-pak-aid>

“President Barack Obama has signed a $662 billion national defenceauthorisation bill into law that, among other sweeping measures, freezes $700 million in aid to Pakistan until Islamabad gives assurances it is helping fight the spread of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).”

Freeze #2- U.S. froze $800 million in aid to Pakistan in July 2011

BBC 2011. December 13, 2011. “US Congress panel freezes $700m worth of Pakistan aid.” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16157631>

“A US Congressional panel has frozen $700m (£450m) in aid to Pakistan until it gives assurances it is tackling the spread of homemade bombs in the region. The move - the second such freeze this year - reflects US frustration over what it sees as Islamabad's reluctance to act against militant groups. But it has has been criticised by senior Pakistani politicians. The killing of Osama Bin Laden by US forces and ongoing US drone strikes in Pakistan have strained bilateral ties. Washington is also known to be unhappy about what it sees as lacklustre Pakistani efforts to counter the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani network, which it believes operates out of Pakistan and fights US troops in Afghanistan. Correspondents say that Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of American foreign aid and the cutback announced on Tuesday is only a small proportion of the billions of dollars it receives from Washington every year in civil and military assistance. But the freeze in aid - part of a defence bill that is expected to be passed by Congress later this week - could presage even greater cuts, correspondents say. Washington has provided about $20bn (£12.8bn) in security and economic aid to Pakistan since 2001, much of it in the form of reimbursements for assistance in fighting militants. In July the US said it was withholding some $800m (£500m) in military aid to Pakistan - about a third of the annual US security assistance to Pakistan.”

SIGNIFICANCE

Pakistan is pressuring al-Qaeda and militants: They’ve lost thousands of soldiers fighting this war

Admiral Mike Mullen 2011. (US Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), “Posture Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 17, 2011, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/posture_17feb11mullen.pdf>

“A key component of our partnership is to help enable the Pakistani Military’s counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations. The series of offensive operations undertaken by the Pakistani Military in the tribal areas expanded dramatically in 2009. Since then, the Pakistanis have fought bravely and sacrificed much—losing thousands of soldiers in the process. We have faithfully supported them in a variety of ways, primarily in the development of the counter-insurgency capabilities of Pakistan’s security forces. This development and the military’s operations have kept pressure on al-Qaeda’s senior leadership and the militant groups threatening Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

Pakistan offers to help Nigeria in the war on terrorism

The African Pilot 2012, “Pakistan to aid Nigeria in war on terror,” March 24, 2012, <http://www.pilotafrica.com/2012/03/24/pakistan-to-aid-nigeria-in-war-on-terror/>

“Pakistan’s Acting High Commissioner to Nigeria, Ahmed Ali Suray, has expressed his country’s willingness to assist Nigeria in the war on terrorism in the country. Surray said on Friday that Pakistan was ready to offer Nigeria its available services to fight the nation’s Boko Haram terror threat. “It is up to the Nigerian government, we are offering all services available; our experience, our training and mostly what Nigeria would be requiring because Nigeria is one of the dearest friends of Pakistan.””

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Even if Pakistan is helping some of our enemies, we still should not disengage

Admiral Mike Mullen 2011. (US Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQSEPTEMBER 22, 2011, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/09%20September/Mullen%2009-22-11.pdf>

**“**History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today. The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network are hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and frustrating U.S.-Pakistan relations. The actions by the Pakistani government to support them—actively and passively—represent a growing problem that is undermining U.S. interests and may violate international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting these groups, the government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani Army, continues to jeopardize Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international influence. However, as I will discuss later, now is not the time to disengage from Pakistan; we must, instead, reframe our relationship.”

Despite Pakistan turning a blind eye to terrorists, U.S. should remain engaged

Lisa Curtis 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, focusing on analyzing America's economic, security, and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal), August 29, 2011, “Drone Strikes Protect America from al-Qaeda’s Terror,” THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, August 29, 2011, <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/29/drone-strikes-protect-america-from-al-qaedas-terror/?query=Drone+Strikes+Protect+America+from+al-Qaeda's+Terror>

“Pakistani officials have long tolerated terrorist groups that are linked to al-Qaeda, which in turn facilitate the organization’s ability to use Pakistan as a launch pad for its international terrorist campaign. Pakistani officials have sought to argue that they can “better control” or “keep tabs on” the terrorist groups if their intelligence agencies retain links to them. However, if such groups were able to protect the world’s most wanted terrorist without the Pakistan military’s knowledge, who is keeping tabs on whom? As the Heritage Foundation Counterterrorism Task Force has argued in its August 24 report, U.S. officials should reject Pakistani assertions that they are incapable of shutting down groups linked to al-Qaeda, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terror attack, and the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, whose leader was in contact with bin Laden’s courier before the May 2 raid. Indeed, the U.S. should never settle for Pakistani excuses for avoiding a full-throttle approach against these terrorist groups and instead demand that Pakistan be accountable for the activities of all terrorist groups on its soil. Despite the severe differences between Islamabad and Washington over terrorism, it is in the interest of the U.S. to remain engaged with Pakistani leaders and demonstrate U.S. interest in the development of a prosperous and moderate Pakistan free of the terrorist scourge. Pakistani leaders are slowly waking to the costs of tolerating terrorism on their soil, and the U.S. should be in a position to support the state against the terrorists’ designs.”

Pakistan is critical to success against terrorism: We must work through differences with Pakistan

John Brennan 2011. Remarks of John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on Ensuring al-Qa'ida's Demise -- As Prepared for Delivery, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 29 June 2011 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/remarks-john-o-brennan-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter>

*“*In recent weeks we’ve been reminded that our relationship with Pakistan is not without tension or frustration. We are now working with our Pakistani partners to overcome differences and continue our efforts against our common enemies. It is essential that we do so. As frustrating as this relationship can sometimes be, Pakistan has been critical to many of our most significant successes against al-Qa’ida. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis—military and civilian—have given their lives in the fight against militancy. And despite recent tensions, I am confident that Pakistan will remain one of our most important counterterrorism partners.”

DISADVANTAGES

1. U.S. loses in Afghanistan

Link/Uniqueness: Panetta- Without Pakistan, U.S. cannot win in Afghanistan

Donna Miles 2011. “Panetta: Stable Pakistan Relationship Critical to Afghanistan Success,” December 12, 2011, Office of the U.S. Defense Department, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66444>

“Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta expressed confidence today that the United States and Pakistan can patch up their differences, emphasizing that “ultimately, we can’t win the war in Afghanistan without being able to win in our relationship with Pakistan as well.” The secretary said restoring the strained relationship with the United States critical to long-term progress in Afghanistan. “I think it is going to be important, as we are able to move and progress in our efforts in Afghanistan, that we continue to do outreach in Pakistan,” he said. “It is essential to stability in that region that we not only achieve a peaceful resolution with regards to Afghanistan, but that we are able to develop a more stable relationship with Pakistan as well,” he said.”

Brink: Afghan campaign is on the knife’s edge between success and failure

Dr. Christopher Paul2012 (PhD sociology; social scientist at the Rand Corporation, a research group) 3 Apr 2012 History Favors More Time, NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/history-shows-that-more-time-is-needed>

We found that in Afghanistan, the government and counterinsurgency forces have realized many positive indicators, like uncontested air dominance, sufficient military strength to force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas, quality intelligence and forces seeking to establish positive relations with the population. But Afghanistan lacks several traits that have been crucial to success historically, like the legitimacy and competence of the imperiled government, and the ability to disrupt or prevent insurgents from obtaining sanctuary and materiel support across borders. The result: the campaign appears poised on a knife's edge between success and failure.

Impact: Global terrorism

FawziaKoofi2012.(a woman candidate for the Afghan presidential elections in 2014) April 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Dark Days If the U.S. Left Now <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/dark-days-would-return-if-the-us-left-now>

If the West abandons Afghanistan once again our country will become a playground for global terrorism and a risk to the world. I understand the pressure on President Obama to pull out of an unpopular war at a time of economic crisis. But by pulling out now we risk undoing all the fragile gains of the last 11 years.

Impact: Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan means attack on another big Western city

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan 2012. (PhD in Russian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; resident scholar and the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute) 3 Apr 2012 Al Qaeda Allies Remain Strong, NEW YORK TIMES<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/al-qaeda-allies-remain-to-be-defeated-in-the-east>

Ryan Crocker, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, recently told The Telegraph, “Al-Qaeda is still present in Afghanistan. If the West decides that 10 years in Afghanistan is too long then they will be back, and the next time it will not be New York or Washington, it will be another big Western city.”

Impact: Horrific oppression of women by the Taliban

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

In August 2010, after years of both military gains and setbacks, *Time* ran a cover story about an 18-year-old Afghan woman named Aisha. Her nose and ears had been cut off by a Taliban commander for having fled abusive in-laws. Provocatively titled “What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan,” the article and attendant images provoked a discussion about whether the United States was about to abandon the women and girls of Afghanistan to renewed oppression under the Taliban.

Impact: Lack of human rights = more likely to promote terrorism, because they don’t value human life

Jamie Fly 2012. (M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University; former Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council in the GWBush administration) Apr 2012 Reclaiming the Moral Case for Afghanistan , COMMENTARY magazine<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/reclaiming-the-moral-case-for-afghanistan/>

An Afghanistan that does not protect the rights of women, children, and minorities would be a devastating failure for the United States. As Hillary Clinton noted back in 2001, “A post-Taliban Afghanistan where women’s rights are respected is much less likely to harbor terrorists in the future. Why? Because a society that values all its members, including women, is also likely to put a higher premium on life, opportunity, and freedom—values that run directly counter to the evil designs of the Osama bin Ladens of the world.”

2. Negotiations in Afghanistan harmed

Link: Pakistan is a key partner in negotiating with the Taliban and bringing peace to Afghanistan

Aryn Baker 2011. (Pakistan and Afghanistan Bureau Chief for TIME Magazine) May 12, 2011, “Why We're Stuck with Pakistan,” TIME MAGAZINE, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2071131,00.html> (brakcts in original)

“Still, the awkward truth remains: The U.S. needs Pakistan. U.S. officials believe that bin Laden's death offers an opportunity to peel the Taliban away from al-Qaeda. And when that happens, Pakistan will be perfectly poised to offer its assistance. Though routinely denied by Pakistani officials, it is hardly a secret that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar has been using Pakistan as a base of operations ever since he fled the U.S. invasion in 2001. With the target date for turning over responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan army in 2015 approaching, there is near universal agreement that the Taliban will have to be involved in some sort of political reconciliation. "The Americans need the Pakistanis to negotiate in Afghanistan," says a senior Western diplomat in Islamabad. In Pakistani eyes, that justifies the policy of maintaining relations with the Taliban, says Senator Azim. "We are the only ones who are accused of keeping close ties, so Pakistan is the only country that [the West] can rely on."

Impact: Delaying negotiations will force a higher price for peace in the end - lives and money will be lost

LakhdarBrahimi and Thomas R. Pickering 2011. (co-chairs of the Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan. Brahimi twice represented the United Nations in Afghanistan — first during the Taliban regime, where he negotiated with its top leaders, and again after its ouster, when he led the international effort to support a new, more open government. Pickering - served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, India, and Russia, as well as undersecretary of state for political affairs) Afghanistan - Negotiating Peace, The Report of The Century Foundation, International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions <http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/afghanistan-negotiating-peace/AfghanTCFTaskForce%20BookComplete.pdf>

The large military effort undertaken since 2009 has provided the time and built the platform for achievement of core American objectives in a negotiation. Arriving at Afghanistan’s ultimate arrangements through a negotiating process—in which the United States plays a central role as the country’s most deeply invested ally—would seem now to be in order. Indeed, for all sides, the longer negotiations are delayed, the higher the price is likely to be for restoring peace at the end. Quite apart from the costs of waging war, in lives and money, during the period that leaders continue to put off peace talks, there are other important factors to bear in mind: higher reconstruction costs to repair the inevitably increased destruction from prolongation of war, bloated payrolls for ever-expanding security forces (which, even with a settlement, can safely be demobilized only gradually into a shattered and jobless economy), and the continued hemorrhaging of Afghan talent sufficiently trained to provide public administration or private-sector dynamism.

3. Victory for al-Qaeda

Link: U.S. may not be able to defeat al-Qaeda without full Pakistani cooperation

Lisa Curtis 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, focusing on analyzing America's economic, security, and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal), August 29, 2011, “Drone Strikes Protect America from al-Qaeda’s Terror,” THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Aug 29, 2011, <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/29/drone-strikes-protect-america-from-al-qaedas-terror/?query=Drone+Strikes+Protect+America+from+al-Qaeda's+Terror>

**“**While the U.S. has made tremendous strides against al-Qaeda in the last 18 months, culminating in the death of bin Laden in May, it will not be able to finish the job of defeating the organization altogether without full Pakistani cooperation.”

Brink/Uniqueness: Al Qaeda’s becoming more sophisticated and still threatens the U.S.

Burke and Graham 2012. Caitlin Burke and Efrem Graham “US Intel: Bomb Plot Shows Al Qaeda Still a Threat,” CBN News, May 8, 2012, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2012/May/CIA-Foils-al-Qaeda-Bomb-Plot-against-US-Bound-Jet/>

“The CIA has foiled an al Qaeda bomb plot against the United States. But officials say even thought the bomber has been caught, al Qaeda is becoming more sophisticated, and the threat is far from over. The plot is a reminder that al Qaeda still has its sights set on the U.S. This time, they have a new type of bomb, one intended to slip past airport security and take down a U.S.-bound commercial airplane. "We are dealing with a dynamic adversary here, so they are always going to identify the vulnerabilities and work-arounds in our own systems," Frank Cilluffo,with George Washington University, said.”

Brink: More suicide bombers with non-metallic bombs out there and al Qaeda continues to call for attacks

Burke and Graham 2012. Caitlin Burke and Efrem Graham “US Intel: Bomb Plot Shows Al Qaeda Still a Threat,” CBN News, May 8, 2012, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2012/May/CIA-Foils-al-Qaeda-Bomb-Plot-against-US-Bound-Jet/>

**“**These new bombs use a more sophisticated detonation system, one without any metallic parts. Security experts say even the best airport scanners may not have caught the devices. And another concern - it's unclear how many airports abroad even have the body-scanner technology. U.S. officials say there may be several other would-be suicide bombers with similar non-metallic devices out there. And al Qaeda's English-language magazine continues to call for attacks against the U.S.”

Impact: A single successful terrorist attack can cost tens of millions to trillions of dollars

Prof. Jon Mueller and Prof. Mark Stewart 2011. Jon Mueller (professor of political science at Ohio State University) and Mark G. Stewart (professor of civil engineering and director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia).“Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security,” The Journal of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Volume VII(2011), <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.1.16>

“A successful terrorist attack can inflict costs in the tens of millions of dollars. Exceptional attacks, like the one on 9/11, can cost $200 billion, and losses could conceivably reach five trillion dollars for the nightmare scenario of the detonation of a sizeable nuclear device in a densely populated area of a city.”

4. Pakistan Instability

Link: Cutting aid to Pakistan would fan deficit spending and would plunge them deeper into economic trouble

Shuja Nawaz 2011 (Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington He is the author of "Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within" and “Learning by Doing: the Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency."), May 10, 2011, “Consider the Broader War,” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/09/should-the-us-cut-off-aid-to-pakistan/why-the-us-still-needs-pakistan>

“Some in the U.S. Congress, meanwhile, are threatening to cut off aid to Pakistan. Both countries’ responses would be disastrous. The U.S. would lose primary access via Pakistan for its supplies to fight the war in Afghanistan at a critical stage in that conflict. The Pakistanis would lose the $2 billion to $3 billion of aid, including cash from the Coalition Support Funds that the U.S. provides Pakistan’s military to cover the costs of its operations in the western half of the country. It is not clear where Pakistan would find the money to finance the war against terrorism and the Pakistani Taliban. Its only option may be further deficit spending that would plunge it deeper into an economic hole, and fuel inflation and public unrest.”

Brink: Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history

Aryn Baker 2011. (Pakistan and Afghanistan Bureau Chief for TIME Magazine) May 12, 2011, “Why We're Stuck with Pakistan,” TIME MAGAZINE, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2071131,00.html>

“Yet for all the anger in Islamabad and Washington, neither nation has much of a choice. However duplicitous and volatile it may be, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is central to the interests of both countries. The U.S. needs Pakistan's help to be successful in Afghanistan. Pakistan provides, among other things, a vital transit link for goods destined for coalition troops in the landlocked country. But even without Afghanistan, the U.S. would need Pakistan to be stable. The alternative — a collapsing nation awash with terrorist groups and possessing a nuclear arsenal — is too awful to consider. How real is that prospect? "Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history," warns Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "[It] is approaching a perfect storm of threats, including rising extremism, a failing economy, chronic underdevelopment and an intensifying war, resulting in unprecedented political, economic and social turmoil.”

Impact: Destabilized Pakistan promotes terrorism

Michael D. Rettig 2011. (MA in International Relations Candidate at New York University) “Preserving Pakistani Security,” September 29, 2011, <http://worldpress.org/print_article.cfm?article_id=4113&dont=yes>

“Second, a destabilized Pakistan would facilitate the growth of regionally focused terrorist groups and undermine nascent security gains in Afghanistan and India. Militants based from within Pakistan have long waged war on India and are responsible for much of the violence in Kashmir as well as the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The remnants of the Afghan Taliban, the Quetta Shura, have made their home in Pakistan and direct much of the Afghan insurgency from there. The Haqqani network, responsible for this year's U.S. embassy attack in Afghanistan and closely tied to both al Qaeda and the Taliban (and Pakistani intelligence), is also based in Pakistan. Presently, many of these regionally focused terrorist cells operate within relative confines set by Pakistan's military-intelligence sector (despite U.S. objections). However, if Pakistani internal security were to further decline, the cells would have the opportunity to strengthen, expand and operate independently of any state control. This development would render these cells immune to any state-based negotiations, hinder democratization and peace in Afghanistan, and lead to a range of provocative situations involving India.”

5. Loose Nukes

Link: Cutting assistance to would weaken Pakistan’s ability to suppress domestic threats and reduce confidence in the disposition of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Marvin G. Weinbaum 2011. (Scholar-in-Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute), “Should U.S. Continue Aid to Pakistan?,” May 17, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/should-us-continue-aid-pakistan/p25015>

“But to now abruptly reduce assistance to Pakistan would jeopardize American military forces in Afghanistan and weaken the Pakistani army's capacity to confront those domestically ensconced terrorist groups that threaten us both. It could also leave us less confident about the disposition of Pakistan's nuclear assets.”

Link: U.S. maintains ties with Pakistan keeps nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands

Lisa Curtis 2011. (senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and former White House-appointed senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, tracking India-Pakistan relations), “Suspend Aid, but Don’t Halt It,” May 10, 2011, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/09/should-the-us-cut-off-aid-to-pakistan/suspend-aid-to-pakistan-but-don>

**“**Abruptly cutting off all aid to Pakistan isn’t the answer, and would likely come at a steep price to United States interests in the region. In that event, Pakistan could play its own cards, perhaps cutting NATO supply lines into Afghanistan and kicking American intelligence officials out of the country. Moreover, maintaining ties — however frayed— allows the U.S. to help keep Pakistan’s nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands.”

Link: Pakistan has received $100 million from the U.S. to secure its nukes including technical assistance

Dr. Harsh V. Pant 2011. (Lecturer at the Department of Defense Studies at Kings College, London with a Masters degree in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University and a PhD from the University of Notre Dame) “Why an unstable Pakistan is a danger to India,” January 7, 2011, Rediff News, <http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-column-why-an-unstable-pakistan-is-a-danger-to-india/20110607.htm>

“Pakistan has accepted US help since 9/11 in designing its system of controls for its nuclear arsenal and the prevention of theft. The US has reportedly spent about $100 million in helping Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal, and some reports have suggested that Pakistan has also received technical assistance from the US.”

Brink: Concerns remain about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles

Dr. Harsh V. Pant 2011. (Lecturer at the Department of Defense Studies at Kings College, London with a Masters degree in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University and a PhD from the University of Notre Dame) “Why an unstable Pakistan is a danger to India,” January 7, 2011, Rediff News, <http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-column-why-an-unstable-pakistan-is-a-danger-to-india/20110607.htm>

“The present turmoil in Pakistan has once again raised concerns about the safety, security and command and control of its nuclear stockpile. Though Pakistan's government continues to dismiss media reports that its nuclear weapons were in danger of falling into the "wrong hands" as "inspired," and stressed that Pakistan provided the highest level of institutionalised protection to its strategic assets, the credibility of such claims remains open to question.”

Brink: Possibility of a very serious breach of Pakistani nuclear security before too long

Mike Shuster 2011. (Journalist) “As Pakistan Expands Nuke Arsenal, U.S. Fears Grow,” National Public Radio, July 7, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/07/07/137651918/as-pakistan-expands-nuke-arsenal-u-s-fears-grow> (brackets added)

“Recent developments have deepened concern among Pakistan experts in the United States. A growing nuclear infrastructure, an expanding weapons stockpile and ever more dangerous domestic attacks are a lethal combination, [David] Albright [director of the Institute for Science and International Security] says. "Particularly the most recent attack is really chilling," he says. "And you have to worry that nuclear sites could be targeted, and the attackers could muster the resources to do it." [Shaun] Gregory [expert on Pakistan at the University of Bradford in Britain] is willing to go so far as to predict an attack on a nuclear weapons site — soon. "I think we are looking at the possibility of a very serious breach of Pakistan's nuclear security before too long," he says.”

Uniqueness: U.S. efforts help Pakistan safeguard its nukes have met with success

Mike Shuster 2011. (Journalist) “As Pakistan Expands Nuke Arsenal, U.S. Fears Grow,” National Public Radio, July 7, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/07/07/137651918/as-pakistan-expands-nuke-arsenal-u-s-fears-grow>

“U.S. efforts to help Pakistan safeguard its growing nuclear arsenal have met with some success, says Feroz Khan, who worked for many years inside Pakistan's nuclear directorate, known as the Strategic Plans Division. "The United States is the most advanced nuclear power with the best practices in the world," Khan says, "and the Pakistani system actually tries to emulate them and learn from them. They have not been shy of doing that."”

Uniqueness: U.S. currently has snatch and grab plan if terrorists were to get access to nukes

The Times of India 2011. “US has 'snatch-and-grab' plan for Pak's nuclear weapons,” August 6, 2011, <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-08-06/pakistan/29858131_1_nuclear-arsenal-pakistan-army-abbottabad>

“The US has a contingency plan to "snatch-and-grab" Pakistan's nuclear weapons, if and when the President believes they are threat to either America or its interests, a media report has said, amid strains in bilateral ties. Plans have been drawn up for dealing with worst-case scenarios in Pakistan, NBC news reported quoting current and former US officials, who say that ensuring security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons has long been a high US security priority even before 9/11 terrorist attacks.”

Impact: Nuclear terrorism remains the greatest threat to global security

President Barack Obama 2012. “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University,” March 26, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university>

“We know that just the smallest amount of plutonium -- about the size of an apple -- could kill hundreds of thousands and spark a global crisis. The danger of nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security.”

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SAUDI ARABIA - good

**(Megan McKinley and Matthew Baker contributed evidence to this brief)**

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

We need Saudi Arabia: They are key to security, stability, counterbalancing Iran, peace plan with Israel, and war on terrorism

Anthony H. Cordesman 2011 (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal), February 26, 2011, “Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Different Nation,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, <http://csis.org/publication/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-very-different-nation>

“Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the world’s economy. It is the key to the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to create local defenses, and for US strategic cooperation with the Southern Gulf states. It plays a critical role as a counterbalance to a radical and more aggressive Iran, it is the source of the Arab League plan for a peace with Israel, and it has become a key partner in the war on terrorism. The US strategic posture in the Middle East depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime.”

Saudi Arabia is central to America’s interests in the Middle East and vital to US energy security.

The Associated Press 2011 (News Agency) December 29, 2011 “U.S. sells $30B worth of fighter jets to Saudis” NY DAILY NEWS<http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-12-29/news/30570700_1_fighter-jets-saudi-arabia-iran>

The plan initially raised concerns from pro-Israeli lawmakers, but U.S. officials reassured Congress that Israel's military edge would not be undercut by the sale. Additionally, there is now broad agreement among Israel, the Gulf Arab states and the West that Iran poses a significant and unpredictable threat. Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter regional rivals. Tensions between them were further stoked earlier this year after the U.S. accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. in Washington. Saudi Arabia is already the most militarily advanced of the Arab Gulf states, one of the richest countries in the world, and central to American policy in the Middle East. It is also vital to U.S. energy security, with Saudi Arabia ranking as the third-largest source of U.S. oil imports.

INHERENCY

Saudi Arabia has made combating terrorism priority and has had success

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,<http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

“Saudi Arabia has made combating terrorism a major priority. Terrorism is one of the biggest threats that Riyadh faces. Before 2003, the effectiveness of Riyadh’s counterterrorism activities was questionable at best. But in response to the rising levels of violence in the country in 2003 through 2006, the government did a good job of clamping down. There are not too many countries that have successfully dismantled and muzzled terrorism like Saudi Arabia has done. The government dedicated a great deal of money to the issue and employed both hard-security methods and softer tactics. This included arrests, better intelligence, amnesties, and counter-radicalization programs, as well as efforts by the governing and religious establishments to mobilize the population against terrorist activities.”

Conditions for Saudi women are sure to improve.

Council on Foreign Relations quoting Thomas Lippman 2012 (Thomas W. Lippman is adjunct senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). In addition, he is currently a member of a study group on Saudi Arabia convened jointly by Princeton University and the Institute des Sciences Politiques in France. In 2005 he was a lecturer on Middle Eastern affairs at the National Defense University and at the Brookings Institution. He has also been also a consultant to the U.S. Marine Corps, and to the National Counterterrorism Center; adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington.) January 13, 2012 “Saudi Arabia Remains Indispensable U.S. Ally, Argues New CFR Book” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS<http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-remains-indispensable-us-ally-argues-new-cfr-book/p27072> (Brackets added)

If there is one certainty about policy change in Saudi Arabia, "it is that the rules governing female behavior will be relaxed and that women will find new opportunities in the country's workplace and in its social and economic life," he [Thomas Lippman] writes. "Saudi Arabia is coming to the collective realization that it can no longer afford to pump vast resources into educating women at enormous expense without recovering the constructive energy and economic productivity of those educated graduates," Lippman explains. Basing his work on interviews and field research conducted in the kingdom from 2008 through 2011 while an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Lippman, now at the Middle East Institute, dissects the central paradox of the U.S.-Saudi relationship: both countries need each other, yet they both remain fundamentally different.

King Abdullah is creating social reforms and opposing terrorism

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011. (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

Since taking power in 2005, King Abdullah has created greater public space for domestic socialreform debates and has promoted the concept of a strong national identity among Saudis in theface of a determined domestic terrorism campaign. He also has codified royal succession rules, begun restructuring the justice system, and taken clear steps to exert stronger government control over religious authorities. Robust oil export revenues have strengthened the kingdom’s economic position and provide Saudi leaders with significant financial resources to meet domestic investment needs and provide social benefits.

“Blocking Peace with Israel” - Response: Saudis support Obama’s attempt to restart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It’s Israel’s settlement policy that’s causing problems for the Saudis

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011. (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (brackets in original) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

In 2010, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud had expressed Saudi leaders’ appreciation for “the prompt movement of the U.S. Administration to resuscitate the [Israeli-Palestinian] peace process and to treat the major issue of conflict within the framework of the two-state solution which aims at an autonomous and viable Palestinian state.” Prince Saud al Faisal supported the Obama Administration’s late 2010 attempt to restart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, while continuing to vocally and vehemently criticize Israeli settlement activity, particularly in the environs of Jerusalem. In September 2010, he described Israel’s settlement policy as aiming “to change facts on the ground and thus jeopardize the peace process and render the negotiations meaningless.” This perspective is widely shared by many Saudis.

Saudis have offered a peace deal for Israel

Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud 2011. Prince Turki is Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and is one of the founders of the King Faisal Foundation. He served as the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America “Palestinian rights won’t be denied by the United States and Israel” June 2011 <http://www.susris.com/2011/06/13/september-un-showdown-turki-al-faisal/>

In 2002 King Abdullah offered what has become the Arab Peace Initiative. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, it calls for an end to the conflict based on land for peace. The Israelis withdraw from all occupied lands, including East Jerusalem, reach a mutually agreed solution to the Palestinian refugees, and recognize the Palestinian state. In return, they will get full diplomatic recognition from the Arab world and all the Muslim states, an end to hostilities and normal relations with all these states. Now, it is the Israelis who are saying no.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

SAUDI GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE – Not Likely

There are only small protests in Saudi Arabia which will not affect the government.

Christopher Boucek 2011 (Christopher Boucek has a Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London, where he remains an associate fellow. Recognized expert on terrorism, security, and stability issues in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He frequently briefs U.S. and European governments and government agencies on terrorism, Islamist militancy, and security issues in the Arabian Peninsula. He has provided expert testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 20, 2011 “Rivals—Iran vs. Saudi Arabia” CAREGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/rivals-iran-vs.-saudi-arabia/68jg#protests>

Saudi Arabia can manage the Arab awakening internally better than anyone else in the Middle East—although this does not mean that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy objectives are in any way helped by the change. While it is not immune from the protest movement inside the country, Riyadh is more equipped to handle it through its religious community and financial resources. Saudi Arabia announced over $130 billion in new social welfare spending and the protests within the country have been very small thus far.

TERRORISM FUNDING/SUPPORT – Being solved

Saudi government has done quite a bit to crack down on terrorist fundraising

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

“With the Hajj attracting millions of Muslims every year to Mecca, there are ample opportunities to make connections and fundraise with people from all over the world. It is relatively easy to get money for many things in Saudi Arabia—and there is certainly money to be had. And terrorist groups can receive cash (or other convertible instruments) from individuals and groups even today, because there are still people who believe in the actions of these groups. The government has done quite a bit to crack down on fundraising. Laws have been implemented to curtail sending charitable money abroad outside government channels. People are not allowed to fundraise in mosques or on the streets, although such fundraising likely persists to some degree. There have also been educational and advertising campaigns letting people know that such money is often used for illicit activities—this has helped increase awareness about the methods terror groups use to raise funds. A fatwa was also issued saying that raising money for terrorism is the same as being a terrorist. And many prominent religious officials have condemned terrorism and worked hard to undermine support for terrorism and counter the intellectual or ideological justifications for terrorist activities.”

Saudi Arabia plays leading role in reducing terrorism out of Yemen

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (brackets added)<http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

“In August 2009, AQAP [Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula], the al-Qaeda affiliate based in Yemen, tried to assassinate Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the head of Saudi Arabia’s antiterrorism efforts. It has been reported in the Saudi press that Prince Mohammed has survived four assassination attempts linked to Yemeni-based militants. So the situation in Yemen is personal for Saudi Arabia—Riyadh considers the terrorists in Yemen a major threat. Saudi Arabia is Yemen’s largest foreign aid donor—by far. Riyadh’s primary concern with Yemen is its stability and security, particularly the Saudi nationals affiliated with AQAP hiding out in the country. Saudi Arabia is spending more money on counterterrorism training and improving intelligence collection. Saudi Arabia’s influence and interest in combating terrorists operating in its smaller neighbor mean that Riyadh has a leading role in reducing the threat of terrorism coming out of Yemen.

SOLVENCY

Saudi Arabia views monarch as absolutely essential, and would never allow democracy.

Prof. Gregory Gauss 2012 (He is a professor political science of the University of Vermont. He has held multiple positions before joining the faculty there. He is the author of three books, most recently, "The International Relations of the Persian Gulf,") January 26, 2012 “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS<http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east/p27205>

I think that Saudi Arabia's clearly counterrevolutionary when it comes to monarchy. It sees monarchy as absolutely essential. It sees the preservation of monarchy, particularly in its geographical area, the Gulf -- and we'll include Jordan in that -- as absolutely essential to its own domestic regime security and stability. And thus for Saudi Arabia, the preservation of monarchy in the Gulf Cooperation Council and in Jordan is a domestic political imperative.

Saudis are trying to stop terror fundraising - but they can’t solve for all the private activity

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011 (Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London, where he remains an associate fellow. Recognized expert on terrorism, security, and stability issues in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He frequently briefs U.S. and European governments and government agencies on terrorism, Islamist militancy, and security issues in the Arabian Peninsula. He has provided expert testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 12, 2011 “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE<http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#saudis>

The government has done quite a bit to crack down on fundraising. Laws have been implemented to curtail sending charitable money abroad outside government channels. People are not allowed to fundraise in mosques or on the streets, although such fundraising likely persists to some degree. There have also been educational and advertising campaigns letting people know that such money is often used for illicit activities—this has helped increase awareness about the methods terror groups use to raise funds. A fatwa was also issued saying that raising money for terrorism is the same as being a terrorist. And many prominent religious officials have condemned terrorism and worked hard to undermine support for terrorism and counter the intellectual or ideological justifications for terrorist activities.But the real problem is that we are talking about mostly small amounts of money and often cash, so it is incredibly difficult to regulate and prevent. Saudi Arabia is good at cracking down on terrorism, but the financing is incredibly hard to control. There are people who give money that gets diverted to other purposes and groups that use similar methods to collect cash.

DISADVANTAGES

Note: A frequent AFF response to disruptions in oil supplies is “markets will solve.” The card below can be used with lots of disadvantages to respond in Rebuttals to this AFF argument.

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

If the supply situation worsens, opportunities for this type of substitution will be fewer, creating supply bottlenecks, shortages of petrol and spikes within price spikes for different crudes and products, even when spare capacity remains. The price differential of about $15 a barrel that has built up between Brent crude, which more closely reflects global trade, and West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for oil prices in America, is a good example of how oil markets can become distorted by local patterns of supply and demand. If supply gets even more stretched, oil could fetch a far higher price in some parts of the world than others. If supply problems become really grave, oil companies may even declare *force majeure*, raising the prospect that, as in 1978, oil markets fail altogether.

1. Increased terrorism

Link: The US and Saudi Arabia have excellent cooperation against terrorism.

Impact: The world is safer from terrorism with Saudi Arabian cooperation than without.

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011 (Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School; previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London; has testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 12, 2011 “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#saudis>

This is one of the better relationships in the world on counterterrorism. The cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is strong and on the issue of terrorism the Saudis and Americans basically see eye to eye. There is also a regular exchange of information to help both countries prevent attacks. This was not the case for the first few years after 9/11, as Saudi Arabia did not fully appreciate the problem. But when violence started in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the relationship with the United States on terrorism improved markedly and quickly grew strong. Now there are programs to improve the security of Saudi’s energy infrastructure, training, officials share databases, photos, fingerprints, etc., and there is a great deal of cooperation on Yemen where there are Saudis hiding out and operating with AQAP. The relationship today shows how two governments can cooperate. If every country was willing to cooperate like Saudi Arabia, the world would be a much safer place. There are two things that are needed to fight terrorism—political will and capacity. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated both. Other countries haven’t. Saudi Arabia recognized that it was at risk of terrorism and then focused a great deal of attention on the problem.

Link: Saudi Arabia currently helps the US combat terrorism and is one of the best success stories for defeating terrorism.

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011( Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London, where he remains an associate fellow; has provided expert testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 12, 2011 “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE<http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf>

Fifteen of the nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers involved in the September 11 attacks were from Saudi Arabia. In the decade since 9/11, Riyadh has been credited as an invaluable partner to Washington in fighting global terror and as one of the world’s best success stories for how to defeat domestic terrorist activities through law enforcement, security and intelligence measures, education, and rehabilitation. Still, some Saudi nationals remain an important source of funding for terrorist networks despite Riyadh’s efforts to crack down on illicit financing.

Example: Saudi cooperation led to blocking a cargo package terror incident in Yemen, 2010

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

And the Saudis can do things in Yemen that Americans cannot. Saudis tipped off U.S. officials to the bombs concealed inside cargo packages destined for the United States in October 2010, demonstrating the good intelligence that Riyadh collects and shares with Washington. This averted what was likely to be a major attack.”

2. Loss of Saudi oil market stabilization

Link: Saudi Arabia is the second largest source of oil for the United States.

US Dept of Energy, Energy Information Administration 2011 (The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) is the statistical and analytical agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. EIA is the Nation's premier source of energy information and, by law, its data, analyses, and forecasts are independent of approval by any other officer or employee of the U.S. Government.) November 29, 2011 “Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries” U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ASSOCIATION<http://205.254.135.24/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html>

The top five exporting countries accounted for 69 percent of United States crude oil imports in September while the top ten sources accounted for approximately 88 percent of all U.S. crude oil imports. The top five sources of US crude oil imports for September were Canada (2,324 thousand barrels per day), Saudi Arabia (1,465 thousand barrels per day), Mexico (1,099 thousand barrels per day), Venezuela (759 thousand barrels per day) and Nigeria (529 thousand barrels per day).

Link: We can’t disengage from Saudis because they are key to moderating world energy prices and meeting global demand. Dr Ali Alyami, who advocates human rights reform in Saudi Arabia, nevertheless admitted in 2008:

Dr. Ali Alyami 2008. (PhD from Claremont Graduate Univ.; originally a native of Saudi Arabia, lived in USA since 1967; advocates for human rights reform in S.A. as Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia) Saudi Arabia: The Gathering Storm, Fall 2008 - Number 15 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/15/alyami.php>

And yet, complete disengagement is not an option, especially at a time when the Saudi monarchy is losing control at home and influence in the Gulf and globally. Given global demands for oil and the abundance of this commodity under the control of the House of Saud, the next U.S. administration will have to deal with Riyadh in some fashion, not only to protect what some have called “our largest single overseas private enterprise,” but to moderate world energy prices and to meet unprecedented global demands.

Link: Saudis take unilateral steps to stabilize oil prices

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011. (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (brackets in original) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

When oil prices rose steeply in early 2008, Saudi Arabia pushed production to peak levels unilaterally [i.e., without the approval of fellow members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)]. In response to the drop in global oil demand during 2008 and 2009 caused by economic contractions in consuming countries, Saudi Arabia led OPEC production cuts in an attempt to stabilize oil prices. At present, Saudi oil officials continue to signal their readiness to respond to market demand and maintain prevailing price levels amid the continuing unrest. This is largely viewed as a commitment to use spare capacity to increase output if necessary. In September 2009, Saudi Oil Minister Ali al Naimi said in an interview that, “We believe that around $75 [per barrel] is a fair price for the oil producer, the consumer.” In late 2010, he made similar remarks and gave an upper range of $90.

Impact: Oil price shocks hurt the US and world economy

Dr. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Kai-Wei Hsu 2012. (Chen - PhD economics; professor of economics at National Taiwan University; Hsu - economics department, National Taiwan University) Reverse Globalization: Does High Oil Price Volatility Discourage International Trade? Jan 2012, <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36182/1/MPRA_paper_36182.pdf>

It has been shown that the dramatic rise in oil prices during the 1970s was associated with subsequent economic downturns. Although there is some debate as to whether oil price shocks are the main cause of recessions, Hamilton (2009b) asserts that the latest surge in oil prices between June 2007 and June 2008 was an important factor that contributed to the economic recession that began in the US in 2007:Q4. Moreover, a number of recent studies show that oil price shocks have significant effects on a variety of domestic economic activities. An increase in oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a), Cologni and Manera (2008), and Lardic and Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.

3. Vulnerable Saudi oil facilities.

Link: The US is currently helping to protect Saudi Arabian oil.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13635972#.T4X51KtSTzM>

Despite their deepening political divide, the United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding defense ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to protect the kingdom's oil riches and future nuclear sites. The U.S. also is in discussions with Saudi Arabia to create an air and missile defense system with far greater capability against the regional rival the Saudis fear most, Iran. And it is with Iran mainly in mind that the Saudis are pressing ahead with a historic $60 billion arms deal that will provide dozens of new U.S.-built F-15 combat aircraft likely to ensure Saudi air superiority over Iran for years.

Link: Saudi Arabian oil facilities are vulnerable to attack.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13635972#.T4X51KtSTzM>

The Saudis' security worries were heightened by a failed al-Qaida car bombing in February 2006 of the Abqaiq oil processing facility, one of the largest in the world. The State Department cable said a subsequent U.S. assessment of Abqaiq security standards determined that it remained "highly vulnerable to other types of sophisticated terrorist attacks." That warning was conveyed to top Saudi officials on Oct. 27, 2008. "The Saudis remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy production facilities," the cable said. "They recognize many of their energy facilities remain at risk from al-Qaida and other terrorists who seek to disrupt the global economy."

Brink: Even the smallest disruption would have a large impact on supply.

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” (brackets added) THE ECONOMIST, <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

That is still a remote prospect and the upward march of the oil price seems to have paused for now. The crucial question is how much oil will be lost, and for how long. When oil markets operate at the limits of supply, even the smallest extra disruption has a disproportionate effect. On February 26th, for example, Iraq’s biggest refinery shut down after a terrorist attack. This and other assaults could knock out another 500,000 b/d [barrels per day] from the world’s fuel supplies. And if the raids on oil installations in previous elections in Nigeria are anything to go by, the next one, in April, may threaten another 1m b/d of supplies from west Africa. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia remains far from secure (see article). On March 1st the country’s stock market, jittery about the neighbors, plunged by 7%, a worrying sign that confidence is fading.

Brink: Saudi Arabia is the focal point of the global oil market.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 266.7 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia produced roughly 8.6 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil as of late December 2010, an increase over the prevailing level for most of 2009 and 2010, but well below the record high production of 9.7 million bpd in mid-2008. Saudi oil reserves, oil exports, and spare oil production capacity make the kingdom the focal point for the global oil market, and recent political unrest in the Middle East has contributed to market concerns and price increases. Saudi Aramco recently completed a multi-year, multi-billion dollar production capacity expansion project that raised its daily crude oil production capacity to 12.5 million bpd. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of December 2010, Saudi Arabia was the third largest source of U.S oil imports, about 1.1 million bpd of 11.1 million bpd gross U.S. imports, behind only Canada and Mexico.

Impact: Collapse of Saudi oil production = deep economic impact around the world

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A collapse of Saudi oil production would drastically affect global energy and the economic situation. The economic performance of national economies around the world would suffer, with some falling into deep recession.

Impact: Global economic downturn.

Gavyn Davies 2011 (Gavyn Davies is a macroeconomist who is now chairman of Fulcrum Asset Management and co-founder of Prisma Capital Partners. He was the head of the global economics department at Goldman Sachs from 1987-2001, and was chairman of the BBC from 2001-2004. He has also served as an economic policy adviser in No 10 Downing Street, an external adviser to the British Treasury, and as a visiting professor at the London School of Economics.) February 24, 2011 “How big is the 2011 oil price shock?” FINANCIAL TIMES BLOG<http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2011/02/24/how-big-is-the-2011-oil-price-shock/>

Each of the last five major downturns in global economic activity has been immediately preceded by a major spike in oil prices. Sometimes (e.g. in the 1970s and in 1990), the surge in oil prices has been due to supply restrictions, triggered by OPEC or by war in the Middle East. Other times (e.g. in 2008), it has been due to rapid growth in the demand for oil. But in both cases the contractionary effects of higher energy prices have eventually proven too much for the world economy to shrug off. With the global average price of oil having moved above $100 per barrel in recent days – about 33 per cent higher than the price last summer – it is natural to fear that this latest oil shock may be enough to kill the global economic recovery. But oil prices would have to rise much further, and persist for much longer, for these fears to be justified.

“Saudis can form other defensive alliances” - Response: No other country can defend Saudi Arabia - they’ve already tried

Dr. David Ottaway 2011. ( PhD in political science; Senior Scholar in the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Uncle Sam and the Saudi Split, FOREIGN POLICY, 23 Sept 2011 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/uncle_sam_and_the_saudi_split?page=0,1>

It is worth remembering that Saudi King Abdullah became so furious with President George W. Bush just before 9/11 that he wrote an angry letter warning that if Washington did not do something quickly to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Saudi Arabia intended to freeze its relations with Washington and go its own way. Bush scrambled to pacify the king, but the presence of 15 Saudis among the 9/11 hijackers so traumatized both countries that their relations effectively froze anyway. King Abdullah then cast about for other political and military partners that could replace the United States, engaging in an exchange of visits with the leaders of China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. But he soon discovered that none was likely, or even militarily capable, of coming to the kingdom's rescue the way the United States had done when Iraqi forces rolled across Kuwait to the Saudi border in August 1990.

“Saudis can defend themselves” - Response: Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself

Prof. David Lake 2012. (department of political science, Univ of Calif-San Diego) Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy, Mar 2012, <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeLegitimatingPowercirc.pdf>

As proven in 1991, despite billions of dollars of sophisticated weapons purchased from the United States, Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself against the regional forces potentially arrayed against it. This holds even more so for Kuwait, which was overrun by Iraq in one night, and the Emirates, which are equally vulnerable because of their tiny size.

4. Lost military hardware exports.

Link: Saudi Arabia is the largest US trading partner in the Middle East.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

Saudi Arabia remained the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2010. According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States were $31.4 billion (up from $22 billion in 2009 but below the 2008 figure of $54.8 billion) and U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia are estimated at $11.6 billion (up from $10.8 billion in 2009 but below the 2008 figure of $12.5 billion). Comparable 2010 figures for Israel, the second-largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were nearly $21 billion in exports to the United States and $11.3 billion in imports from the United States. To a considerable extent, the high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in the value of Saudi exports to the U.S. in recent years.

Brink: The US recently instituted a new arms deal with Saudi Arabia.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13635972#.T4X51KtSTzM>

Even so, Saudi Arabia has become one of Washington's most valued counterterrorism partners. It also is a top client for U.S. arms. When Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Riyadh in April, he reaffirmed U.S. intentions to proceed with the deal announced last fall to sell up to $60 billion in weaponry, including 84 F-15s and the upgrading of 70 existing Saudi F-15s. U.S. officials said the arms deal might be expanded to include naval ships and possibly more advanced air and missile defense systems. The Saudis want to upgrade their Patriot air defenses to the latest U.S. version, which can knock down short-range ballistic missiles in flight. And they have expressed interest in a more capable system designed to defend against higher-flying, medium-range missiles.

Impact: Lose 50,000 jobs and $3.5 billion annually.

David Jackson 2011 (USA Today Reporter) Updated December 29, 2011 “U.S. arms sale to Saudis: Jobs and a message to Iran” USA TODAY [(MrEarnestnameismisspelledEarnetintheoriginalatthefirstreference) http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/12/obama-team-makes-294b-arms-sale-to-saudis/1#.T4nfYqtSTzN](http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/12/obama-team-makes-294b-arms-sale-to-saudis/1#.T4nfYqtSTzN)

In announcing the new arms deal with Saudi Arabia, White House spokesman Josh Earnet said: "Valued at $29.4 billion, this agreement includes production of 84 new aircraft and the modernization of 70 existing aircraft as well as munitions, spare parts, training, maintenance and logistics." "These F-15SA aircraft, manufactured by the Boeing Company, are among the most sophisticated and capable aircraft in the world," Earnest said. Earnest also said in a statement: "This agreement will positively impact the U.S. economy and further advances the president's commitment to create jobs by increasing exports. According to industry experts, this agreement will support more than 50,000 American jobs, engaging 600 suppliers in 44 states, and providing $3.5 billion in annual economic impact to the U.S. economy. This agreement reinforces the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a strong Saudi defense capability as a key component to regional security."

5. More Iranian influence.

Link: The alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia is critically important to countering Iranian influence.

Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, Marissa Allison 2011 (Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. He has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies on the wars in those countries. He frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries. Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Alsis is a researcher at Military OneSource and a Burke Chair Intern at CSIS. He has a MA, International Studies, International Security; Middle East from the University of Denver. Marissa S. Allison, a History and Middle Eastern Studies graduate (2010) of the University of Mary Washington, was a research intern at the Palestine-Israel Journal in Jerusalem, and at a Baghdad Embassy virtual internship.) November 16, 2011 “US and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and Yemen” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-southern-gulf-arabia-and-yemen>

The Gulf is the strategic center of the competition between the US and Iran. The stability of the Gulf is critical to the global economy, as roughly 40 percent of the world’s oil trade is transported through the Strait of Hormuz, which at its narrowest point is just 21 miles wide. The US support for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in their broader competition with Iran is the fundamental relationship driving US-Iranian completion in the Gulf. The Gulf is a primary strategic economic, political, and military interest to the US, and this makes the de facto alliance between the US and the Southern Gulf states critical to the success of US competition with Iran. The US once depended on a “twin pillar” policy of allying with both the Saudis and the Iranian Shah to secure its interests in the region. The Iranian Revolution (1979) toppled the US-installed Shah, effectively ending this policy and established Iran as an adversary to the US-Saudi relationship. As a result, Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states have become critical partners in countering Iranian influence.

Brink: The United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is extremely sensitive.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13635972#.T4X51KtSTzM>

Saudi Arabia is central to American policy in the Middle East. It is a key player in the Arab-Israeli peaceprocess that President Obama has so far failed to advance, and it is vital to U.S. energy security, with Saudi Arabia ranking as the third-largest source of U.S. oil imports. It also figures prominently in U.S. efforts to undercut Islamic extremism and promote democracy. The forging of closer U.S.-Saudi military ties is so sensitive, particularly in Saudi Arabia, that the Pentagon and the State Department declined requests for on-the-record comment and U.S. officials rejected a request for an interview with the two-star Army general, Robert G. Catalanotti, who manages the project to build a "facilities security force" to protect the Saudis' network of oil installations and other critical infrastructure.

Impact: Terrorism and confrontation. Iran foments terrorism and confrontation in the region

Dr. Ariel Cohen and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation) Iran’s Menace in Azerbaijan, 16 Mar 2012 <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/03/16/irans-menace-in-azerbaijan/>

Iranians are not only operating terrorist networks on Azerbaijani territory, but are also allegedly behind the 2006 murder of RafikTagi, a prominent Azeri writer against whom an Iranian ayatollah issued a fatwa sentencing him to death. The third wave of anti-terrorist arrests since the beginning of the year is seen as a reprisal by Baku to signal to Iran to “play by the rules.” Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been steadily deteriorating as Azerbaijan continues to develop its ties to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States has been leading the effort to impose sanctions to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. It is possible that Iran is growing more wary and aggressive as sanctions start to bite. Azerbaijan is not the only country in the region that Iran targets. Iranian intelligence and its Hezbollah subsidiary recently conducted operations against Israeli targets in Tbilisi, Georgia, New Delhi, and Bangkok. According to some experts, Iran is wary of a major confrontation and wants to provoke Israel into smaller confrontations, because it needs an external threat around which it can organize its increasingly dissatisfied population.

6. End of the Petrodollar

Link: Affirmative removes US military protection from Saudi Arabia

Link: The “Petrodollar” arrangement. Saudi pricing of oil in dollars depends on US military protection

Jerry Robinson 2012 (Economist, holds a Bachelor's degree in Economics with Honors from the University of Tulsa. He has taught a course in macroeconomics at the college level. In addition, appeared on numerous TV and radio programs, including FoxNews, to discuss global economic topics. Robinson has been quoted by USA Today and other news agencies on the topic of the economy, and his columns have appeared regularly in numerous print and web publications) April 19, 2012 “Meet the System That Will Collapse the U.S. Dollar (Part 1)” FTM DAILY<http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/>

The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970’s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. In a series of highly secret meetings, the U.S. – represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to many commentators – and the Saudi Royal Family made a powerful agreement. According to the agreement, the U.S. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. What did the U.S. want in exchange? For Saudi Arabia to agree to price all of their oil sales in U.S. dollars and to then invest their surplus oil proceeds into U.S. Treasury Bills. This system was later referred to as “petrodollar recycling” by Henry Kissinger. The Saudis agreed and the petrodollar system was born.

Link: Petrodollar established the US dollar’s status as a world reserve currency

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

What saved the greenback after Nixon removed the U.S. dollar from the gold standard in 1971 — ending the post-war Bretton Woods international financial order — was the status of U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. This began with Saudi Arabia agreeing in 1973 to accept only U.S. dollars as payment for oil in exchange for U.S. protection of the Saudi monarchy and its oilfields. By 1975, the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar was firmly established, with OPEC members agreeing to trade only in dollars. Trading of other commodities came to be priced in dollars, which reinforced the reserve currency status of the dollar.

Link & Brink: Collapse of the dollar is closer than we realize as erosion of the dollar as a reserve currency happens while the federal debt grows

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

On March 29, the China Development Bank agreed with its BRICS' counterparts to eschew dollar lending and extend credit to each other in their own respective currencies. The erosion and loss of the use of the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency means less demand and more dollar selling by central banks around the world, which in turn causes inflation as the dollar weakens against other currencies. Worse, the demise of the dollar's reserve currency status at the same time that federal debt compounds to new heights creates a perfect storm, making a collapse of the dollar closer than most Americans realize.

Impact: $225 billion impact on US economy

Dr. Barry Eichengreen 2011. (PhD; professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley) Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End 1 Mar 2011 WALL STREET JOURNAL Foreign Exchange Report <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html>

Conversely, life will become easier for European and Chinese banks and companies, which will be able to do more of their international business in their own currencies. The same will be true of companies in other countries that do most of their business with China or Europe. It will be a considerable convenience—and competitive advantage—for them to be able to do that business in yuan or euros rather than having to go through the dollar.

Dr Eichengreen goes on to explain the impact on the U.S. economy:

Dr. Barry Eichengreen 2011. (PhD; professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley) Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End 1 Mar 2011 WALL STREET JOURNAL Foreign Exchange Report <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html>

In this new monetary world, moreover, the U.S. government will not be able to finance its budget deficits so cheaply, since there will no longer be as big an appetite for U.S. Treasury securities on the part of foreign central banks. Nor will the U.S. be able to run such large trade and current-account deficits, since financing them will become more expensive. Narrowing the current-account deficit will require exporting more, which will mean making U.S. goods more competitive on foreign markets. That in turn means that the dollar will have to fall on foreign-exchange markets—helping U.S. exporters and hurting those companies that export to the U.S. My calculations suggest that the dollar will have to fall by roughly 20%. Because the prices of imported goods will rise in the U.S., living standards will be reduced by about 1.5% of GDP—$225 billion in today's dollars. That is the equivalent to a half-year of normal economic growth. While this is not an economic disaster, Americans will definitely feel it in the wallet.

7. US National Security

The US cannot end its security ties with Saudi Arabia.

Anthony H. Cordesman 2010 (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS); received Dept of Defense Distinguished Service Medal; has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies ; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community ; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense ) September 14, 2010 “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-saudi-security-cooperation-and-impact-us-arms-sales>

The United States needs all the friends it can find in the Gulf. It faces serious uncertainties in reshaping its security posture in the region as its forces depart from Iraq. These include Iraq’s uncertain future political stance and government, the inability to predict Iranian actions and alignments, the uncertain outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and uncertainties surrounding the success or failure of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and Reshaping the U.S. Strategic Posture in the Gulf At the same time, several factors are clear. There is no possible “end state” to the U.S. presence in the Gulf nor an end to the need for the strongest possible U.S. security ties to Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the region.

8. Radical backfire. Pressuring Saudis to make more arrests runs the risk of radicalizing family members and creating more extremism

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

“Early on, however, Saudi Arabia realized that it did not want to make the same mistakes that Egypt and Syria made when too many people were arrested. Massive, unaccountable arrests run the risk that family members will be radicalized. Riyadh realized that it needed to reduce the impact of arrests and prove to the population that it was working to take care of them. The government and religious authorities worked to drive a wedge between extremists and the public by proving that extremists are not acting in the population’s best interests and funded disengagement and rehabilitation programs. Riyadh put all kinds of resources and money into this and has enjoyed some success, but the sheer amount of financial backing, resources, and top-level focus makes the programs hard to emulate in different countries.”

9. Saudis build nuclear weapons

Link: Affirmative removes security guarantees from the Persian Gulf region

Link: US security keeps nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia

Michael Miner 2011. ( teaching fellow at Harvard Univ.; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and International Society for Iranian Studies) 18 Dec 2011 “Strategic Clarity and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran” FRONTLINE <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/opinion-strategic-clarity-and-the-prospect-of-a-nuclear-iran.html>

Saudi Arabia represents the most likely state to begin a nuclear program in response to developments in Iran. Riyadh may not feel that a U.S. alliance is adequate enough defense on its own accord. With significant pressure from allies and increased security reassurances, these anxieties can be dealt with through political and economic policies. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and given substantial investment in the United States of Saudi assets, it seems reasonable that strategic alliances and guarantees would be adequate to keep nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia.

Brink: Saudi Arabia fears Iran getting a nuclear bomb and is considering building one of its own

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power”<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf> (brackets in original)

Speaking with Western researchers, a senior Saudi diplomat said in 2006 that the best way for the Gulf to respond to an Iranian nuclear capability would be “with another nuclear weapon.” “We are naked,” a Saudi prince recently complained. “We are surrounded by a country that already has a nuclear capability [Israel], and a country that is building it [Iran].”

Link: US partnerships in the Persian Gulf are key to deterring nuclear proliferation.

Anthony H. Cordsman 2010 (Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Cordesman has directed numerous CSIS study efforts on terrorism, energy, defense panning, modern conflicts, and the Middle East. He has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies on the wars in those countries, and he frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries. Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He also served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition, he served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Energy Department and as national security assistant to Senator John McCain.) September 14, 2010 “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-saudi-security-cooperation-and-impact-us-arms-sales>

Iran remains an emerging challenge. It is deeply involved in strategic competition with the United States and its friends and allies in the region. It is developing steadily better capabilities to attack shipping, targets in the Gulf, and targets on the Saudi and southern Gulf coast, and it is using asymmetric warfare in doing so. It is fielding significant long-range missile forces and may acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States is to deter other regional states from proliferation in reaction to Iran, and make its statements about offering “extended regional deterrence” a credible option, it must show it will do its best to create effective regional partners in the southern Gulf, as well as try to build a strategic partnership with Iraq.

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN 2011 (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) March 7, 2011 “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html>

Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know-how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used. It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.

Impact: Nuclear war. Saudi Arabia would deploy nuclear weapons not only for deterring war but for actually fighting one

Dr. Richard L. Russell 2010. (PhD; Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and Adjunct Professor of Security Studies in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University) “Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race” NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY 3rd Quarter 2010 <http://www.ndu.edu/press/middle-east-nuclear-arms-race.html>

Another key determinant for nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East is the desire for nuclear weapons to wage war. This view may be startling to observers who judge that nuclear weapons are only good for deterrence and not for warfighting. But the history of nuclear weapons development shows otherwise. The United States and its NATO Allies during the Cold War deployed nuclear weapons in Europe not as some grand deterrent bluff, but because they intended to use them if the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Western Europe with conventional forces. The United States and its Allies worried that Warsaw Pact forces outnumbered and outgunned NATO forces, so the Alliance would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to blunt a conventional invasion. Middle Eastern states will probably be making similar calculations. Saudi Arabia, for example, might come to think that the early use of nuclear weapons against Iranian forces invading through Kuwait would be wiser statecraft than letting those forces get an operational foothold in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where a largely Shia population is alienated from the Sunni Saudi regime and is sympathetic to Iran.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SOUTH KOREA

**(Megan McKinley contributed evidence to this brief)**

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

We need China, but we also need good relations with South Korea for dealing with North Korea.

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., and Scott A. Snyder 2010 (Pritchard - president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington; former ambassador for negotiations with North Korea and U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Tilelli - former commander in chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea. Snyder - adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS; MA from the Regional Studies–East Asia program at Harvard) 2010 “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula” THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS[http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdfhttp://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf)

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valuable ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain proliferation. It notes that China’s participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea’s dismantling its nuclear program rests on China’s willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes that robust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must underpin any efforts to deal with the North Korean problem.

First priority for US/S.Korea alliance should be: deterring North Korea

Admiral Michael McDevitt 2011 (Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, is Senior Fellow in the Strategic Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses; M.A. in American Diplomatic History from Georgetown University; former Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group Fellow at the Naval War College; former Director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush administration; served as the Director for Strategy, War Plans, and Policy for U.S. Pacific Command.) February 2011 “Deterring North Korean Provocations” THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE [(bracketshttp://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02\_north\_korea\_mcdevitt.aspxadded) http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02\_north\_korea\_mcdevitt.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02_north_korea_mcdevitt.aspx)

A good point of departure for thinking about the future is the classic adage commonly attributed to the medical profession’s Hippocratic Oath: first, do no harm. This suggests that the U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea/South Korea] alliance should carefully reexamine all policy, posture, and command changes that are currently planned or under discussion from the point of view of will the change either increase or undercut deterrence in the eyes of the North Koreans.

INHERENCY

China’s goal is to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Mike Shuster 2012 (journalist with NPR; part of the NPR News team to be recognized with a Peabody Award for coverage of September 11th and its aftermath. He was also part of the NPR News teams to receive Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Awards for coverage of the Iraq War (2007 and 2004); September 11th and the war in Afghanistan (2003); and the Gulf War (1992)) January 6, 2012 “Nations Want Korean Peninsula to Remain Stable” NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO[http://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stablehttp://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stable](http://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stable)

Stability. Stability has been the watchword since Kim Jong Il died on December 17th. The problem is stability means different things for different nations. China is probably the regional player that most wants things to stay exactly the same under his son, Kim Jong Un. Chinese leaders talk about economic reform for North Korea, but any sweeping changes in North Korean economic policy would mean uncertainty. That could spark disturbances inside North Korea: refugees streaming across the border into China, unpredictable events. The Chinese don't want unpredictable, says Young-ho Park, analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.YOUNG-HO PARK: For China and for the Chinese political leadership, it is their interest to keep the current North Korean system intact and to keep the current status of the Korean peninsula.

China is already working towards North Korean denuclearization.

Chris Buckley 2011 (Journalist) September 19, 2011 “China makes new push for North Korea nuclear talks” REUTERS[http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/19/us-china-korea-nuclear-idUSTRE78I0LH20110919http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/19/us-china-korea-nuclear-idUSTRE78I0LH20110919](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/19/us-china-korea-nuclear-idUSTRE78I0LH20110919)

China urged regional powers on Monday to restart moribund nuclear disarmament talks with North Korea, with its foreign minister Yang Jiechi defending Beijing as an honest broker seeking to defuse confrontation with Pyongyang. Yang made the call at a forum in Beijing to mark the sixth anniversary six-party talks, which offered North Korea economic and energy aid in return for dismantling its nuclear arms program and marked a high point for China as a broker on the world diplomatic stage.

US troops deter North Korea and serve as a symbolic message to Pacific allies.

Audrey McAvoy 2012 (Associated Press Journalist) March 9, 2012 “Panetta: U.S. keeping troops in South Korea” ARMY TIMES[http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-panetta-us-keeping-troops-in-south-korea-030912/http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-panetta-us-keeping-troops-in-south-korea-030912/](http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-panetta-us-keeping-troops-in-south-korea-030912/)

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Thursday that Washington needs troops in South Korea even amid budget cuts as a means to deter North Korea and to send a message the Asia-Pacific region is important to the U.S. Asked why it was necessary to keep U.S. troops in South Korea, especially since Seoul's military appears strong and the U.S. is under pressure to cut costs, Panetta said the U.S. is a Pacific power and will remain a Pacific power. "We maintain those forces not only for help and protection of South Korea but also as a force to indicate that the United States is going to always maintain a military presence in the Pacific," he told reporters during a visit to Hawaii. "We believe this is an important area economically, militarily, strategically and in terms of the allies that we have in this region, that are an important part of our Pacific family."

“South Korea cuts defense spending because they know the US will protect them” - Response: S.K. has been dramatically increasing defense spending since the ‘90s

Dr. J.J. Suh 2010 (Ph.D., political science, University of Pennsylvania. Associate Professor and Director of Korea Studies and Academic Advisor of the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. Former faculty member of Cornell University’s Department of Government, East Asia Program and Peace Studies Program; recipient of Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research, SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship for Peace and Security in a Changing World, Smith Richardson Foundation grant, and East West Center fellowship; was visiting professor at Seoul National University, research professor at Yonsei University, visiting scholar at MIT and visiting fellow at University of California, Irvine.) May 17, 2010 “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race” FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS [(“won” is](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race) [http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_racethe](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race) [http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_raceS. Korean](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race) [http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_racecurrency) http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_race](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race)

In the 1990s North Korea was having serious difficulties, which turned into a massive starvation and an economic crisis in the latter half. Its military spending too showed a marginal increase in the early 1990s, only to fall precipitously in the latter half. But Seoul continued increasing its military spending as if it were indifferent to the relative and absolute decline of the North’s power. The increase is all the more puzzling because it was maintained even as the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments pursued rapprochement with the North. The two liberal governments, in fact, tripled South Korea’s defense budget from 9.9 billion won in 1998 to 28.6 billion won in 2008, just when Pyongyang was struggling to survive.

DISADVANTAGES

1.Destabilizes region

Link: Strong coordination with S. Korea ensures regional stability and deters N. Korea

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., and Scott A. Snyder 2010 (Pritchard - president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington; former ambassador for negotiations with North Korea and U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Tilelli - former commander in chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea. Snyder - adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS; MA from the Regional Studies–East Asia program at Harvard) 2010 “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula” THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS[http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdfhttp://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf)

Strong alliance coordination with South Korea has ensured peninsular stability for more than five decades, initially in response to North Korea’s conventional threat and now in promoting a coordinated response to North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. While successfully deterring North Korea, the alliance also provided the political stability necessary for South Korea’s economic and political transformation into a leading market economy with a vibrant democratic political system. South Korea’s democratic transformation has allowed a more robust and enduring partnership with the United States that also applies to a growing list of regional and global security, economic, and political issues beyond North Korea.

Brink: North Korea is extremely aggressive and unpredictable.

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., and Scott A. Snyder 2010 (Pritchard - president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington; former ambassador for negotiations with North Korea and U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Tilelli - former commander in chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea. Snyder - adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS; MA from the Regional Studies–East Asia program at Harvard) 2010 “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula” THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS[http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdfhttp://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf)

The urgency of the threat is undeniable. North Korea possesses nuclear-weapon and missile capabilities, has threatened its neighbors, and has been willing to sell nuclear materials and technology to the highest bidder. Its reclusive leadership is unpredictable, something yet again underscored by the unprovoked destruction of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel, by a North Korean torpedo in late March 2010. Moreover, the future of its regime is uncertain, with the potential for a contested succession or breakdown of authority after the death of Kim Jong-Il.

Brink: Korea is at a key turning point, stability is the most critical goal

South Korean President Lee myung-Bak quoted by journalist Mike Shuster 2012 (Mike Shuster was part of the NPR News team to be recognized with a Peabody Award for coverage of September 11th and its aftermath. He was also part of the NPR News teams to receive Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Awards for coverage of the Iraq War (2007 and 2004); September 11th and the war in Afghanistan (2003); and the Gulf War (1992)) January 6, 2012 “Nations Want Korean Peninsula to Remain Stable” NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO[http://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stablehttp://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stable](http://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stable)

PRESIDENT LEE MYUNG-BAK: (Through translator) The situation on the Korean peninsula is now at a new turning point. But there should be new opportunities amid changes and uncertainty. Our most critical goal is the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.

SHUSTER: Stability. Stability has been the watchword since Kim Jong Il died on December 17th. The problem is stability means different things for different nations. China is probably the regional player that most wants things to stay exactly the same under his son, Kim Jong Un. Chinese leaders talk about economic reform for North Korea, but any sweeping changes in North Korean economic policy would mean uncertainty. That could spark disturbances inside North Korea: refugees streaming across the border into China, unpredictable events.

Impact: Turn Chinese cooperation (essential to managing N. Korea, see evidence above). Anything that risks status quo stability will be against Chinese policy

Mike Shuster 2012 (Mike Shuster was part of the NPR News team to be recognized with a Peabody Award for coverage of September 11th and its aftermath. He was also part of the NPR News teams to receive Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Awards for coverage of the Iraq War (2007 and 2004); September 11th and the war in Afghanistan (2003); and the Gulf War (1992)) January 6, 2012 “Nations Want Korean Peninsula to Remain Stable” NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO <http://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144777143/nations-want-n-korean-politics-to-remain-stable>

PRESIDENT LEE MYUNG-BAK: (Through translator) The situation on the Korean peninsula is now at a new turning point. But there should be new opportunities amid changes and uncertainty. Our most critical goal is the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.

SHUSTER: Stability. Stability has been the watchword since Kim Jong Il died on December 17th. The problem is stability means different things for different nations. China is probably the regional player that most wants things to stay exactly the same under his son, Kim Jong Un. Chinese leaders talk about economic reform for North Korea, but any sweeping changes in North Korean economic policy would mean uncertainty. That could spark disturbances inside North Korea: refugees streaming across the border into China, unpredictable events.

Impact: US economy depends on Asian stability.

Dr. Subhash Kapila 2011 (; a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, with a Masters in Defence Science (Madras University) and a PhD in Strategic Studies (Allahabad University) August 24, 2011 “South East Asia: Strategic Power Play And Regional Arms Buildup – Analysis” EURASIA REVIEW<http://www.eurasiareview.com/24082011-south-east-asia-strategic-power-play-and-regional-arms-buildup-analysis/>

The sea-lanes traversing the South East region carry 50% of the global trade and 33% of the world’s oil. More than 550 million people inhabit South East Asia and the regional economies total upwards of US $ 1 trillion. The economies of the United States and those of US allies like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan and Australia heavily depend on stability in South East Asia and more specifically the security of sea-lanes on which depends their trade and commerce and energy security.

2. Arms race

Link: US departure is likely to start an arms race in Asia.

Dr. Robert Kelly 2009 (assistant professor in the Political Science and Diplomacy Department of Pusan National University in Busan, Korea; PhD in political science from Ohio State University, with a specialization in international relations and political theory) December 18, 2009 “Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No” ASIAN SECURITY BLOG[http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/](http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/)

A US departure will touch off an arms race as regional uncertainty rises. Asia is not where Europe or Latin America are in terms of regional amity. The US presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of the local democracies. It is hard to see how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start competing for regional leadership, plus perhaps India and China, would help the US. The US could very well be pulled back in later. A US departure from Korea (and Japan next?) will be read as a clear victory for China in the Sino-US regional competition.

Brink & Impact: Asian countries are increasing arms sales and peace is jeopardized

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2010. (independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament; established in 1966, partially funded by the Swedish government; Wezeman is Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Arms Transfer program and has MA in Contemporary History, State University Groningen, Netherlands) 15 Mar 2010 “New SIPRI data on international arms transfers reflect arms race concerns” <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2010/100315armstransfers>

Indonesian, Singaporean and Malaysian arms imports have increased by 84 per cent, 146 per cent and 722 per cent respectively. Singapore is the first ASEAN member to be included in the SIPRI Top 10 arms importers since the end of the Vietnam War. Acquisitions of long-range combat aircraft and warships by these states have influenced the procurement plans of neighbouring states. SIPRI Asia expert SiemonWezeman notes that ‘In 2009, Viet Nam became the latest South East Asian state to order long-range combat aircraft and submarines. The current wave of South East Asian acquisitions could destabilize the region, jeopardizing decades of peace.’

Impact: Increased Asian defense spending increases the chance of war.

AMOL SHARMA JEREMY PAGE JAMES HOOKWAY RACHEL PANNETT 2011 (WSJ Reporters) February 12, 2011 “Asia's New Arms Race” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704881304576094173297995198.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704881304576094173297995198.html](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704881304576094173297995198.html)

The region's newly bristling arsenals have stoked concerns that more powerful militaries could lead nations to pick fights over long-held territorial grudges, threatening to destabilize an area whose waters carry much of the world's cargo containers and oil. "Little incidents could easily escalate into bigger incidents, and then little nasty wars," says Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks defense spending. China, to be sure, isn't the only catalyst for the arms buildup. Many Asian militaries delayed modernizing their armed forces because of the regional financial crisis in the late 1990s. Some countries are worried about threats from Islamist or separatist insurgencies. Others fear hostilities with longtime foes, such as India with Pakistan, and South Korea with North Korea.

3.Increased risk of war with North Korea

Link: The United States’ current cooperation with South Korea is preventing war.

Admiral Michael McDevitt 2011 (Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Senior Fellow in the Strategic Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses; M.A. in American Diplomatic History from Georgetown University; was the Director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush administration. He also served as the Director for Strategy, War Plans, and Policy (J5) for U.S. Pacific Command.) Feb 2011 “Deterring North Korean Provocations” THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE[http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02\_north\_korea\_mcdevitt.aspxhttp://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02\_north\_korea\_mcdevitt.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02_north_korea_mcdevitt.aspx)

In the first instance, potential aggressors are deterred by the prospect of having to endure unacceptable punishment in response to an aggressive act. In the second case, deterrence by denial, the potential aggressor is deterred because defenses are so good that the aggressor concludes that it could not achieve its political and military objectives through use of force. In Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance combines both of these approaches—a strong defense that can deny success, buttressed with the promise of overwhelming retaliation in the event of an invasion from the north. For either of these forms of deterrence to be successful what is threatened in response to aggression or a hostile act must be believable, or as it is commonly cast, must be credible. Credibility in turn, derives from a combination of military capability and a belief in the minds of North Korean leaders that the alliance has the political will to act. There is no doubt that the U.S.-ROK allies have the political will to respond to an invasion; hence the conditions necessary for a credible deterrent, capability and political will, are met.

Link: Cooperation between the US and South Korea strengthens nuclear deterrence.

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., and Scott A. Snyder 2010 (Pritchard - president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington; former ambassador for negotiations with North Korea and U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Tilelli - former commander in chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea. Snyder - adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS; MA from the Regional Studies–East Asia program at Harvard) 2010 “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula” THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS[http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdfhttp://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean\_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf)

A strong U.S.-South Korea alliance remains the foundation for coordination of policy toward North Korea. Both U.S. president Barack Obama and South Korean president Lee Myung-bak have agreed that their top policy objective vis-à-vis North Korea is its complete denuclearization. Their common goal is to promote a regional strategy that constrains North Korea’s destabilizing activities and counters the risks resulting from its nuclear and missile activities. In the wake of the ship sinking, the two administrations have worked particularly closely to forge bilateral and multilateral responses designed to strengthen deterrence and ensure that North Korea cannot engage in such provocations with impunity.

Brink: North Korea threatens to attack South Korea

The Associated Press 2012 (News Agency) April 24, 2012 “North Korea issues sharp military threat to South Korea” FOX NEWS[http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/24/north-korea-issues-sharp-military-threat-to-south-korea/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/24/north-korea-issues-sharp-military-threat-to-south-korea/](http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/24/north-korea-issues-sharp-military-threat-to-south-korea/)

North Korea's military warned Monday of imminent "special actions" that would reduce South Korea's conservative government to ashes within minutes, sharply escalating the rhetoric against its southern rival. The threat from the North's military leadership comes amid concerns that North Korea may be plotting another provocation in the wake of an unsuccessful rocket launch condemned by the U.N. Security Council as a violation of a ban against missile activity.

Impact: Korean War II would be devastating to South Korea and to world economy, even if S.Korea wins

DAVE BODEN 2011 (News-Tribune Journalist) January 16, 2011 “FACEOFF: Should the U.S. defend South Korea if it is attacked by North Korea?” NEWS TRIBUNE[http://www.newstribune.info/opinions/columnists/x1334357652/FACEOFF-Should-the-U-S-defend-South-Korea-if-it-is-attacked-by-North-Koreahttp://www.newstribune.info/opinions/columnists/x1334357652/FACEOFF-Should-the-U-S-defend-South-Korea-if-it-is-attacked-by-North-Korea](http://www.newstribune.info/opinions/columnists/x1334357652/FACEOFF-Should-the-U-S-defend-South-Korea-if-it-is-attacked-by-North-Korea)

Should conflict arise, military experts believe the South would prevail given its advantages in air and sea forces, as well as technology. But with a growing nuclear arsenal and heavy advantages in tanks and artillery -- which can easily shell the South’s capital city Seoul -- any such war would be a bloodbath and devastating not only to South Korea, which is the world’s 15th largest economy, but to the world economy as well.

Brink: War could break out on Korean peninsula at any minute without warning

Impact: Tens of thousands of casualties

David Wood 2011 (David Wood was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for his reporting on conflict, national security and foreign affairs; has lectured at the Marine Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College and the Army's Eisenhower Fellows conference, and has appeared on CNN, CSPAN, the PBS News Hour, and on BBC and National Public Radio.) 2011 “Deliberate or Accidental, a New Korean War Would be Devastating” POLITICS DAILY<http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/11/23/deliberate-or-accidental-a-new-korean-war-would-be-devastating/>

A war on the Korean peninsula could explode almost without warning, senior U.S. military officers say. North Korea's immediate, if suicidal, intent in such a conflict: to demolish Seoul in a blizzard of glass shards and cause tens of thousands of casualties, before U.S. and South Korea forces could react. That is why millions of people living in Seoul regularly practice scrambling into bomb shelters in subway stations -- and why any disruption in "normal'' relations with the reclusive and unpredictable regime to the north quickly gets the world's attention: a surprise attack from the North, whether deliberate or a miscalculation, would be bloody and costly, and likely would trigger all-out war.

Impact: North Korea would likely use weapons of mass destruction in a war.

Dr. Jennifer Lind 2012 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Master’s in Pacific International Affairs from the University of California, San Diego, and a B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Lind has worked as a consultant for RAND and for the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, and has lived and worked in Japan.) April 12, 2012 “Why North Korea Gets Away With It” FOREIGN AFFAIRS[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137399/jennifer-lind/why-north-korea-gets-away-with-it?page=showhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137399/jennifer-lind/why-north-korea-gets-away-with-it?page=show#](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137399/jennifer-lind/why-north-korea-gets-away-with-it?page=show)

But even though Pyongyang would lose this war, no one wants to fight it, either. North Korea can still inflict terrible pain on South Korea (and possibly, with its ballistic missiles, on nearby Japan). The city of Seoul, home to more than ten million people, lies well within range of North Korean artillery. North Korea’s leaders know that a second Korean war would be an existential war -- that neither the regime nor they themselves would survive a defeat -- and so they would have an incentive to use every weapon in their arsenal, including weapons of mass destruction. Is North Korea so crazy that if CFC carried out an act of limited retaliation, the country would start a war that would end in its own certain destruction? No one wants to find out.

4.We Lose South Korea as an ally

Link: South Korea doesn’t want us to leave.

Dr. J.J. Suh 2010 (Ph.D., political science, University of Pennsylvania. Associate Professor and Director of Korea Studies and Academic Advisor of the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. Former faculty member of Cornell University’s Department of Government, East Asia Program and Peace Studies Program; was visiting professor at Seoul National University, research professor at Yonsei University, visiting scholar at MIT and visiting fellow at University of California, Irvine.) May 17, 2010 “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race” FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS[http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_racehttp://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_race](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race) [Brackets in original]

This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance: “The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.”

Brink: Pulling troops out would cause the US to lose South Korea as an ally.

Dr. Robert Kelly 2009 (Robert Kelly is an assistant professor in the Political Science and Diplomacy Department of Pusan National University in Busan, Korea. He received his PhD in political science from Ohio State University, with a specialization in international relations and political theory.) December 18, 2009 “Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No” ASIAN SECURITY BLOG <http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/>

It also means that the US will lose SK as an ally, because without the troops, they’ll feel, rightfully, that the US abandoned them. It would be nice to assure SK security without the ground forces, but US infantry on the ground (the USFK logo above) sends a much greater signal of commitment than air and sea power. SK will slide into China’s orbit if the US leaves. It’s already edging that way now. If America bails, it loses them. It is correct that SK no longer needs us to win a second Korean war though. So after unification, US retrenchment from Asia would be more possible and likely. But if America sticks with the Koreans through these difficult times, it will have them as good allies long into the future.

Link: More Chinese influence, less US credibility

Dr. Robert Kelly 2009 (Robert Kelly is an assistant professor in the Political Science and Diplomacy Department of Pusan National University in Busan, Korea. He received his PhD in political science from Ohio State University, with a specialization in international relations and political theory) December 18, 2009 “Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No” ASIAN SECURITY BLOG [(brackets](http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/) [http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/added) http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/](http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/)

If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that we are weak and that we are leaving Asia generally. Yes, this is the credibility argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan debates. But the world sees US power today as wavering; we are the tottering giant, especially in Asia. If we leave during the GWoT, [global war on terror] that image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia.

Link: More Chinese influence leads to the decline of US strength.

Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu 2011 (Tony Tai-Ting Liu - Doctoral Student at Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Assistant Editor at Review of Global Politics (Journal) Chung Hsing University in Taichung, Taiwan- M.A. University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, Canada - B.A. Hung Ming-Te- Doctoral Candidate of Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung-Hsing University) 2011 “Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia: China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy Transformation since 9/11” POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sino-US-strategic-competition1.pdf>

China remains a riddle for the US, as Washington needs Beijing’s support and cooperation on issues such as North Korea, anti-terrorism and climate change, yet Washington continues to be anxious and remains watchful over China’s intention to establish a new world order (Art, 107 2010). A new world order entails the decline of US political and economic influence in the world, possible changes to the Bretton Woods system and the sharing of power with at least another great power (China). As the so called G-2 proposal fell short due to China’s reluctance to enter into the partnership, the US has reasons to speculate over Beijing’s intentions (Lu, 2010: 299).

Impact:Risk of global conflicts. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com,[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids\_friend\_goliath](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath%20)<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

Loss of Credibility Impact: Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy

George Kourous 2000. (masters thesis for Master of Arts, International Affairs, Center for International Studies, Ohio Univ) SHADOW BOXING: International Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://shadowboxing.kourous.net/2.international.pdf>

The image of the last American helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975 made an indelible impression upon U.S. officials, who worried that America’s failure had worked “to weaken [allies] and embolden...adversaries,” one analyst observes. “[T]he effect was to raise serious doubts about the credibility of American power.” Kissinger later lamented that “[t]he collapse in 1975…ushered in a period of American humiliation, an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe, and pervasive insecurity, instability, and crisis.” And ten years after the fall of Saigon, Richard Nixon wrote that the defeat in Vietnam paralyzed America’s will to act in other Third World trouble spots and therefore encouraged aggression...Over the next five years, Soviet clients and proxy forces unleashed a geopolitical offensive that led to stunning reversals for the United States in virtually every region of the world, [for example] the fall one by one of Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. As Washington’s national security establishment mulled over its failure in Vietnam, the post-Watergate presidency of James Carter tried to chart a foreign policy course that did not assume the inviolability of U.S. commitments as its underlying principle, but which instead sought to substitute a sort of “moral credibility” for the conventional notion of credibility. For many the results proved disastrous and, unsurprisingly, when global events appeared to indicate an increased threat to U.S. interests, the pressured administration quickly returned to more familiar strategies.

5. Weakens South Korean Army

Link: Ending the alliance would compromise the South Korean army’s readiness and disrupt their military equipment

Dr. J.J. Suh 2010 (Ph.D., political science, University of Pennsylvania. Associate Professor and Director of Korea Studies and Academic Advisor of the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. Former faculty member of Cornell University’s Department of Government, East Asia Program and Peace Studies Program; recipient of Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research, SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship for Peace and Security in a Changing World, Smith Richardson Foundation grant, and East West Center fellowship; was visiting professor at Seoul National University, research professor at Yonsei University, visiting scholar at MIT and visiting fellow at University of California, Irvine.) May 17, 2010 “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race” FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS[http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_racehttp://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\_to\_race\_the\_us-korea\_alliance\_and\_arms\_race](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race)

Second, if the alliance were terminated, it could potentially disrupt the flow of parts and materials, causing an incalculable disaster in equipment maintenance and production that might even compromise the ROK army's readiness. The work of many of Korea's defense contractors would grind to a halt as Korea failed to obtain necessary parts. Many U.S. contractors would lose customers. These secondary costs are difficult to estimate but are frequently used as a reason for maintaining the alliance. Typifying such justifications, Hwang Tong-Jun, Director of the Weapons Systems Research Center, has argued that, despite the need to diversify the sources of weapons imports, "we need to focus on our cooperation with the U.S., which has developed over the past 20 years and which has sustained weapons interoperability."

Link & Impact: South Korean military equipment is key to their ability to win a war against the North, because the North has a bigger army

Jeremy Laurence 2012 (Reuters Journalist) January 4, 2012 “North Korea military has an edge over South, but wouldn't win a war, study finds” THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR[http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0104/North-Korea-military-has-an-edge-over-South-but-wouldn-t-win-a-war-study-findshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0104/North-Korea-military-has-an-edge-over-South-but-wouldn-t-win-a-war-study-finds](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0104/North-Korea-military-has-an-edge-over-South-but-wouldn-t-win-a-war-study-finds)

The Seoul-based Korea Economic Research Institute said in a report that in 2011 North Korea operated a 1.02-million-strong army and a record number of tanks, warships and air defense artillery. Total military personnel strength is 1.2 million. "The depressing reality is it would not be entirely wrong to say North Korea's military strength is stronger," the institute said. "We need to remember that the North is far superior in terms of the number of troops, and especially the North's military is structured in its formation and deployment with the purpose of an offensive war." But analysts say that even though the North's army far outnumbers the combined South Korean and US troop levels, the North's forces would stand no chance of winning a war because their equipment was vastly inferior.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: WAR POWERS

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY / NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Now is not the time to change war powers - the political process we have now is fine

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

HARMS

NO PROBLEM WITH PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS

Historical claims of Presidential excess don’t hold up: Military interventions have either been authorized by Congress or else they were not situations requiring a declaration of war

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” (Note: AUMF = a congressional vote of Authorization for Use of Military Force) <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the post-9/11 struggle against al Qaeda and its allies were formally authorized by AUMFs (joint resolutions or statutes) from Congress – a practice recognized as lawful by the Supreme Court for more than two centuries. President Truman repeatedly asked to address a joint session of Congress about Korea and had the State Department draft an AUMF, but ultimately acquiesced when congressional leaders told him he had authority to act under the Constitution and the U.N. Charter and urged that he “stay away from Congress.” The lesser examples that have been cited, like covert assistance to the non-Communist factions in Angola and Nicaragua, do not come close to constituting situations in which a declaration of war would have been deemed appropriate when the Constitution was ratified and such instruments were in use. Specific covert wars may or may not be wise policy; but they are not unconstitutional.

Participation in international peacekeeping doesn’t require Congressional approval

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

When the Senate consented to the ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, and Congress approved the UN Participation Act (UNPA) later that year, it is absolutely clear that they believed that international peacekeeping operations did not infringe upon their power "to declare War" and recognized instead that this was the business of the President. The unanimous report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urging ratification of the Charter, quoted by the unanimous report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the UNPA, argued that "enforcement action" pursuant to an order of the Security Council "would not be an act of war, but would be international action for the preservation of the peace," and reasoned: "Consequently, the provisions of the Charter do not affect the exclusive power of the Congress to declare war." During the final day of Senate consideration of the UNPA, an amendment offered by Senator Burton Wheeler requiring prior congressional approval before the President could send U.S. armed forces into harm's way, pursuant to a Security Council decision to use force to keep the peace, was denounced by the bipartisanship leadership as contrary to our Charter obligations and the President's well-established independent constitutional powers to use armed forces short of war for various reasons. In the end, the amendment received fewer than ten votes.

Small deployments of forces by the President should not be usurped by Congress

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to declare War," which was intended to be a veto or check against an adventurist President who might seek to take the nation from peace to war over some political or economic grievance or from a desire for personal fame and conquest. As an exception to the President's general grant of the new nation's "executive Power," the congressional check was to be construed narrowly. The Framers well understood the concept of "force short of war," and throughout our history presidents have deployed U.S. armed forces into harms way to protect American citizens and their property, to enforce treaty obligations and rights, and to deter misconduct by other countries. Even if one concludes that Congress still has a check on large-scale, prolonged commitments of U.S. armed forces into hostilities, it does not follow that the power to declare war permits Congress to usurp the Commander-in-Chief power concerning military deployments that do not even arguably constitute the initiation of "war."

Secret military operations are sometimes necessary and justified

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

In other cases, like Pakistan in the current conflict with al Qaeda, permission for U.S. involvement may be contingent upon secrecy because the leadership of the host state might pay a severe political price domestically if its consent to American military activities within its territory were made public. Foreign states sometimes condition cooperation with, or assistance to, the United States upon strict secrecy because they do not wish to offend other nations – as with France during the American Revolution and Canada during the rescue of American embassy employees from Tehran during the Carter administration. There is nothing about acting covertly that is inherently immoral or illegal.

THE UN CHARTER (a treaty the US signed and ratified that authorizes member states to commit military forces to aid a UN member)

House & Senate have already said they have no problem with the President taking military action under the UN Charter

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf> (brackets and ellipses in original)

When the U.N. Charter was pending before the Senate, a question arose about whether the provisions of the treaty authorizing the Security Council to commit military forces provided by Member States under Article 43 agreements to hostilities (an arrangement that was never implemented) would infringe upon the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. The unanimous report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found to the contrary:

Preventative or enforcement action by these forces upon the order of the Security Council would not be an act of war but would be international action for the preservation of the peace and for the purpose of preventing war. Consequently, the provisions of the Charter do not affect the exclusive power of the Congress to declare war. The committee feels that a reservation or other congressional action . . . would also violate the spirit of the United States Constitution under which the President has well-established powers and obligations to use our armed forces without specific approval of Congress.

This language was quoted with favor in the similarly unanimous report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommending passage of the United National Participation Act (UNPA), which also explained:

The basic decision of the Senate in advising and consenting to ratification of the Charter resulted in the undertaking by this country of various obligations which will actually be carried out by and under the authority of the President . . . . [T]he ratification of the Charter resulted in the vesting in the executive branch of the power and obligation to fulfill the commitments assumed by the United States thereunder . . . .”

President is authorized to act under the UN Charter, because he enforces the law and the Charter is a treaty, therefore it’s a law, therefore it justifies his actions

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” (ellipses in original) <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution obligates and empowers the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and Article VI declares, inter alia, that “all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .” Ergo, as Marshall observed during the Jonathan Robbins debate, the executive branch is “the proper department to be entrusted with the execution of a national contract” like the Jay Treaty or the U.N. Charter.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Constitutional power to declare war doesn’t mean very much - does not imply that Congress must approve before military engagements

Herbert Lawrence Fenster 2012.(attorney, practiced in Washington, D.C., and Denver, Colorado, for over fifty years, primarily in the field of government contract law) “The Great War Powers Misconstruction” JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/The-Great-Powers-Misconstruction.pdf>

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, referred to as the Declaration Clause, is frequently cited as vesting Congress with its authority, but it is actually of very limited importance in defining the powers and responsibilities of the two political branches. It has been invoked only eight times in our nation’s 235-year history. But we have had several hundred military engagements of various sizes and shapes. Possibly, the foundational problem with the clause is that, being declarative only, it is inherently meaningless and little more than a repetition of the equally meaningless provision that had been included in the Articles of Confederation. What is most troublesome about the clause is the persistent attempts to give it meaning by the inference that it is essential for any military undertaking by the nation. The 1973 War Powers Resolution implies just such authority. This is plainly not the case nor is it likely that the Framers ever considered that its invocation was a prerequisite to military engagements. We should know this because it was clear that the military engagements that were anticipated by the Framers were most likely those initiated by state militias or engagements at sea for the protection of sea lanes.

Congress’ power to “Declare War” is only referring to offensive or aggressive, all-out wars. Declaration of war isn’t necessary for limited military action

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

It is important to keep in mind that when James Madison moved on August 17, 1787, to reduce the power to be given to Congress in the new Constitution from “make war” to “declare war,” he chose a term of art from the law of nations that had a well-understood meaning. Declarations of war were associated with large-scale perfect wars in which “one whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war, are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other”; and formal declarations were only considered necessary for all-out “offensive” (what we would today call aggressive) wars. Things were different in that era. Sovereign states had a recognized right to resort to armed force for any purpose – to acquire territory or conquer a neighbor, or perhaps just to impose “justice” or obtain satisfaction for a perceived wrong. States were not expected to declare war when they were acting defensively or when their goals were more limited – i.e., when they were engaging in “self-help” measures or other uses of “force short of war.”

“Declare War” clause is an anachronism because we signed a treaty (the UN charter) agreeing we would never resort to war as defined by the law of nations

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

During the twentieth century, the world community outlawed the use of force as an instrument of national policy – first, in theory, by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty, and later with an (admittedly imperfect) enforcement mechanism, when the U.N. Charter entered into force in 1945. Article 2(4) of the Charter clearly prohibits any use of force that previously, under the law of nations when the Constitution was ratified, might arguably have required a declaration of war, and no nation has issued such a declaration since the Charter was ratified. Put simply, the power of Congress to declare war is as much an anachronism today as the power conveyed in the same sentence to “grant letters of marque and reprisal,” which will be discussed below.

The “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” clause doesn’t limit the President

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

It was these “general” letters of marque and reprisal, authorizing private ship owners to arm their vessels and seize the ships and subjects of an enemy state on the high seas, that Elbridge Gerry had in mind on August 18, 1787, when he moved that the powers given Congress include the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal – an apparently uncontroversial action that produced no record of a debate. There is no serious evidence that the Framers intended by this clause to vest in Congress a negative over every use of force short of war, as letters of marque and reprisal were by 1787 a very specific type of authorization for private ship owners to engage in certain otherwise unlawful actions against specified targets on the high seas. Even in those nations that conferred virtually all “war powers” on the King, the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal was reserved to the legislative branch.

Presidents deploying troops in harms way is not a recent issue, it’s happened >200 times in US history

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, The Constitutionality of Covert War: Rebuttals <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/The-Constitutionality-of-Covert-War-Rebuttals.pdf>

The practice of Presidents sending troops into harm’s way without legislative sanction to protect American lives or defend our interests has occurred more than two hundred times throughout our history, and did not begin in 1950. Virtually every situation Professor Lobel complains about since then was defensive in character, often carrying out commitments established by the U.N. Charter or other treaties. While there are often risks that such operations might escalate into major hostilities, a policy of weakness and vacillation might also lead to armed conflict (e.g., Munich in 1938). Providing covert training and military equipment to paramilitary forces in response to armed international aggression does not require a declaration of war, and Professor Lobel’s suggestion that Congress should have instead declared war against the Soviet Union over Afghanistan is truly bizarre.

The Constitution has no clear answer: We should stop debating war powers and instead debate the merits of specific military action

James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton 2011. (Baker was secretary of state from 1989 to 1992. Hamilton is a former Democratic representative from Indiana) June 10, 2011 Breaking the war powers stalemate WASHINGTON POST, (ellipses in original) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/breaking-the-war-powers-stalemate/2011/06/08/AGX0CrNH_story.html>

Stuck in the middle are the American people, particularly our soldiers in arms. They would be best served if our leaders debated the substantive issues regarding the conflict in Libya — and those of Afghanistan and Iraq — rather than engaging in turf battles about who has ultimate authority concerning the nation’s war powers. There is, unfortunately, no clear legal answer about which side is correct. Some argue for the presidency, saying that the Constitution assigns it the job of “Commander in Chief.” Others argue for Congress, saying that the Constitution gives it the “power to . . . declare war.” But the Supreme Court has been unwilling to resolve the matter, declining to take sides in what many consider a political dispute between the other branches of government.

FOUNDING FATHERS’ INTENT/INTERPRETATION OF WAR POWERS

Founding Fathers agreed: Presidential power is not just response to “Sudden Attacks.” No constitutional violation if President sends troops abroad without notifying Congress - Jefferson did it and Congress didn’t complain

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY, The Constitutionality of Covert War: Rebuttals <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/The-Constitutionality-of-Covert-War-Rebuttals.pdf>

As for citing Framers, Hamilton drafted much of Article II. “Repel sudden attacks” was an example of ways in which the President might need to use force defensively. Jefferson’s cabinet unanimously agreed to send two-thirds of the U.S. Navy to the Mediterranean with instructions to sink and burn their ships if the Barbary Pirates had declared war against us, and Jefferson did not formally notify Congress for nearly nine months – at which time no one in Congress complained, and Hamilton argued that legislative sanction was “unnecessary” in that setting. Jefferson was hardly responding to “sudden attacks.”

Presidential power to send forces to war is supported by 2 centuries of constitutional history

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

American Presidents have sent military forces into harm’s way without congressional authorization more than 200 times, often engaging in hostilities, and in most cases without visible signs of significant congressional concern. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: “The United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this country – over 200 times in our history – for the protection of American citizens or national security.” During the Carter administration, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel observed:

Our history is replete with instances of presidential uses of military force abroad in the absence of prior congressional approval. This pattern of presidential initiative and congressional acquiescence may be said to reflect the implicit advantage held by the executive over the legislature under our constitutional scheme in situations calling for immediate action. Thus, constitutional practice over two centuries, supported by the nature of the functions exercised and by the few legal benchmarks that exist, evidences the existence of broad constitutional power.

Pres. Thomas Jefferson deployed military forces overseas and notified Congress 6 months later (they read about it in the newspapers before Jefferson notified them)

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

It is important to keep in mind there was no “sudden attack” or even reasonable likelihood that any Barbary state was considering attacking the United States – and no need for urgency (since the squadron did not leave for more than two months). Yet Congress was not even officially informed of the deployment for more than six months (although legislators certainly read about it in the newspapers), and when it was finally reported there were few if any complaints from Capitol Hill that the President had exceeded his constitutional authority. Sadly, Jefferson’s overly deferential (indeed, quite misleading) description of the deployment in his first State of the Union message has confused many scholars. It is true that Congress (at Jefferson’s urging) in subsequent years enacted several statutes approving the use of force, but they were neither sought nor enacted until months after Jefferson had sent most of the U.S. Navy into harm’s way.

Early Congressional actions illustrate original understanding of war powers: They often delegated broad discretion to the President and accepted military actions that were not explicitly authorized

Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, Thomas J. Nicola 2011. (Legislative Attorneys with Congressional Research Service) 8 Sept 2011 “Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41989.pdf>

Early exercises of Congress’s war powers may shed some light on the original understanding of how the war powers clauses might empower Congress to limit the President’s use of the Armed Forces. In the absence of a standing army, early presidents were constrained to ask Congress for support in advance of undertaking any military operations. Congress generally provided the requested support and granted the authority to raise the necessary troops to defend the frontiers from deprivations by hostile Indians and to build a navy to protect U.S. commerce at sea. Congress, in exercising its authority to raise the army and navy, sometimes raised forces for specific purposes, which may be viewed as both an implicit authorization to use the forces for such purposes and as an implicit limitation on their use. On the other hand, Congress often delegated broad discretion to the President within those limits, and appears to have acquiesced to military actions that were not explicitly authorized.

Founders intended to give the President control of the military, with only strictly construed limitations

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2012. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY “Covert War and the Constitution: A Response” <http://www.jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Covert-War-and-the-Constitution-a-Response.pdf>

By vesting the nation’s “executive Power” in the President, the Founding Fathers intended to convey the general control of the nation’s diplomatic, political, and military relations with the external world – subject to some very important “negatives” vested in the Senate or Congress. One of those negatives was that the President could not use whatever military forces Congress made available to initiate what today would be called a major aggressive war (a use of force subsequently outlawed by international law). But as exceptions to the general grant of power to the President, these negatives were to be “construed strictly.” Presidents have used “force short of war” both overtly and covertly hundreds of times since at least the days of Jefferson, and until recently Congress has seldom seriously complained. The President needs the approval of two-thirds of the Senate to make a treaty and a majority of both houses of Congress to raise and equip military forces or provide money for operations.

Long American tradition: Presidents have been sending forces to battle since Washington and Jefferson

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

Without any congressional approval, presidents have sent forces to battle Indians, Barbary pirates and Russian revolutionaries; to fight North Korean and Chinese communists in Korea; to engineer regime changes in South and Central America; and to prevent human rights disasters in the Balkans. Other conflicts, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war, received legislative “authorization” but not declarations of war. The practice of presidential initiative, followed by congressional acquiescence, has spanned both Democratic and Republican administrations and reaches back from President Obama to Presidents Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington.

INHERENCY

Power of the Purse: Congressional funding authority is adequate to block Presidential war power

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

Congress’ check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.

Afghan war shows the process is working as the Framers intended

Prof. Charles Tiefer 2011. (Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan; Professor, University of Baltimore Law School) Can the President and Congress Establish a Legislative Veto Mechanism for Drawing Down a Long And Controversial War? March 2011 (brackets added) <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=charles_tiefer&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dfunding%2520%2522war%2520powers%2522%2520%2522power%2520of%2520the%2520purse%2522%2520veto%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D7%26ved%3D0CEQQFjAG%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fworks.bepress.com%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1001%2526context%253Dcharles_tiefer%26ei%3DqzGeT4m-EYiy0QXfotz1Dg%26usg%3DAFQjCNE1W41DKtPVBa78n8AH2YkT4VwvDg#search=%22funding%20war%20powers%20power%20purse%20veto%22>

As noted above, however, the Secretary Rumsfeld’s “light footprint” doctrine left the way open for the return of the Taliban as an insurgency. That insurgency, being too much neglected during the Bush Administration, took deep root. As presented in the 2010s, the war had entered its second decade, now cast as a long-term counterinsurgency – not what the public and Congress could have expected during the three days of the AUMF’s [Authorization for Use of Military Force in response to 9/11] consideration in 2001. If Congress sought, and the President supported, a drawdown schedule and/or a concurrent resolution mechanism, they used their shared war powers in a way the Framers would have approved.

Congressional votes of funding are formal consent to military operations and war

Mark Levin 2011. ( attorney, served in the administration of President Ronald Reagan and was a chief of staff for Attorney General Edwin Meese) “Mark Levin on Presidential and Congressional War Powers” <http://iusbvision.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/mark-levin-on-presidential-and-congressional-war-powers/>

When members of Congress vote to fund these activities, they are giving their formal, official consent to the operations. More than voting to declare war, they are actually voting to fund war — all kinds of war. Interestingly, in most of the cases in which Congress has formally declared — which is World War II — there was never any doubt that the president would use all possible military force to protect the nation, and Congress would fund it, even without any declarations. The declarations were not used as constitutional requisites for war, but to rally the nation and assert our resolve. But once Congress has funded a military operation, and it funds virtually all of them, it is undoubtedly helping to make war for without the funds there can be no war.

Congress has power to end operations that are started with general revenue funding - they just aren’t interested in doing so

Mark Levin 2011. ( attorney, served in the administration of President Ronald Reagan and was a chief of staff for Attorney General Edwin Meese) “Mark Levin on Presidential and Congressional War Powers” <http://iusbvision.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/mark-levin-on-presidential-and-congressional-war-powers/>

What of military operations launched by a president where the president uses funds already appropriated by Congress before the operations began, but which were approved for general national security purposes — that is, where Congress has not actually voted on funding a particular operation? Without question Congress has the power to withhold appropriations or defund operations, if it can muster enough votes to overcome a presidential veto. Congress rarely does so, although most notably in ending the Vietnam War. Congress has the power to enforce its decisions by impeaching a president and removing him from office should he continue to prosecute military operations after it has formally acted to end them. Hence, comparisons between the president and a monarch are ridiculous. These are very powerful tools, should Congress decide to use them. However, even now, when the president has directed military operations in Libya, is Congress even considering cutting off funding? What about the Republican majority in the House? No. But there is no question that congressional authority respecting war powers is significant, which distinguishes our system from many, including a monarchy.

SOLVENCY

Congressional paralysis: Politics makes congressmen afraid to take stands on war controversies, they want the President to do it

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) (ellipses in original) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.

Incompetent Congressional enforcement: We know from experience that Congress will retroactively approve military actions that succeed and condemn actions that fail, regardless of whether the President complied with War Powers limitations

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 (ellipses in original) <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

Space does not permit a full discussion of this phenomenon, which is just as well as I have dealt with it extensively in two books on the War Powers Resolution. But compare the reaction of Congress to President Ford's rescue of the crew of the *S.S. Mayaguez* in Cambodia during May 1975 with President Carter's failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages from Iran four years later. In the Mayaguez rescue, President Ford flagrantly violated not only the War Powers Resolution but also several specific statutory prohibitions on using appropriated funds for combat operations by U.S. armed forces "in or over or from off the shores of . . . Cambodia." But the operation was a success, and it received strong support from the American public. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee responded by unanimously passing a resolution praising the rescue and falsely asserting it was conducted "within the framework of the War Powers Resolution." In contrast, President Carter's rescue attempt failed, so the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Foreign Relations Committee held a press conference denouncing the President for violating the War Powers Resolution, and other Members of Congress suggested the President should be impeached.

Political games: Congress inserts loopholes and ambiguity so they can declare the President’s actions “illegal” later if something goes wrong

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

As much as we might like to think that the recent murderous attacks on our nation have finally brought us together and put the divisiveness of Vietnam behind us, a careful reading of the authorizing statute passed overwhelmingly by Congress on September 14 leaves some doubt. In addition to the repeated references to the War Powers Resolution, the President is authorized to use not "necessary" force, but "necessary and appropriate" force. This is not boilerplate language for declarations of war or other statutory authorizations for the use of military force. It sounds instead like the kind of ambiguous, equivocal terminology that someone might slip into a statute, so that if the President's overwhelming popularity at present slips in the future, or something goes wrong in the struggle against terrorism, legislators will be able to absolve themselves of all complicity by proclaiming that the President's conduct of the war was "inappropriate" and thus "illegal."

DISADVANTAGES

1. Signs of weakness.

Link: Withdrawal of troops could be a sign of weakness

Impact: Encourages international armed aggression

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

As Commander in Chief, the President is charged with so disposing of the resources placed under his command by Congress as in his judgment are most likely to protect American interests and maintain peace. While it may be argued that sending thousands of U.S. troops to South Korea at the request (or with the consent) of that country's government might ultimately lead to war-if, for example, China or North Korea were to decide to attack those forces-the reality is that virtually every movement of U.S. forces could encourage war. Indeed, it is absolutely clear that President Truman's decision to withdraw U.S. military personnel from South Korea in 1949 was a major factor in North Korea's decision to invade South Korea the following June. Indeed, modern history strongly suggests that signs of American weakness and vacillation are far more likely to result in armed international aggression than signs of strength.

2. Setting Dates for Withdrawal

Link: Setting dates for withdrawal is unreasonable and enables our enemies. Professor Robert Turner in 2005 gives two historical examples, one hypothetical - imagine if Congress had set a date for withdrawal after Pearl Harbor -- and one real, the US Marine engagement in Lebanon in 1983.

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

One of the points on which there was no apparent discord at the Federal Convention in Philadelphia was that Congress had no role in the actual conduct of military operations. They were given only a "veto" over certain kinds of commitments, leaving to the President such decisions as where to deploy troops, when to attack or redeploy troops, and when to bring them home. As Locke explained, such decisions are heavily dependent upon the behavior of external actors, and it would have been foolish for the President to declare in advance that U.S. forces would be withdrawn on a given date irrespective of those realities. Imagine the reaction of Franklin D. Roosevelt had Congress demanded a withdrawal deadline before it would consider authorizing the President to defend the United States following Pearl Harbor? Once they knew the artificial date on which the United States would withdraw, opponents of a peace settlement in Beirut would be able to orchestrate their strategy for maximum advantage. For much of the press and many Americans, the issue no longer became whether the United States should assist the parties in an important Middle Eastern country to resolve differences and achieve peace, but whether the President was "above the law." Legislation to authorize the President to continue the deployment led to more partisan debate, and the Washington Post noted that the active involvement of Senate Democratic Campaign Chairman Lloyd Bentsen in the debate suggested that "the Democrats are doing push-ups" for the 1984 elections. Marine Corps Commandant P.X. Kelley became so concerned about the partisan debate that he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the partisan debate could "encourage hostile forces or forces inimical to the best interest, the life and limb of the Marines." General Kelley warned that "hostile forces would use this as an opportunity to up the ante against our Marines."

Impact: American servicemen die. Unfortunately General Kelley was right: Our enemies in Lebanon acted because of Congressional meddling

Prof. Robert F. Turner 2005. (U. of Virginia Law school; taught International Law at the U.S. Naval War College; veteran of two Army tours in Vietnam; was national security adviser to Senator Robert P. Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism? 15 Feb 2005 <http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-war-powers-resolution-an-unnecessary-unconstitutional-source-of-friendly-fire-in-the-war-against-international-terrorism>

All of this partisan bickering was not lost on radical states in the Middle East, and the Syrian Foreign Minister announced that the United States was "short of breath." The message had also not escaped radical Muslim militia members in Beirut, and in October U.S. intelligence intercepted a message between two terrorist units saying: "If we kill 15 Marines, the rest will leave." Inadvertently, by its partisan debate and repeated pronouncements that further Marine casualties could provoke another debate and a withdrawal of funds for the deployment (such legislation had already been reported out of a key House subcommittee), in their partisan effort to invoke the War Powers Resolution, Congress had essentially placed a bounty on the lives of American forces. The rest is history. Early on the morning of Sunday, October 23, 1983, a Mercedes truck loaded with highly-sophisticated explosives drove into the Marine Corps compound at the Beirut International Airport and exploded. America's terrorist enemies had capitalized on the congressional signals of weakness by murdering 241 sleeping marines, sailors, and soldiers-more Marines than had been lost on any single day since the height of the Vietnam War in 1968 and more American military personnel than had been killed in the Gulf War, Grenada, Haiti, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, and all other military operations since Vietnam until the September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon.

3. Policy Paralysis.

Link: Alexander Hamilton explained that we need the President to have power to conduct war because he can act decisively to protect the country

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) (ellipses in original) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

The most important of the president’s powers are commander in chief and chief executive. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in *Federalist 74*, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.” Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. ... It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”

Impact: Foreign policy paralyzed as high-stakes foreign threats grow

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

The framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action—sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances—that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’ loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow.

Impact: Inaction and isolationism by Congress can threaten national security

Prof. John Yoo 2012. ( professor at the Univ of Calif.-Berkeley, School of Law; worked in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel in the G.W. Bush Administration) War Powers Belong to the President 1 Feb 2012, ABA JOURNAL (journal of the American Bar Association) <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>

Congress’ track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’ isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism.